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This thesis examines the role of the Labour MP George N. Barnes (1859-1940) in the 
establishment of the International Labour Organisation in 1919. It focusses primarily on 
the creation of the Labour Convention (Chapter XIII, the ‘Labour Chapter’ in the 
Treaty of Versailles) and its adoption by the Peace Conference. It has been recorded 
that Barnes considered this his proudest achievement; however Labour Party 
historiography has not adequately taken account of his valuable contribution to the 
advance of social and economic justice for the world’s workers.  By examining the 
challenges Barnes faced in his dual role as representative of British organised labour 
and plenipotentiary with the British Empire Delegation, the argument is made that he 
was particularly well suited to successfully steer the Convention through to its 
adoption. An understanding will be gained of the role that Barnes played as an 
international diplomat and spokesman for organised labour in the Peace Conference 
setting, and how he channelled contemporary ideas about labour’s place in the post-war 
world through his approach to policy. It is further argued through examination of his 
background, beliefs and political ideology that Barnes was an important figure of whom 
historians of the early Labour Party should take more account. This project aims to 
provide fresh insight into George N. Barnes as a trade unionist and politician and 
ascertain how his work in Paris helped Britain’s ‘socialist’ Labour Party achieve an 
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 In the spring of 1919, George N. Barnes steered the Labour Convention for the 
International Labour Organisation through thirty-six sittings of the international Labour 
Commission, securing its adoption by the plenary Peace Conference for insertion into 
the Peace Treaty. Labour Party histories have often considered this his proudest 
achievement, but no monograph exists in relation to his diplomatic work at Versailles. 
Although the trade unionist Barnes was instrumental in the Labour Party’s creation, 
relatively little is known him about and the historiography tends to focus on his stint as 
Labour member of the David Lloyd George Coalition, 1917-1920, unfairly 
characterising him as ‘right-wing’ for his support of the war and separation from the 
Party in 1918. The thesis questions why Barnes as a figure for Labour Party study has 
been overlooked despite his long career in trade unionism and public life.   
 This study undertakes exploration of Barnes’ role in the International Labour 
Organisation’s creation, examining how he influenced the British plan for reorganising 
industrial relations after the first world war. One of the first twenty-nine Labour Party 
members to enter Parliament in 1906, Barnes became a plenipotentiary with the British 
Empire Delegation in 1919, leading the British delegation to the International Labour 
Commission during the Peace Conference. Was Barnes’ work during in Paris 
instrumental in the acceptance of moderate socialism by international institutions, and if 
so, to what extent?  The thesis argues that Barnes was a key figure in Labour Party 
history during an important phase in the development of international relations. Did his 
prominence on the world stage affect the Labour Party’s appearance of fitness to 
govern? How did a politician who started out as a trade unionist and socialist in the 




the war’s end?  What particular strain of socialism did Barnes identify with, and what 
made his approach distinctive?  How did his national policy ideas translate to the 
international sphere? Answering these and other questions will contribute to greater 
understanding of an important Labour Party figure, and a key phase in the evolution of 
its ideas. 
 The starting point for this thesis was the hypothesis that Barnes has been 
overlooked or underestimated in many Labour Party histories. During study as an 
undergraduate and Master’s Degree student of British politics and history with emphasis 
on the Labour Party, it was observed that the name ‘George Barnes’ peppered the 
literature but little was said about him. On those occasions that his work with the ILO 
was mentioned, little emphasis or detail was offered. The primary focus in the 
historiography seemed to be on his 1896-1908 leadership of the Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers (‘ASE’), his portrayal as an ineffectual Party chairman, 1910-11, or his 
wartime and post-war affiliation with David Lloyd George. Why did Barnes elect to 
stay in the Coalition Government when the Labour Party he helped to create left it in 
1918?  For this, Barnes has sometimes been depicted as a ‘class collaborator’ who 
betrayed the Independent Labour Party’s pacifist-socialist ethos, but no one has studied 
in-depth the political ideology and the philosophical underpinnings of this interesting 
British socialist, someone that went from being one of the ILP’s founders to become an 
international diplomat. George N. Barnes bridged the ideological gap between the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, witnessing important changes to the organised 
labour movement throughout his life.   
 Barnes’ personal papers were lost during the Blitz in 1940, and the full-length, 




destroyed after the Peace Conference.  Research for this project has also shown that the 
civil service had a hand in taking some of Barnes’ Paris papers from circulation in the 
early nineteen-thirties. He may therefore have been overlooked as a figure for study 
owing to the outward appearance of a lack of raw source material. Curiosity and 
perseverance, however, led to a wealth of information about Barnes, so much in fact 
that it is wholly feasible to produce a full biography. It is hoped that this work will 
inspire further discussion and research into some of the more elusive early Labour Party 
members and aspects of the Party’s history which have not been fully explored, 
particularly during the years leading up to the formation of their first Government in 
1924.  
Barnes: from domestic to international politician   
 Another area to contemplate regarding Barnes’ ideological and political 
trajectory is the effect and causes of ‘the international turn’ in the context of his own 
socio-political awakening, and how his policies may have been shaped as a result. 
Glenda Sluga’s Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism
1
 and Nation, Psychology, 
and International Politics, 1870-1919
2
 provided excellent and interesting insights for 
this discussion and are deserving of more coverage than space allows. Barnes was 
already a political figure during the ‘apogee of Empire’
3
 when nationalism was at its 
peak, ultimately leading to mass militarisation and total war. In Barnes’ case, his 
involvement with the ILO’s inception was arguably one way for him to personally 
repair his legacy as a voice for the working classes, given some of his unfortunate turns 
in domestic British politics, which are discussed below. Nationalism and 
                                                 
1
 US: 2013, University of Pennsylvania Press) ‘Sluga Internationalism’ from here) 
2
 UK: 2006 Palgrave Macmillan (‘Sluga Psychology’ from here) 
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internationalism, conceptually and linguistically, were often in conflict and competition 
with each other, until a ‘new’ internationalism became increasingly representative of 
modernity and progress during the 1890s in particular. This phenomenon is evident 
from parsing man of Barnes’ speeches and recollections; his British pride is 
unmistakeable as he simultaneously champions the benefits of all nations and people 
embracing a globalised mindset. While he shared many of the aims of the First and 
Second International, particularly through the notion of greater workers’ solidarity, his 
language retained a national and moral character that set it aside somewhat from the 
class-based ethos of them.  
 The transition from the ‘national’ to the ‘international’ that pre-dated the war ran 
on several tracks: there was a global ideological consensus developing, symptomatic of 
growing world sentiment about the ethical relationship between the State and an 
expanding mass representation/broadening democracy from a working class 
perspective, and of a civilised, ‘international society’ from the middle-class/liberal elite 
aspect.  Technological advances were the confirming ‘facts’ about internationalism: 
electricity, news and mail services, telegrams and wireless communications, along with 
railways, canals, ocean vessels, were breaking down borders, creating opportunities for 
social and economic advance: Barnes often referred to similar ’facts’ of man’s social, 
scientific and philosophical evolution.  As an engineer and a Communitarian Christian 
socialist, Barnes also held such advances as confirmation of mankind’s natural yearning 
for mutual, benevolent cooperation. He was in agreement with many others who 
contemplated a greater international mentalité, and potential for peace through this 
global interconnectedness at the time. Members of the liberal elite such as Nicholas 




law. Harold Butler (Barnes’ close companion in the Labour Ministry and co-worker on 
the ‘British scheme’ as it came to be known) described it as “the habit of thinking of 
foreign relations and business in such a way as to inspire friendly and cooperative 
relations.”
4
 Barnes’ allegiance to Christian communitarian socialism during the 
progressive era of social reform in London’s poorest communities mirrored wider, 
universally held sentiments that drew so many of the socially excluded to the 
international movement.  First-wave feminists, as Sluga pointed out, were compelled by 
the international because they were denied the legal and political rights that men could 
enjoy. Racial matters also became increasingly extra-national during this period (despite 
lasting national prejudices which were often argued through economic concerns, as 
minutes of the British Empire Delegation discussed in Chapter 5 disclose).
5
 Sluga’s far-
ranging work clearly indicated how numerous, widespread and lingering contemporary 
ideas about identity, power and place overlapped and transcended the national sphere 
into the international – and back again - as the nineteenth century verged onto the 
twentieth as Barnes’ political awakening also dawned.  
 The thesis also examines how Lloyd George’s selection of Barnes to lead the 
British labour delegation to Paris presented the potential for him to re-establish himself 
as a champion of workers’ interests on the international stage after years of tumult on 
the domestic front. Considering some of the turbulence and disappointment Barnes 
faced through 1918, the appeal of the potential Paris appointment takes on greater 
significance. The following chapters examine how Barnes brought his ideas about 
domestic industrial policy to the world stage as he also evolved personally, a move 
which arguably fulfilled his vision for ‘home rule to industry’ with the tremendous 
                                                 
4
 Sluga Internationalism, p.31 (fn) 
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bonus of restoring his reputation as a fighter for working class interests in the world 
stage.  
 As the Labour Commission took shape, the lines between the national and the 
international, and between industrial matters and matters of high diplomacy, were 
frequently overlapping and often blurred. At the time, all of the delegations to the Peace 
Conference were dealing with this phenomenon in their own way, making up new rules 
for the ‘new’ internationalism while yet upholding ages-old tenets of pre-war ‘national’ 
ideas and practice at the same time. Barnes synthesised his role as a spokesperson for 
labour and his Government as he promoted the British labour scheme, promoting British 
primacy on the world stage while to large extent re-inventing himself as an international 
figure in the process.  
 A number of Labour Party personalities followed a similar trajectory. They 
experienced struggles domestically, often at times with the labour forces they were 
meant to represent, and at others with their own leadership, very much as Barnes did. 
Perhaps most conspicuously one might consider Barnes’ contemporary Arthur 
Henderson.
6
 Henderson was at continual odds with Ramsay MacDonald whether 
Labour was in power or opposition, yet he was consistently involved in guiding the 
Party’s direction, its policies and its expansion as a mass party before and during the 
war. He was chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party (1908–10, 1914–17), 
president of the Board of Education (1915–16), and in the first Coalition Government 
was Paymaster General (1916), and member of the war cabinet (1916–17). Henderson 
was also the central author of Labour’s 1918 manifesto, Labour and the New Social 
                                                 
6
 Arthur Henderson, PC (1863-1935) First Labour cabinet minister, Labour Party leader three times; PLP 
chairman, 1908; President of the Iron Founders’ c. 1910; Party treasurer from 1912; Chairman of the 




Order, which contained the famous line ‘by hand or by brain’ that came to define the 
Party as that of the working classes, and  also the middle classes – ‘by brain’.
7
 However 
Henderson came under fire for not supporting domestic labour forces at certain times as 
Home Secretary during the first Labour Government (1924), much as Barnes had 
throughout his domestic career. Although not a labour minister, Henderson was always 
involved in industrial relations while Home Secretary, and was castigated for not being 
unsympathetic to striking policeman who had essentially ‘downed tools’ by refusing to 
provide their service to the community (Barnes often held a similar opinion about 
strikers, particularly when they defied decisions regarding settlements), asserting that he 
could do little aside from opening a minority-led special inquiry. Henderson’s public 
remarks also drew ire from the Clydesiders - a parallel and recurring theme during 
Barnes’ early political career - and he was eventually forced to climb down from his 
position.
8
 The desire to act like a ‘national’ and not a ‘class’-based Government is 
attributed as a major reason for Henderson (as well as Clynes and Shaw) supporting the 
Whitehall view on a number of issues relating to labour and unemployment bills.
9
 
Wrigley emphasised how links between the TUC and the Ministry of Labour  weakened 
throughout 1924, and how Henderson’s support for invocation of the Emergency 
Powers Act, et al., made it difficult for the Labour Party in opposition to criticise the 
Baldwin Government’s tactics during the General Strike of 1926.
10
  
   The Labour Party under MacDonald viewed foreign policy as the key to 
restoring Britain’s economic prosperity, and as the focus on better relations with Russia 
                                                 
7
 The Labour Party, Labour and the New Social Order:  a report on reconstruction (London: 1918 Labour 
Party Press), pp.4-5; see also Rt. Hon. A. Henderson, The Aims of Labour (as above, 1919), et al.  
8
 Chris Wrigley, Arthur Henderson (Cardiff :1990 GPC Books) (‘Wrigley’ from here), pp.144-6 
9
 Wrigley, p.147 
10




became the priority, it was natural for Henderson, who had been a key figure in the 
Second International, to become Foreign Secretary. From 1929 Henderson, an avid 
supporter the League of Nations, also worked to moderate Franco-German problems 
during that second Labour government. Yet Henderson proved to be a weak leader of 
the Labour Party after 1931 when the critical financial crises dealt a death blow to 
MacDonald’s second government and caused the failure of the National Government he 
headed. From 1932 until his death Henderson was president of the World Disarmament 
Conference, and he was awarded the 1934 Nobel Peace Prize. It bears mentioning that 
Barnes also had his problems with MacDonald, but before Labour came to power in 
1924 his ‘divorce’ from the Labour Party in 1918, not to mention his strong alignment 
with Lloyd George, protected him from Labour’s internecine and extra-parliamentary 
turbulence (these phenomena are discussed more completely in the chapters that 
follow). After the war, Henderson arguably found greater ‘success’ in the international 
sphere than the domestic much as Barnes had done, although this is not to discount 




 A combination of experience, opportunity and ideological beliefs in response to 
contemporary political and social circumstances combined to underlie the ‘national to 
international (and sometimes back again)’ shift(s) that Barnes underwent along with 
other Labour Party members: much the same was true of Ramsay MacDonald. It is 
important to note that while Barnes was unique in many ways, he was not alone and he 
stood at the convergence of multiple threads of ‘international’ thinking before as well as 
after the war. His transition from domestic to world politician was buoyed by these 
                                                 
11
 One may also wish to consider the cases of Roy Jenkins and David Miliband, Labour Party members 
who, many years later, also shifted from the domestic to the international realms, albeit under vastly 




philosophical observations, along with his belief in benign, beneficent state structures 
and effective administrative processes, as examination of his time serving on the Labour 
Commission demonstrates in the chapters that follow.    
 The thesis’ chronology begins with an investigation of Barnes’ early life and the 
influences upon his introduction to trade unionism, socialism, and political activity 
centred on industrial relations and progressive social reform. He later adjusted to the 
role of international diplomat easily, and is featured in a number of paintings depicting 
the Treaty’s signing in Versailles’s Hall of Mirrors; he appears relatively casual, leaning 
on a plinth in Sir James Guthrie’s Statesmen of World War I (1924-30).
12
 During 
research for this project in Geneva, the unlabelled portrait of Barnes by Murray 
Urquhart was unexpectedly discovered during a walk through the ILO building.
13
 Yet 
Barnes remained humble, writing ‘I have been able to do things by my being in the right 
place at the right time. After all, there is an element of luck in life and I have been 
lucky.’
14
  Instead of writing a memoir about his Peace Conference experience or 
keeping a daily journal as was conventional, he chose instead to speak publicly on the 
work of the ILO after he retired. While this is an example of his preference for live, 
practical exposition, it also represents another reason for a dearth of literature about his 
Peace Treaty accomplishments.  
 Barnes’ work with the British Empire Delegation was intrinsically tied to his 
Labour Commission role, and a hefty tome from Barnes in the vein of those of David 
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 Sir James Guthrie (1859-1930), Statesmen of World War I hangs in London’s National Portrait Gallery; 
also see John Christen Johansen (1876-1964),Signing of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), and William 
Orpen (1878-1931) The Signing of Peace in the Hall of Mirrors, Versailles, 28 June 1919 (1919). Orpen 
also painted a portrait, The Right Honourable G. N. Barnes, PC (1919).   
13
The painting’s plaque was missing; ILO Archive staff were unable to locate it. Murray Urquhart (1880-
1972), The Rt Hon. G. N. Barnes (year unknown).   
14





Hunter Miller’s or David Lloyd George’s might have provided tremendous insights on a 
range of Peace Conference themes from his unique perspective. One can not ponder too 
heavily on what might have been. Late in life Barnes wrote about the ILO, his time on 
the Labour Commission, and the Labour Charter in an interesting series of editorials for 
the AEU monthly journal, not long before he fell into a coma.
15
  The columns were 
informative and entertaining, capturing well Barnes’ casual eloquence. According to his 
final May 1938 column he was preparing another piece on the ILO since 1919, but 
found it was beyond him, writing ‘I find it is beyond me. I must leave it to younger men 
to carry the story on…’
16
 
 Barnes never strayed far from his roots in Christian communitarian socialism 
during his work to advance worker’s reform, and this ethos coloured his policy 
decisions before, during and after the war. Chapter one depicts a class-free political 
ideology that could be described as ‘One Nation Labour.’ In his 1923 memoir, he gave 
advice to the Labour Party with a nod to the historical materialism of Marx, a man he 
greatly admired. The Party’s rise as a political entity, he wrote, proved that ‘the 
economic theories of the last century have been discarded as socially, as well as 
morally, and even economically, wrong, and the thinkers of all classes are agreed that 
the highest possible standard of living for the mass of the people is the ideal to be aimed 
at by the makers and administrators of laws.’
17
 However he also criticised the party 
under MacDonald for being stuck in its own past, too reliant on slogans and 
propaganda, and in danger of being overtaken by self-interested, extremist individuals 
in the trade unions especially. Some months before the formation of its first 
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 Barnes, ‘The I.L.O.’, April 1938, and ‘The Labour Charter’, May 1938, A.E.U. Monthly Journal 
16
 Ibid, ‘The Labour Charter’, p.193 
17




Government, Barnes presciently warned them to quickly modernise to meet the 
challenges ahead:  
I have seen freedom broadening down to the class in which I was born and 
bred and which I have tried to serve… a danger, at the moment, as it seems 
to me, is in Labour allowing itself to be politically over-ridden and 




The weakness of the Labour Party is not that it lacks the ability to govern, 




Barnes had mixed emotions when writing about his former colleagues four years after 
leaving them. However he was hopeful about Labour’s future, and his eternal emphasis 
on ‘practical’ politics was explicit in the memoir’s closing lines: ‘I believe that it will 
yet settle down to practical business on the basis of actual facts in the world which we 
live, and use its political power to steer the cause of Labour into the main stream of the 
Nation’s life. That is its mission.’
20
  
 The thesis begins with a discussion of the primary sources and archives that 
have been drawn on for this project, including the missing ‘Barnes papers’ that directly 
informed it and provided inspiration for future research. Chapter one explores important 
biographical aspects of Barnes’ life and career prior to the Peace Conference and the 
Labour Commission’s formation, making the argument that although his ‘awakening’ 
came in the nineteenth century he ably bridged the transition to the twentieth, retaining 
his core ethical and socialistic beliefs and applying them to find solutions to modern 
problems. It is important to recognise that inaccurate analysis of Barnes’ political 
ideology has led to a substantial failure of understanding, depriving the literature of an 
                                                 
18
 Barnes, FWWC, p 295; Stanley Baldwin fought the general election of December 1923 on the doomed 
platform of tariff reform, and with explicit Liberal support Labour formed its first minority Government 
in January 1924, lasting a mere ten months.  
19






early Labour Party figure who was integral to the development of their ideas, something 
this thesis aims to address. It must be stated that while a seeming lack of sources 
available to researchers in Britain may have contributed to inadequate information about 
Barnes and his ILO work, there is a great deal of information to be gleaned from a wide 




 The thesis’s chronology begins in chapter two with an examination of how he 
worked as a member of the War Cabinet, and how he attempted to influence the 
Government to declare its labour policy before the announcement of the Peace 
Conference, discussing how he used both official and unofficial channels to that end. 
What was his involvement with the earliest drafts of the British ILO scheme in London, 
and what challenges did he face upon arriving in Paris?  This is determined though 
examination of how he utilised the people and resources at his disposal during the 
chaotic preliminary Peace Conference period. Another important question chapter two 
asks is how and to what extent was Barnes able to include British organised labour’s 
input for the scheme, and what forces ultimately determined whether he succeeded or 
failed in that mission. Chapter three then introduces new conflicts and challenges for 
Barnes to navigate with the formation of the International Labour Commission (‘Labour 
Commission’ or ‘Commission’), emphasising how the complications that came through 
the appointment of the head of the American Federation of Labour (‘AFL’) as its 
President affected his role. 
                                                 
21
 Apart from the Columbia University’s special collections as discussed, the New York Public Library 
network proved a surprising source for a number of rare books, records and microfilm thought exclusive 




 Chapters four and five further examine how Barnes handled the problems 
involved in designing a ‘treaty’ for world labour that impinged upon long-standing 
ideas about national sovereignty, democracy and constitutionality. These chapters also 
prompt questions about how quickly the world was changing right after the war, and 
whether the Peace Conference’s attention to industrial relations and working-class 
welfare signified a true paradigm shift, or merely represented a continuation of a 
process already underway. Along those lines, the thesis also asks how women fared in 
the short- and longer-term from the Labour Convention’s creation, considering how 
Barnes managed their requests for inclusion in the process. Some of the most salient 
phases of Barnes’ involvement with the Labour Convention came after its final drafting 
and the Labour Commission having officially disbanded, so chapter five examines how 
Barnes prevented its detractors from boycotting it or losing it in the vast shuffle of Paris 
committee papers. A final epilogue chapter touches upon several aspects of Barnes’ 
ILO-relevant work that may exceed this particular project’s remit yet still support the 
general argument that he has been discounted in the historiography. Then, a summary of 
this thesis’ findings and final conclusions follows. The study ultimately illustrates how 
Barnes advanced working class demands for raised industrial standards in his way, and 
that for this reason there is potential for further research into the life and work of this 
progenitor of the Labour Party as it is known today. 
 The draft Labour Convention for the International Labour Organisation became 
Chapter XIII of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919 comprising Articles 387 
through 427. Article 427 comprises the nine points (or clauses) of the ‘Labour Charter’ 
as it has been commonly described.  For reference, Chapter XIII is reproduced in the 




Convention. The Labour Charter’s original nineteen points is also reproduced, 
juxtaposed against the ‘Balfour redraft’ for comparison. Chapter XIII was not the only 
section of the Treaty dealing with labour matters, therefore Article 312 of Chapter X, 
Section VIII, pertaining to social and State insurance in ceded territory is also included 




Primary sources: The Mystery of the ‘Barnes Papers’ and Shotwell’s Origins of 
the International Labor Organization 
 As stated, Barnes has remained an under-researched British Labour Party 
figure, partially owing to his personal archive being lost in 1940 when his Brixton 
home was destroyed. A small amount of personal memorabilia that has survived is held 
at the LSE Archive in London, donated by a descendent several decades after his 
death.
1
 There is still a good deal of information about both his personal life and 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary work to be gleaned, albeit fragmentary and 
scattered. The absence of a complete Barnes archive provoked some sleuthing which 
revealed unexpected sources providing further evidence that much about his political 
record remains undocumented. This included comparative research of British, 
American and Swiss resources which provided further evidence of Barnes’ prominence 
in the early development of the ILO. 
 Barnes was mentioned throughout James T. Shotwell’s all-encompassing two-
volume work Origins of the International Labor Organization (1934: ‘Origins’), which 
provided inspiration for further research.
2
 It has been recorded by Shotwell that the 
British delegation’s original stenographic minutes and hand-written notes of the Labour 
Commission were destroyed shortly after the Peace Conference.
3
  During an interview 
in 1930, Barnes’ personal secretary G.M. Hodgson attested to burning the bulk of his 
Paris papers ‘to avoid leakage’ before returning the rest to the War Cabinet.
 4,5
 Volume 
II (‘Documents’) of Origins faithfully reproduced the official British record of the 
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thirty-four Labour Commission sittings held at the National Archive in London which 
are yet bound with a number of peripheral documents that were not, or could not, be 
published in 1934. Barnes was interviewed a number of times during the preparation of 
Origins, and he was keen to give a full and frank account of the work underpinning the  
birth of the ILO as correspondence in Shotwell’s personal archive at Columbia 
University showed. A further search for documents concerning Barnes at the ILO 
Archive in Geneva, the official repository for Shotwell’s Origins papers, revealed a 
great deal of material relevant to Barnes and the ILO.  The Shotwell material retains a 
great deal of insider commentary and other material that Origins did not (or could not) 
make use of, and this thesis is by no means an exhaustive study of their valuable 
content.  
 Shotwell copied hundreds of original documents between 1930 and 1934 before 
returning them to their owners or national governments. Both collections include 
interview notes with Paris witnesses that are largely unpublished, and, although copies, 
preserve the records of certain transactions for which official records are not available 
(e.g., some British delegation material). Emile Vandervelde, head of the Belgian labour 
delegation,
6
 claimed he kept no Peace Conference dossier himself (owing to his 
loathing of secretarial work), but an interview record kept in Geneva revealed that he 
personally considered Barnes to be the most important person on the Commission.
7
 
Indexes of the Geneva collection referred to several folders of ‘Barnes Papers’ which 
were absent upon arrival. Copies of some of these were found in New York: Barnes’ 
continuing correspondence with British Trade Union representatives after the 
Commission concluded its Report (while it was still ‘Peace Conference Confidential’) 
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were discovered amongst the Columbia University (COL) papers.
8
 A good deal of 
material concerning Barnes in both Shotwell archives exceeds the scope of this thesis, 
including Germany’s admission to the first Washington Conference, with which he was 
heavily involved.
9
   
 The notes of Carol Riegelman (Lubin),
10
 Shotwell’s research assistant, revealed 
a great deal of unexpected information. Barnes loaned Riegelman many documents 
which were shuttled between Geneva, Paris and New York before their return to 
London.  He was keen to help his friend Shotwell write about the formation of the ILO.  
Riegelman’s eighteen-page index of material concerning Barnes included War Cabinet, 
Ministry of Labour and Labour Party papers, including texts of speeches and personal 
correspondence covering a wide range of topics spanning his post-1916 career.
11
 The 
elderly Barnes may have forgotten (or did not know) that Hodgson had destroyed his 
papers when he sent Riegelman to visit him at the Ministry of Labour in 1930.
12
 At first 
Barnes did not recall having any remaining Paris documents, but Reigelman reported to 
Shotwell that he suddenly recalled two red boxes that had remained unexamined since 
he left the Peace Conference, even when writing his memoirs
13
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 Barnes allowed her to take what she wanted to copy, hoping their content would 
be published ‘without too much discretion.’ He believed he would be able to obtain 
copies of the Minutes of the British Empire Delegation debates, and of Lloyd George’s 
‘Garden Suburb’ records of War Cabinet discussions of labour matters. Barnes also felt 
he could coerce Sir Malcolm (Delevingne
14
) into being more open about the British 
Empire Delegation material he held very secretively.
15
  Sir Malcolm, she wrote, had ‘a 
very complete correspondence’ with Barnes, who gave detailed testimony about the 
Nine Points, Germany’s admission to the Washington Conference and ‘the trouble with 
the Dominions’ over Articles VII and XXXV.
16
  Reigelman told Shotwell that the vast 
amount of material to which Barnes gave her access would make their book 
unmanageably large, but it was ‘too good historical material to let go by!’
17
  
 Sir Maurice Hankey, head of the Civil Service,
18
 learned of Shotwell’s 
publication-in-progress and was fearful about its disclosures. In July 1931, Shotwell 
planned a trip to visit Barnes on holiday in Margate to discuss ‘the problem of the 
documentation of the record of the work in which you had so great a share at the Peace 
Conference’,
19
 but he was called away to the Committee on Intellectual Cooperation 
conference in Geneva. Barnes nevertheless loaned another tranche of papers to 
Riegelman by early October.
20
 On October 20, however, he asked for all his material to 
be returned and not taken to New York after receiving a letter from Hankey requesting 
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 (Sir) Maurice Pascal Alers Hankey (1877-1963), civil servant, secretary to the War Cabinet,see 
appendices. 
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 Barnes had retired from public life since 1922, hence whatever Hankey 
wrote must have been very persuasive since politically Barnes had nothing to lose. 
Unfortunately the letter has not been found. Reigelman apparently suggested that 
Harold Butler
22
should speak to Hankey to try to sway him, but Shotwell replied: - 
…With reference to the Barnes’ correspondence, it is what I feared from the 
start. Hankey has certainly scared Barnes about our possible use of the 
documents, and there is no alternative at all open to us but to turn back any 
and everything that Barnes wants. Your letter to him was a good one, and 
you have handled the whole situation absolutely correctly. I should not have 
Butler see Hankey though, for I don’t think Hankey would be moved from 




Regardless, Shotwell seemingly retained some of Barnes’ papers in Geneva until 1933, 
as a January letter from Barnes to Butler showed wherein he requested their return due 
to not knowing how to reach Reigelman.
24
 It appears that Barnes may have returned 
much of his material to the Civil Service, from where some records might have found 
their way to The National Archive and Parliamentary Archives, while others might 
have been intentionally destroyed, due to their assumed sensitivity. The Shotwell notes 
may provide the only clues to their content. As nationalism and fascism advanced on 
the continent in 1933, Sir Malcolm wrote to Shotwell that he was consulting the 
Foreign Office and Home Office about the publication of the official documents he 
held.
25
 In January 1934, Sir Malcolm informed Shotwell that British opinion was 
highly averse to the publication of, or even reference to, Departmental memoranda or 
notes of internal proceedings; the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, had recently 
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expressed that sentiment in a public speech and he was in full agreement.
26
 On 
February 6 he informed Shotwell that the British civil service would not allow the 
publication of Departmental Minutes and Memoranda.
27
  A February 28 telegram from 
Phelan to Shotwell read ‘…considered reference delegation minutes in footnote very 
dangerous and better omitted.’
28
 This suggests that many of Barnes’ documents were 
probably culled by the Foreign Office and/or Hankey years before Barnes’ home in 
South London was destroyed.   
Other primary sources 
 A typed copy of the American stenographic record of the Labour Commission 
sittings, chronicled by Guy Oyster’s secretary, John T. Graves,
 29
 was an unexpected 
find in the Columbia Shotwell collection.
30
 It delineated the Americans’ differing 
perception of the British draft, giving emphasis to specific arguments in ways the 
British record did not. A concluding note by Graves made a point of summarising 
Gompers’ guiding principle that the labour movement must remain independent from 
governmental influence or interference. Graves assessed that although Barnes had to 
defend the ‘Socialistic idea’ his European supporters championed, he was not guided 
by this principle so much as a ‘Statesman’s consciousness’ and a recognition that the 
labour convention’ success depended on certain compromises and as little erosion of 
state sovereignty as possible.
31
 The Graves minutes gave insight into the American 
delegation’s perspective, but conclude on March 14 when the Commission was at a 
                                                 
26
 COL 104, MD to JTS, 13.01.34 
27
 COL 104, MD to JTS, 6.2.34; the appendices were shortened per his suggestion also. 
28
 COL 105, Phelan to JTS, 28.2.34 
29 
Guy H. Oyster (N/A), secretary for labour questions at the Peace Conference. 
30
COL 114 ‘Minutes of the labour conference JTG’; European spellings on the folder denote this was 
kept in Shotwell’s Geneva or Paris office. 
31




critical juncture over the Henry Robinson amendment (the ‘special protocol’) to Article 
XIX which is discussed.   
 British records revealed that the post-1918 split between Barnes and the British 
Labour Party and TUC PLP was not as rigid as portrayed in some Party histories, 
discussed below. The Labour Party Archive (at the People’s History Museum, ‘PHM’ 
from here) and its Arthur Henderson papers held little material relative to Barnes after 
1918, but contained some original correspondence showing that he was keeping the 
Labour Party chairman abreast of War Cabinet discussions despite leaving to stand 
with the Coalition.
32
 Similarly, correspondence between Labour’s William Gillies
33
 and 
Hodgson regarding the delegates for the proposed Inter-allied Labour and Socialist 
Conference helped demonstrated that Barnes was an important conduit for infusing the 
Labour Commission with some of the 1919 Berne Conference’s principles, and for 
Lloyd George when it came to information-gathering about labour and the Peace 
Conference.
34
 Barnes acted as a go-between, telling Lloyd George what British Labour 
expected from Paris, and informing Henderson what he could reasonably expect from 
the War Cabinet and the Allies. 
 The Parliamentary Archive’s (‘TPA’ from here) David Lloyd George papers 
made Barnes’ multiple roles exceedingly evident. They revealed a wealth of original 
correspondence between Barnes and the Prime Minister highlighting his importance to 
the War Cabinet and peacetime coalition on numerous topics, also featuring some more 
Henderson documents.  The collection underscores Lloyd George’s fluctuating interest 
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in labour matters, and that Barnes was dedicated to keeping the Prime Minister attuned 
to labour’s thinking at any given time, not so much as a ‘mole’ for the imperialists but 
out of his sincere desire to see their needs met, and fulfil the aim of representing them 
in Paris. Barnes kept Lloyd George abreast of the Labour Convention’s development 
during and after the Labour Commission, unafraid to ask for the Prime Minister’s 
attention during trying times. The frankness and emotional pitch of some of the 
exchanges between the two is noteworthy, particularly around German reparations 
which Barnes abhorred.
35
 Lloyd George often spoke highly of Barnes in his published 
works, and also of the ‘constant help he gave me as a colleague’ in the introduction to 
Barnes’ memoirs: ‘In many a crisis fraught with destiny his calm and wise counsel was 
of priceless value.’
36
 Upon forwarding his resignation to the King in February 1920, the 
Prime Minister spoke of Barnes’ ‘fine achievement’ in connection with the ILO’s 
establishment, a ‘magnificent piece of work…its success is more attributable to your 
initiation and wise guidance than to any other living man.’
37
  
  The National Archive (‘TNA’ from here) was a most vital resource for many 
documents chronicling Barnes’ long and varied political career which are located in 
numerous collections. Many of the official records are dry, and bear the marks of 
editing and revision, while others were more unabridged and therefore more rewarding. 
This research naturally relied on series 23 and 24 War Cabinet conclusions and 
memoranda, known for their reliability but relative brevity. Extensive examination of 
Foreign Office series 608 and 371 proved valuable for their preservation of original 
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documents and hand-written notes by numerous civil servants and Ministers. Series 
608/238 included the official British record of the Labour Commission sittings, related 
reports and memoranda; minutes of the British Empire Delegation (‘BED’) sessions 
regarding the Labour Commission’s work; and Drafting Committee copies of 
Commission reports circulated in Paris. Shotwell did not reproduce the minutes of the 
BED sessions that Barnes chaired and only made reference to their outcomes in 
Origins’ first volume. Series 608/239 contained much early correspondence and drafts 
pertaining to the British labour scheme’s inception. It also held international and British 
press reviews of Peace Conference developments, including criticism from domestic 
Labour presses and the wider world.  Valuable material discovered in series FO 
371/3439 included correspondence between Balfour’s office and The League to 
Abolish War (LAW), the pro-League organisation Barnes chaired, discussed below. It 
also holds early drafts and correspondence regarding the Philimore Report advocating 
for a post-war democratic ‘league of nations’, which is also discussed in relation to 
Barnes’ LAW chairmanship.     
 The vast array of detailed Washington Conference Organising Committee 
records showing Barnes’ intrinsic involvement are scattered across TNA’s LAB 2 
(Ministry of Labour) series, particularly 771 and 774, as well as within the FO 608/241 
file. These provided further insight into Barnes’ continuing commitment to the ILO 
mission after the Labour Convention was adopted, discussed briefly in the Epilogue. 
Many of these records have been neglected and remain poorly catalogued, and some of 
its folders still refer to their 1930s-era catalogue numbers which are hard to trace in 
TNA’s electronic search system. To fully explore these one must visit the repository. 




Democracy (1986), and it would appear they have had little consideration since then.
38
  
The Organising Committee for the first international Labour Conference in Washington 
was virtually a continuation of the Labour Commission without Barnes’ official 
membership, and as the British Government administrated and financed its work, the 
reams of paper in these files speak to the magnitude and minutiae involved in such a 
feat.  
 TNA series FO 608/149 holds documents relating to Barnes and the 
Washington Conference, his involvement with the Supreme Council over neutral, 
German and Austrian delegates,
39
 and evidence of Barnes’ personal involvement in 
arranging for German labour conference delegates who, in the end, never arrived in 
America owing to travel complications. 608/241 holds records of the League of Nations 
Council demonstrating Barnes’ early, strong support for the League, and his work with 
Robert Cecil in arguing the   benefits of coterminous membership of the League and 
ILO to anyone who would listen. The contents of 608 and 241 provided more 
understanding of Barnes’ belief systems and the efforts he made to uphold them in his 
official capacity through policy decisions, inspiring research beyond this project’s 
remit. 
  The British Library’s collection of newspapers, rare pamphlets and books was 
essential for examination of Barnes’ life and influences. Its collection greatly informed 
the entire thesis but was particularly relevant for the biography chapter. It holds his 
1923 memoir From Workshop to War Cabinet, texts of Barnes’ speeches and 
interviews, biographical pamphlets he wrote for the ILP and other co-operative and 
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trade union periodicals, and various League of Nations Union publications not 
available elsewhere.  London Metropolitan University, the official repository for both 
the TUC and the ILO in London, was valuable for its collection of reference works 
pertaining to all aspects of trade unionism and the early Labour Party when it still 
shared its office with the TUC.  It also holds the daily reports of the 1919 Washington 
Conference and literature relating to the conventions passed there. The Barnes artifacts 
held at the Women’s Library at the London School of Economics donated by a family 
member luckily escaped destruction by the Blitz, and contains personal effects such as 
family photos, postcards, awards and honours he had received after leaving public life.  
The touching mementoes they preserve reinforce the desire to create a fuller 
biographical survey of Barnes, and it is hoped that a complete volume on his life and 
work will follow.  
 An overview of some of the other primary sources and secondary works that 
have most informed and inspired this research follows as they have helped to identify 
Barnes’ political ideology in some instances, and locate ‘gaps’ in the historiography 
pertaining to his ILO-related work in others. Some publications through the nineteen-
thirties may also be considered primary sources for the contemporary and contextual 
insights they provided.  Barnes’ memoir From Workshop to War Cabinet (1923) 
figures prominently throughout the thesis, as his personal archive was destroyed during 
the London Blitz.
40
 It is a rich source for his colourful, entertaining depictions of 
situations and personalities he encountered during his seventeen-year career as an MP 
and beyond. While seeking to correct prevailing interpretations of past events, Barnes 
was often deferential and self-deprecating, showing decided humility. A prolific public 
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speaker and writer, he wrote many editorials and newspaper articles, several short 
biographies, a number of extended treatises on industrial management and engineering 
and published several works on the International Labour Organisation and the Co-
operative movement. Barnes was well-travelled in work and leisure, taking several trips 
to Germany from 1898 which resulted in his fondness for its people and culture, as well 
as visiting Canada, America, Norway and elsewhere. Late in life he went with his wife 
Jessie through South Africa to Rhodesia, and to Port Said, where he was happily 
surprised to see Scotch whiskey for sale.
41
 After his extended visit to Palestine and 
Egypt he wrote An Eastern Tour (1921)
42
 which merits closer examination elsewhere.  
 Several biographical chapters about Barnes helped inform the chronology of the 
most significant events in Barnes’ life before the creation of the British scheme for the 
ILO Convention, a full list is included in the bibliography. J.S. Middleton’s
43
 brief but 
informative entry in Legge’s Dictionary of National Biography, 1931-40 (1949), was 
based on Barnes’ memoir plus ‘private information; personal knowledge’. It offers a 
broad, uncritical outline of his career with basic facts.
44
 Middleton was the only 
biographer to mention the portrait of Barnes which hangs in the ILO office in Geneva, 
painted to commemorate his services toward its creation.
45
  Baylen and Gossman (eds) 
Biographical Dictionary of Modern British Radicals, 1870-1914 (1988) defined some 
of the numerous tensions permeating Barnes’ life as a socialist and Parliamentarian, yet 
the claim that he had a ‘realistic, if somewhat cynical, view of the political abilities of 
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the common worker’ is coarse.
46
 The workers were easily misled, Barnes wrote 
sympathetically, for their lives of toil had denied them the opportunities of self-
education that others took for granted. He said stated in 1919 that they had led ‘a life 
cribbed, cabined and confined: -  
He has but little time to read, except the news-paper. He has little chance of 
meeting people of refinement. He lives in mean streets all his life, while he 
is seeing others who have grown rich by speculation… division is 
inevitable unless there is some helpful mutual contact between the 
workman and other classes, because in his isolation the workman becomes 
an easy prey of the man with the little knowledge, which is a dangerous 
thing…
47
   
 
 
Incomplete and inaccurate depictions of Barnes may have contributed to his lack of 
adequate representation in Labour Party histories of the mid-nineteen-seventies through 
the early nineties. One example is Nield’s comparatively in-depth chapter in Dictionary 
of Labour Biography (1977, ‘DLB’). It drew on numerous sources to present more facts 
and commentary about Barnes than most, noting that the ‘empirical and undogmatic’ 
Socialist initiated a Henry George study group as a young trade unionist.
48
   It also 
rightly and importantly identified that his list of proposals in 1918 directly influenced 
the Labour Chapter of the Treaty, noting his optimism about the ILO’s future and 
feeling that the Convention’s acceptance by the Peace Conference was his greatest 
achievement.
49
 However, contradictory opinions infer flawed logic and a poor 
methodology. The characterisation that ‘his general political ideas were shifting 
towards the right’ after becoming an MP in 1906 epitomises a common over-statement 
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this thesis addresses: Barnes understood the limits of parliamentary socialism earlier 
than some of his Independent Labour Party (‘ILP’) contemporaries. Nield more 
accurately assessed elsewhere that Barnes displayed increasing moderation in industrial 
and political matters that reflected political realities, as most early Labour Party 
members did upon entering Parliament.
50
   
 Working from Barnes’ memoir, Nield did mention Barnes’ staunch anti-
Bolshevism and belief that it was ‘where madness lay’, but the crucial the reason for 
this – his early disenchantment with German-inspired revolutionary rhetoric – was 
ignored. That crucial experience fed his guiding belief that the class war was deeply 
anti-social and self-destructive to the workers.
51
 Another criticism is made when, after 
consideration of Barnes’ steadfast support for the Government’s war policies and his 
continuation in the 1918 Coalition Government, Nield opined that it was ‘doubtful 
whether he appreciated at the time the degree to which his ideas and attitudes had 
moved away from those of his early years.’
52
 This swingeing criticism came despite an 
earlier statement that Barnes had long believed that labour’s emancipation relied on 
working-class representation in Parliament. A fuller consideration would conclude that 
Barnes was never a revolutionary despite his early associations. Finally, no solid 
explanation is offered for the statement that Barnes’ last few years in Cabinet were 
difficult.  This 1977 entry contains useful data about Barnes’s life and work, but it is 
subjective in its focus.  
 Brivati and Heffernan’s compendium of essays, The Labour Party, a centenary 
history (2000)
53
 mentions Barnes several times, but primarily in relation to the Party’s 
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early formation; neither his war record nor relationship with Lloyd George is discussed. 
Taylor’s depiction of Barnes inferred that he took a swing-to-the-right over time: it was 
stated that Barnes was the ‘left-wing general secretary of the ASE…(who)  took a 
prosaic view of the LRC’s purpose’,  and part of a group of trade union officials who 
viewed socialist ideology with ‘cautious realism and suspicion.’
54
 Chadwick’s entry 
suitably recognised Barnes as a ‘reformist voice’ from 1900-24 and a prominent figure 
like Philip Snowden
55
 who ‘supported reform, and pointed to foreign examples of 
socialist success in countries such as Germany and Sweden.’
56
 Finally, Ellison assessed 
how Barnes and the other early ILP reformists held a positive view of the state, noting 
the divergence of ideology that was in evidence. He juxtaposed Ramsay MacDonald’s 
evolutionary socialism against the more pragmatic ideas of men like Barnes and J R 
Clynes.
57
 The former saw the modern state as ‘the cornerstone of the socialist 
commonwealth in waiting’, growing its social and economic role as capitalism 
withered away, whereas the latter’s view was ‘stripped of the ILP’s socialist rhetoric’, 
advocating for the state to provide prompt support for unskilled and non-unionised 
workers when voluntary efforts and charity failed.
58
  Centenary made some thoughtful 
assessments of Barnes’ early career, but his work in progressive social reform, as an 
MP from 1906 and upon entering the Ministry of Labour under Lloyd George, is 
neglected. 
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  Two fairly recent, compact entries on Barnes in biographical Labour Party 
works offered commentary from differing political perspectives. David Marshall MP
59
 
contributed to Men Who Made Labour (2006), a centrist compendium of biographies 
commemorating the centenary of the 1906 PLP.
60
 Marshall sentimentally introduced 
Barnes as ‘a much neglected and underestimated giant of the trade union and Labour 
movement… a pioneer of old age pensions and national insurance, of minimum 
employment conditions for women and young people, and of industrial safety and the 
right of combination.’ It is an accessible reference article for general information, but 
does little to emphasise the conflicts running through Barnes’ political career. It gives 
fair attention to Barnes’ Labour Commission work, but is very brief regarding the 
aftermath. Marshall observed that Barnes’ draft for the ILO scheme included many of 
the ‘minimum requirements’ the Berne International Labour and Social Conference had 
discussed for submission to the League of Nations, noting his responsibility for steering 
it through the Labour Commission until it was ‘approved unanimously.’
61
  Marshall 
also borrowed extensively from Barnes’ memoir, but looked also into his relationship 
with the Communitarian movement and other early interests, leading to a more 
sympathetic understanding of his loyalty to the Government. Men who Made Labour 
exultantly concluded that ‘the life that most of us enjoy today and often take for granted 
exists only because of the labours of George Barnes and his colleagues of that era.’
62
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 Far less complimentary was the entry on Barnes in British Labour Leaders 
(2015),
63
 a thinly-veiled attempt to revive Tony Blair’s legacy
64
 and typical of the 
limited view of Barnes generally put forward decades earlier. In a chapter combining 
Barnes and Willie Adamson,
65
  a derogatory summary is badly researched and 
confused; it draws on few sources and brings little new to the discussion.  The primary 
assertion is that Barnes epitomised mediocrity and accomplished little because he failed 
to lead the Party to electoral victory in 1910,
66
 when it was still finding its 
organisational and ideological feet. The focus is primarily on how he became perceived 
by the radical ILP wing in the north-east as a traitor, and the claim that Barnes’ ‘big 
moment’ came in replacing Henderson in the Lloyd George War Cabinet implies that 
he was merely ambitious.  Barnes’ pivotal Peace Conference and ILO connections are 
minimised, and a blood-thirsty assertion that his ‘one major regret’ was not in sooner 
bringing the Kaiser ‘and other chief warmongers to trial, and if found guilty, to have 
hanged them out of hand’ diminishes his contribution to the labour movement even 
further.
67
  The entry’s heavily left-leaning (and out-dated) interpretations sum up that 
Barnes was ‘uninspiring’ and became leader ‘purely by default’, denying the student 
another opportunity to better understand an important, transitional phase of the Labour 
Party’s history.   
 To conclude this appraisal, it is worth noting how the 2001 edition of 
Dictionary of Labour Biography reduced Barnes’ life and work to a few mere 
sentences. Its summary of his political trajectory did accurately acknowledge on the 
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one hand a transition from the nineteenth century to the twentieth, but on the other hand 
it again characterised Barnes inadequately: ‘His transition from militant trade unionist 
to patriotic coalitionist indicates the complexity of political choices for working-class 
choices’
68
  Working class politics were undeniably undergoing vast, rapid change 
during Barnes’ life and career, but his transformation to right-wing is mistaken and oft 
repeated. At his core he remained unchanged from when he was a young man, and as a 
colleague from the Ministry of Labour in 1917 said of him: ‘Though called a Labour 
member, there was nothing of the modern-Socialist-Labourite about him. I should 
describe him as being really an old-fashioned and very cautious Scottish Whig…’
69
   
Barnes and his contemporaries 
 Some authors have been decidedly unflattering. Beatrice Webb described 
Barnes as weak in her typically acerbic manner despite their long acquaintance arising 
from her trade union research, deeming him unfit for either the War Cabinet or the 
Peace Conference.
70
 Webb placed him among ‘suspect’ Labour Party and Trade Union 
officials accepting ‘places and honours’ in 1917
71
 and wrote ‘it is a travesty on political 
democracy that George Barnes should be in the War Cabinet from which Secretaries of 
State like Arthur Balfour are excluded.’
72
 Ramsay MacDonald’s opinion of Barnes, 
according to Marquand ‘had never been high’, and as soon as Barnes became Party 
Chairman in 1910 they were at odds over party tactics.
73
 MacDonald and Henderson 
reportedly both saw him as a Keir Hardie-type figure, ‘too individualistic’, and prone to 
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‘regard himself as a free-lance when it suits him and as a member of a team when it 
suits.’
74
   
 Others have been much kinder, not surprisingly David Lloyd George, who 
wrote the foreword to Barnes’ memoir, praising his ‘moderation and courage’, 
comparing his temperament to that of Abraham Lincoln.
75
 The former Prime Minister 
spoke of his ‘devoted and untiring service to the working classes’, yet that he knew ‘by 
instinct the limits of the attainable,’
76
 and he remarked that ‘in many a crisis fraught 
with destiny his calm and wise counsel was of priceless value’ during the war.
77
 Lloyd 
George was emotional about his friend Barnes in 1938 who was at that stage showing 
grave signs of old age, and recalled his virtues over several pages.   
Mr. Barnes was a fine specimen of the sturdy Northern artisan; shrewd, 
sensible, practical, straightforward: a man whose education did not stop 
when he left the primary school for the works. He and Arthur Henderson 
belonged to the same breed. They justify the confidence of the reformers 
who fought for the inclusion of the workers amongst the governing classes 
of their country. Barnes had two predominant characteristics – honesty and 
common sense… honesty means that he expresses an opinion or urges a 
course of action without reference to its popularity but because he believes 
that it is right, and that when he thinks so he stands by that conviction at all 




The former Prime Minister made it seem like Barnes was the chief architect of the ILO 
plan, saying ‘It was he who took the principal initiative in the establishment of the 
International Labour Organisation and in the framing of its constitution. In his quiet, 
persistent way, he piloted it safely through the Committee as the principal delegate of 
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 knew intimately the working relationship between the 
two men, and her diary read: -  
He was on the whole I think the sanest of all of D.’s colleagues at the time 
of the peace conference. His calm, rather slow but unprejudiced mind could 
take stock of a situation in the shrewdest way, while he had the courage to 
express his judgements even when they were unpopular and unpalatable… 
the letters that passed between them are illuminating as a record of what D. 
knew he ought to do, but what circumstances prevented him from doing… 
(Barnes) has tremendous deep loyalties, which make for a charm he would 
otherwise lack.




 the Ministry of Labour civil servant who aided the British Delegation 
on the International Labour Commission, spoke of his ‘quiet gentle manner’
84
 and his 
‘curious habit of standing with crossed feet, an attitude which gave him an awkward 
appearance.’
85
 Yet he was equal to large personalities regardless of the circumstances. 
Phelan recalled the ease with which Barnes navigated around the buffet during the 
Peace Conference: -  
…it became apparent that we were heading straight for the spot where 
President Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George had been respectfully 
allowed a modicum of elbow room, but Barnes went steadily on quite 
unperturbed.  
 
 Wilson, who was biting into a sandwich, gave him a friendly nod and the 
greeting of his companions indicated that he would be welcome to join the 
group. Barnes replied with a gesture towards the buffet and moving in 
behind Lloyd George devoted his whole attention to securing for me a glass 
of champagne and one for himself.  
 
 The incident illustrates features in his character which I found especially 
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attractive: his complete unselfconsciousness, his indifference to any 
flattering mark of attention, and a singleness of purpose in small things as 




The Wedgwood survey of living Parliamentarians
87
 contained many pithy entries; the 
chapter on Barnes, personally written by Wedgwood, is full of praise.
88
 The term 
‘Socialist’ is wholly absent and he argued that had Barnes left the Coalition in 1919 
(presumably upon return from Paris as a Treaty signatory), ‘he probably would have 
been Prime Minister in 1924 and history would have been very different. For Barnes, 
unlike MacDonald, was essentially a Liberal and devoid of any animosity. He was a 
man capable of great sacrifice, who wanted measures, not kudos.’
89
 Wedgwood wrote: 
The path to victory of the Trades Union leader is strewn with the corpses of 
competitors. The successful use of elbows develops self-assertion and 
confidence rather than the gentler virtues. On arrival he is apt to arm 
himself with suspicion and a cautious determination not to ‘give himself 
away’. They do not as a rule make comfortable colleagues. How then can 
one account for such as Tom Burt
90
 and George Barnes, with their quiet soft 
voices, and all that modesty and courtesy which endeared them to the 
House of Commons?   
 
 …Barnes had beside something which all his colleagues lacked - the sure 
knowledge of what was wrong with the world, and the certainty of the way 
out. He was firm (sic) founded on Adam Smith and Henry George with a 
faith that none could shake. Such a man could afford to be honest, and his 
comparative poverty today carries with it the dignity of a Cincinnatus
91
  
into private life. George Barnes remains where he was in 1892. 
 
This appraisal of Barnes in Labour Party biography indicated the potential for a 
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definitive biography as the existing literature is so incomplete and inconsistent, 
and as so many inaccuracies persist. His influence as a historical Labour Party 
figure or intrinsic proponent of the ILO’s creation is at times dependent on the 
author or publisher’s relative ideological bent: Mentions of Barnes wax and 
wane across the literature, largely owing to his support for the war (something 
the bulk of the Labour Party also backed) and his 1916-20 affiliation with the 
Lloyd George Coalition, ignoring important social reforms like Old Age 
Pensions (discussed below) that he played a significant role in bringing about. 
 
Secondary literature 
 A summary of the secondary literature that helped inform and inspire this thesis 
follows. It also further identifies gaps across several areas of historiography relevant to 
Barnes. Some of the earlier works referenced served as both primary and secondary 
sources of information, as they conveyed contemporary observations and opinion, 
reflecting to some degree the socio-political zeitgeist of the time in which they were 
written. 
 Both volumes of Origins of the International Labour Organization (1934) 
served as a primary source inspiration for this work as the introduction discussed, but 
its first volume also served as a valuable secondary source. Published for the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, it was part of the ‘The Paris Peace Conference 
History and Documents’ educational series in an examination of the ILO’s creation for 
the sake of a primarily American readership.
92
 Borrowing from Woodrow Wilson’s 
principle of open covenants, it reproduced formerly classified documents and 
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memoranda from France, Great Britain, and Belgium as well as the United States in 
Volume two. In Volume one, essays by former Labour Commission members, and 
international academics and technical experts provided invaluable historical 
background from a number of perspectives. Individual chapters on the Allied and 
Central Powers’ preparations for the Paris labour talks were highly readable as well as 
informative, highlighting the implications of  drafting a blueprint for labour’s 
restructuing in the Peace Conference setting. Published in 1934, it also had a 
propaganda imperative to fulfil as fascistic nationalism on the European continent 
grew; the ILO and League of Nations’ benevolent aims are repeatedly used as a 
metaphor for continued world peace and harmony. Origins depicts the ILO’s creation 
as a triumphal intercontinental effort indicative of the ‘new internationalism’, but is at 
the same time a continuum of ‘the Whiggish narrative’ and an interesting convergence 
of two ideologies.
93
 Shotwell’s somewhat unwieldy tome emphasised the British role to 
a great extent, yet it remains a potent educational artefact for the documents and 
narratives it preserves, and is an authoritative source for students of ILO and Versailles 
Peace Conference history to embark from. 
 Written around the same time and somewhat more accessible, Francis Graham 
Wilson’s Labor in the League System (1934),
94
 provided a philosophical yet concise 
examination of the ILO’s Labour Convention in connection with its League of Nations 
relationship. Wilson ably presented labour’s rise during the pre-war period, and 
summarised some of the most salient arguments Barnes and the Commission faced in 
the light of their new-found responsibility, the inception of a world labour institution 
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that had to be firm, yet flexible. It employed a more easily-followed, chronological 
layout than Shotwell’s book. Wilson’s exceedingly thorough footnotes indicate a robust 
methodology derived from numerous international resources.   
 There was an outpouring of ILO-related works upholding its virtues shortly 
after it formed in 1919, indicating the ongoing contention over the ILO under the 
League of Nations. Barnes epitomised in The Industrial Section of the League of 
Nations (1920),
95
 a public address wherein he appealed to the enlightened mentality of 
the ‘new internationalism’, portraying  ILO as ‘an international Soviet of an 
evolutionary and constructive kind…’ and its Conference as ‘an opportunity of 
thinking, and not only of thinking, but of acting, internationally.’
96
  The Fabian Society 
was no exception in heralding the ILO as a triumph over the past. Their 1921 tract
97
 
opened with the Labour Convention’s prosaic Preamble, skipping directly to the 
Labour Charter’s nine points of principle (the annex to the Labour Convention) before 
discussing the Labour Conference machinery. It emphasised that the annual 
Conference’s over-arching purpose was to put the aims of the Charter and Preamble 
into universal practice, reflecting the ‘economic necessity of the times’ and the 




 To commemorate the ILO’s fiftieth anniversary and the British contribution in 
its creation, the Department of Employment and Productivity (formerly the Ministry of 
Labour, rebranded in 1968 during Harold Wilson’s second ministry) published Britain 
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and the ILO – The Story of Fifty Years (1969), with a forward by Barbara Castle.
99 
 
This centre-left screed was bursting with national pride, part ILO history and part 
Government propaganda, published when the Department was promoting numerous 
international technical assistance programmes in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
(boosting economic growth and industrial education were Wilson’s perennial high 
priorities). It is interesting to note its timing: the contentious White Paper that Castle 
and James Callaghan
100
 secretly drafted, In Place of Strife, had recently been 
published.
101
  Castle proudly noted Britain’s ‘distinguished part’ in contributing to 
social justice through its continued support of the ILO.
102
 Barnes is called a ‘staunch 
Nonconformist’, and given considerable prominence. Stewart opined that the ILO’s 
launch was a vindication of his decision to stay in the Coalition when the Labour Party 
disassociated from the Government.
103
 Fair enough, but reading that Lloyd George 
regarded Barnes as ‘the authentic voice of Labour’ upon replacing Henderson gives one 
pause. Lloyd George undoubtedly preferred Barnes to be the ‘authentic’ voice because 
he upheld the Allied Governments’ policies when Henderson and the Labour Party 
resolved in favour of a negotiated peace.
104
 Barnes’ challenge in getting the Labour 
Convention adopted by the Peace Conference is noted, and Stewart went so far as to 
give him sole credit for the ILO scheme based upon a remark he made in his memoir.
105
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Although very proud of the ILO’s creation, Barnes was exceedingly deferential about it 
and continually alluded to the combination of efforts required to bring it about. 
 One fact was badly twisted when Barnes’s belief about German admission to 
the ILO is discussed, indicating a misunderstanding. Stewart’s assertion that Barnes 
wanted ILO membership ‘limited’ to League nations gets it backwards.
106
  Barnes 
always believed that coterminous League-ILO membership was necessary to keep all 
nations on an equal footing, and he argued for Germany’s ‘early’ admittance to the ILO 
(as French labour, the IFTU ad TUC also did) to make the Conference democratic and 
representative, and when it became apparent the League’s constitution would remain 
uncertain for quite a while he redoubled his efforts. This 1969 publication was useful 
for some of its data, bibliography of source documents and interesting photographic 
artefacts, but as and historical document it is unreliable. 
 Alcock’s 1971 work provided a more academically reliable assessment of the 
ILO’s history, and Barnes’ role in its inception.
107
  It provided a good, concise 
overview of historical, international aspirations for an annual world labour conference 
going back as far as the late fifteenth century, noting the attempts of the First and 
Second International to form permanent links between the trade unions of different 
countries. Alcock’s work combined the findings of many international experts, and 
ultimately deduced that the ILO could not exist until the war prompted a universal 
sacrifice of national sovereignty which was previously unthinkable.
108
 Alcock 
described the Lloyd George Government’s inception of the Ministry of Labour as a 
confirmation of class collaboration and of recognition that the working class had 
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become ‘a responsible element in its own right for the first time.’
 109
 Barnes was given 
credit for giving powerful expression in Britain to the idea that ‘the working class had a 
part to play in the future problems of the nation’, and that there must never be a return 




 Alcock made several mentions of Barnes’ contributions toward the ILO scheme 
in a work devoid of overt left- or right-wing leanings. He depicted Barnes’s stint as a 
member of the Lloyd George pre- and post-war coalitions in a favourable light, 
portraying his contribution to the Labour Party and labour movements as positive.
 
The 
argument that Barnes was integral towards the acceptance of organised labour as a part 
of governmental machinery, beyond munitions production, was well made. Under 
Barnes’s stewardship at the MoL, ‘class collaboration’ had signified that ‘the working 
class had been accepted as a responsible element in its own right for the first time’, he 
wrote.
111
 Alcock’s interpretations also supported some traditional arguments, Marxist 
as well as realist, that the ILO in the post-war settlement was part of the universal 
initiative for better relations with trade unions and a pragmatic public relations 
exercise. His comprehensive book also upheld some of the ‘economic equalisation’ 
theories of the immediate post-war period that defended the ILO’s necessity on the 
grounds of economic self-protection and the preservation of Britain’s Empire,
112
 
theories that also indicated the backwards-looking desire for a pre-war ‘return to 
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 In 1989, Ewing in Britain and the ILO
113
 also made arguments that combined 
Marxist and realist perspectives. The author asserted that the war had only temporarily 
interrupted the developmental progress of international labour standards, assisted by the 
war’s horrors and the fear in the West that the October Revolution engendered.
114
 This 
implies two of the ‘four dimensions’ the historian Arthur Marwick espoused regarding 
total war’s societal effects; the first being destruction and disruption, followed by the 
second wherein existing social institutions are tested, and replaced with better ones.
115
 
Ewing shared Barnes’ explanation as to why the ILO machinery was not as ‘radical a 
venture’ as some trade unionists might have liked: it was a virtual impossibility given 
the small window of time the British Delegation had, more so given the intricacies 
involved in considering the individual needs of different countries.
116
    
 One prominent writer on the Versailles peace talks, Margaret Macmillan, 
commented somewhat flippantly in The Peacemakers (2001) that the Labour 
Commission ‘worked away quietly’ during the Peace Conference.
117
 This superficial 
impression might be owing to the ‘languid interest’ the plenipotentiaries gave to labour 
matters, but this thesis’ research showed that Barnes expended much effort to publicise 
the Commission’s work, bringing in Lloyd George for support when it was most 
needed. Things got so turbulent on the Commission that it nearly broke apart more than 
once, discussed below. Making matters worse, Barnes faced strident opposition from 
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the Commission President, the AFL Chairman, Samuel Gompers,
118
 and his American 
delegation cohorts. Gompers had been disparaging aspects of the draft Labour 
Convention with the American peace delegations, creating considerable prejudice 
against the British delegation’s scheme which is also discussed. Macmillan argued that 
a lack of concern for the Commission’s work fortuitously allowed the ILO to form 
‘with a minimum of fuss’
119
 and hold its first conference in October 1919. This glosses 
over a plethora of challenges Barnes faced during several difficult months. Yet it can be 
argued that the Foreign Secretaries’ disinterest was a boon in the early phases, for it 
prevented the Commission from being tasked with complicated emigration issues 
ultimately left to the League of Nations.
120
 Given her assessments it is not clear what 
documents Macmillan was working from, because the most accessible British records 
at The National Archive tell a rather different story.  She at least noted with some irony 
that the ILO survives to this day and included Germany from the start, while the ill-
fated League of Nations did not.
121
 
 The international law scholar and advisor to the ILO on human rights issues 
Bob Hepple noted briefly in Labour Laws and Global Trade (2005) that that Barnes, 
along with Albert Thomas
122
 and others, were ‘co-opted into Government’ following 
the shocks of the October Revolution and the war.
123  
Those factors undoubtedly 
hastened the Government’s formation of a labour ministry, but that is a broad 
assessment; such a thing was arguably on the cards given the Labour Party’s entry into 
Parliament and cross-party support for industrial reforms intended to see off strikes.  
                                                 
118 
Samuel L Gompers (1850-1924) American Federation of Labor (AFL) originator; see next section for 
fuller bio.  
119
Macmillan, Peacemakers, p.223 
120
 TNA FO 608/239/8, 5.2.19 ‘Emigration Problems and the Peace Conference’ minutes 
121
 Macmillan, p.223 
122
 Albert Thomas (1878-1932) ILO’s first Director, 1920-32; a prominent, moderate socialist; assistant 
editor of L'Humanite, the French Sociality Party newspaper; see appendices. 
123




 Two fairly recent publications used an actor/agency methodological framework 
to critically re-examine the ILO’s inception. The first by Hidalgo-Weber (2013) 
questioned the British role, concluding that earlier histories portraying them as its 
prime architects over-stated their case. She posited alternatively that they were 
sounding-boards for international ideas long circulating, seizing their moment as the 
war’s victors to pursue an Imperialist economic agenda. Her critique of the ‘Whig’ 
historical narrative asserted the Britons were ‘at the heart of a number of trans-national 
networks’, combining their human resources, network connections and administrative 
expertise to ultimately shape the ILO into an ‘international organisation consistent with 
(Britain’s) economic and imperial interests.’
124
  Hidalgo-Weber contended further that 
the British labour delegation were not leaders for reform but merely channelling the 
wishes of an international community of socialist and workers’ groups: an argument 
backed by an arguable assertion that the Labour Charter’s principles were ahead of 
most of British social legislation at the time.
125
  Nevertheless, it rightly asserted that 
Barnes played a central role and was something of a leader in this ‘channelling’: his 
ideas accurately reflected those of the world labour network, enabling his delegation to 
‘absorb both the ideas of the Labour Party’s peace programme and also international 
socialist ideas.’  Barnes’ drive to involve the trade unions and employers in the early 
Labour Charter’s drafting was also recognised.
126
   
 McKillen’s Making the World Safe for Labor (2013) focussed on the 
relationship between American President Woodrow Wilson and the AFL concerning 
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the ILO’s creation from a foreign policy perspective, examining contemporary labour 
and working-class debates around the restructuring of international labour after the 
war.
127
  McKillen employed a combination of American and British sources including 
Shotwell’s two volumes, and Harvard University’s collection of Arthur Henderson and 
J S Middleton papers to produce an interesting, wide-ranging study. She concluded that 
the diaspora Left was more responsible for creating American opposition to the League 
of Nations and the ILO’s creation than previously considered. It was said that Wilson, 
who held that labour was central to maintaining a democratic peace, could not fully 
capitalise on any positive publicity his foreign policy had largely owing to the 
‘uniquely myopic lenses’ through which the AFL viewed Britain and the European 
continent.
 128
 Gompers and his associates provided Wilson with poor intelligence, as 
they ‘tended to oversimplify the enormous differences emerging between moderate 
Socialists and Labor (sic) Party activists on the one hand, and those promoting 
Bolshevism and social revolution on the other.’
129
  Barnes, McKillen discovered, had 
been characterised by Chicago labour reporters as the ‘conservative British Labor (sic) 
delegate’ personally responsible for threatening America’s standard wage principle, 
owing to Labour Convention clauses making exceptions for special economic or 
climactic conditions in certain countries. This assessment of Barnes was typical of 
‘harsh indictments of British imperialism’ and ‘growing disillusionment’ with the 
Versailles negotiations emanating from American working class channels.
130
  
 This thesis does not fault the standard assessment McKillen made that the ILO’s 
Labour Convention was a primarily British innovation, or that the Labour Commission 
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idea was in fact the ‘brainchild’ of Barnes,
131
 but a declaration that ‘the Americans 
crafted the first Labor (sic) bill of rights to be incorporated into the Treaty’, referring to 
the nine points of the Labour Charter, is contested.
132
 It is argued below that although 
Gompers fought heavily to see the AFL’s statements of labour principles incorporated 
into the Treaty, it was a far more international affair, and that the British led efforts to 
appease the Americans to keep things moving. McKillen also wrote that Gompers’ 
Labour Commission presidency was assured by Wilson and Barnes upon its 
formation,
133
 but official records indicated that a French labour delegate nominated 
him.  A comment that Barnes was ‘more conservative’ than Henderson is also 
debatable.
134
 Both McKillen and Hidalgo-Weber’s 2013 publications depict British 
motivation for the ILO scheme as part of ‘preservation of Empire’ exercise (the latter 
more than the former, which utilised more British and European resources for its 
research). This was not wholly untrue, nor was it something Barnes shied away from 
when defending the ILO in his History of the ILO (1926, passim). Both 2013 
publications critically and robustly analysed multiple sources and applied a stringent 
methodology to provide a number of fresh insights, despite any minor disagreements 
with their findings.    
  Insight into the ideology of Samuel Gompers was essential for understanding 
the root causes of the specific challenges Barnes faced from the American labour 
delegation. Gompers’ deep suspicion of European Socialism and rejection of the British 
Labour Party’s embrace of direct political representation was apparent early, and a 
combination of primary and secondary works helped explain this cross-Atlantic schism. 
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Numerous speeches and editorials by Gompers and his AFL colleagues preserved in the 
journal American Federationist delineated a purely economic approach to trade 
unionism and a steadfast belief that the worker’s command of the marketplace would 
lead to his emancipation.
135
 Gompers’ autobiography, Seventy Years of Life and Labor 
(1924)
136
 provided some interesting and colourful passages, but it was completed at the 
end of his life and allegedly largely ghost-written by an ‘uncritical admirer’, therefore 
only marginally reliable.
137
 The Samuel Gompers papers (vol. XI)
138
 were more useful 
for gauging his attitude during various phases of his career. Gompers’ recollection of 
his Labour Commission experience in What Really Happened at Paris (1921), a pro-
Wilson compendium of essays by American Peace Conference delegates, revealed his 
confused Labour Commission priorities in detail.  Secondary works included a number 
of semi-biographical, mainly realist-school publications that depicted a fiery character 
shaped during the earliest years of American industrialism.
139
 Gerald Stearn’s 
introduction to the compendium Gompers (1971)
140
 provided an essential and concise 
overview of his career in trade unionism. Stearn effectively summed up the epitome of 
Gompers’ credo, writing that he passed away in 1924 ‘without regret’, and that his 
alleged last whispered words were to tell the workers that ‘he kept the faith.’
141
  
                                                 
135
 American Federationist, the  official magazine of the American Federation of Labor (1894-1952) 
136
 Samuel N. Gompers, Seventy years of life and labor (Henceforth Seventy years)(New York, USA: 
1948 Dutton) 
137
 According to another Gompers biographer, John H M Laslett in ‘Samuel Gompers and the Rise of 
American Business Unionism’, in Dubofksy and Tine Labor Leaders in America (USA: 1987 University 
of Illinois Press), fn p.87 
138
 Peter J. Albert and Grace Palladino (eds) The Samuel Gompers Papers (vol, XI, 1918-21) (Illinois, 
USA: 2009 University of Illinois Press)  
139
 See bibliography, but for example Charles Rehmus, Doris McLaughlin and Frederick Nesbitt, eds., 
Labour and American Politics (2nd edition) (Ann Arbor, USA: 1978 University of Michigan); and Philip 
Taft, The AFL in the Time of Gompers (henceforth Taft) (New York, USA: 1970 Octagon Books) et al. 
140
 Gerald E. Stearn, ed., Gompers (henceforth Stearn) (New Jersey, USA: 1971 Prentice Hall) 
141




 The AFL was founded on the principle of freedom from political intervention in 
labour affairs. Gompers studied Marx intensely in the 1870s and viewed his works as ‘a 
terrific indictment of society’, but he later rejected socialism and its utopian ideals.  
Like Barnes, Gompers was disenchanted with his socialist contemporaries’ utopian 
rhetoric, accepting that industrialism and capitalism were both ‘historically correct 
phenomena’ working in tandem to shape society. However, unlike Barnes, who 
embraced the more philosophical aspects of Marx’s theories, Gompers developed a 
purely economic approach to working class reform, believing that Materialism was 
life’s driving force’, and that ‘economic, not political rights’ determined relative 
freedom.
142
    
 Gompers held the AFL Presidency from its 1886 inception until his death, save 
in 1895 when a heavy socialist incursion temporarily unseated him. He was a shrewd 
and highly organised administrator and policy-maker with a ‘limitless reserve of 
energy, a brilliant public speaking style… (and) an ego born to be inflated.’
143
 The 
AFL’s defeat of its predecessor, The Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor 
(‘Knights’) which included skilled and unskilled workers, was complete by the turn of 
the century, and its membership swelled from 140,000 in 1886 to nearly 4,000,000 
during the war.
144
  As head of a Federation of skilled workers operating through local 
branches, Gompers held little authority himself. His real power came from growing and 
organising new branches, and applying external pressure to persuade and influence 
Congress, state legislatures, governors and presidents on labor causes. Gompers 
founded American Federationist as its publisher, editor and chief writer, and was a 
prolific and forceful public speaker and agitator. The success of his tenure relied 
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heavily on his gift for coercion and influencing the will of the major craft unions.  
Gompers was a tough little man used to getting his way through his persuasive oratory.   
 The AFL had resolved in 1894 that ‘Party politics, whether they be democratic 
republican, socialistic, populistic, prohibition, or any other, shall have no place in the 
conventions of the American Federation of Labor.’
145
 Gompers declared during that 
Conference address that ‘The industrial field is littered with more corpses of 
organizations destroyed by the damning influences of partisan political action than 
from all other causes combined... Let the watchword be: no political party domination 
over the trade unions: no political party influence over trade union action.’
146
  He 
continually suffered attacks from the left and the right. Socialists tried to permeate the 
AFL with their own policies and create division within the local branches; they ran 
candidates for the executive against Gompers regularly, and their presses condemned 
him as a cynical faux revolutionary and class collaborator. From the right, the heavily-
bankrolled National Association of Manufacturers (‘NAM’) persecuted him at every 
turn, framing him as the organiser of violent strikes: worse than a socialist, he was ‘the 
enemy of due process and law and order.’
147
  His greatest nemesis, however, was the 
State, which repeatedly issued punitive injunctions against labour to suspend union 
activity before strikes could occur. ‘Organised labour entered the twentieth century 
with a criminal record’ wrote Stearn, presenting numerous cases before the war where 
Congress and the Supreme Court ultimately pushed Gompers into a political direction 
despite being repulsed by the idea.
148
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 Gompers was portrayed as turning ‘from pacifism to chauvinism’ during the 
war out of loyalty to Wilson, supporting the League of Nations and serving on advisory 
boards and striving for industrial peace in the name of the war effort.
149
  Before 
America joined the war, Gompers was beholden to the idea that an international trade 
union conference, held at the same time and place as the peace conference, might assist 
in the permanent abolition of war, as many international trade unionists did.
150
 After 
America’s 1917 entry into the war, the AFL tried to encourage visits between Allied 
and American trade unionists, but got involved in trying to relocate the IFTU from 
Berlin to Amsterdam, eventually cutting off relations with German trade union leaders. 
The AFL was emphatic not to engage with labour representatives of belligerent 
countries, and felt the international labour conference proposed for Berne for October 
1917 was ‘premature and untimely’, and could lead to ‘no good purpose.’
151
 Through 
1918 Gompers sought to strengthen ties with Allied labour, but his visits to England 
that autumn crystallised his position against ‘socialist’ political labour. 
 Gompers headed an AFL delegation to the TUC’s Fiftieth Annual Conference 
in Derby in September 1918.  The ‘broad church’ ethos of the political Labour Party 
and its constituency of socialist labour evaded Gompers, who disregarded the historical 
underpinnings of the TUC-Labour Party relationship: -  
The Labour Party of England dominates the labour movement of England. 
All the time I was in England I never heard of a phrase like ‘The British 
Trade Union Movement and the Labour Party’. I never heard it said ‘The 
Parliamentary Committee of the British Trade Union Congress and the 
Executive Committee of the Labour Party.’ It was always the Labour Party 
and the Trade Union Congress.
152
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During his TUC address he boasted of the AFL’s political independence,
153
 and alluded 
to international workers’ solidarity while differentiating between the American and 
European labour movements: -  
The American Trade Union movement, as expressed by the American 
federation of Labour, is one and comprehensive, and is all its own… It is 
willing that all should advise and suggest, but we yield not on inch to 
anybody – individual or corporate – the right of leadership of our 
movement. That remark has reference to the Democratic Party, the 
Republican Party, the Socialist Party, or any other party. We stand for 




Gompers and his delegation next attended the Inter-allied Labour Conference (of 
Socialist political groups and trade unions) in London a few weeks later.  The 
American Socialist Party had not been invited, however, so Jean Longuet, Marx’s 
grandson and a leader of French labour, moved to reduce the American delegation’s 
votes. Gompers was incensed, declaring that the AFL represented American labour as 
the majority voice.
155
 The French motion was lost. It was resolved that a conference of 
labour representatives would be held to run concurrently with the official peace 
conference, but Gompers was deeply perturbed at constant references to ‘socialism and 
socialists’ with far fewer references to ‘labour’.
156
  





His December 1918 AFL Conference address recalled with horror the 
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 The Chicago Federation of Labor’s moved in November 1918 to create a State-level labour part 
branch; approved on 3 December by the Illinois FOL Conference; days later the Central Federated Union 
of Greater New York also created a labour party; a special January Conference then founded the 




situation he had encountered in London: he was aghast to see his delegation’s names 
printed on admittance cards that confirmed their attendance at a ‘Socialist’ 
 conference: - 
I refused to sign my name, or permit my name to be put upon any card of 
that character. My associates were as indignant as I was and refused to sign 
any such credential.
158
    
 
There was considerable commotion and his delegation nearly walked out before TUC 
members assembled to escort them inside. Henderson had cited  the reason for this 
‘error’ as old stationery and a minor oversight at the printing press, but the problem for 
Gompers was that such carelessness revealed a deeper truth: -   
I want to call your attention to the significance of that explanation. That is, 
that the trade union movement of Great Britain was represented at these 
former conferences, but at this conference the importance of Labour was 
regarded as so insignificant that everybody took it for granted that it was 
perfectly all right to have the credential card read, ‘Inter-Allied Socialist 
Conference,’ and with the omission of this more important term ‘Labor’.   
  
…The fact is that an independent political labour party becomes either 
radical, so-called, or else reactionary, but it is primarily devoted to one 





Gompers headed off to Paris only weeks later, cynical and suspicious. He had been 
appointed by his President to an International Labour Commission comprising both 
socialists and members of European Governments, and was disappointed at not being 
made a full Peace Conference delegate. Stearn summed up his contribution to labour 
there in a single sentence: ‘Still, he went to Versailles and helped start the International 
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 In 1921, Gompers delivered a caustic account of the Labour 
Commission sittings depicting a ceaseless ‘contest against reaction and 
misunderstanding and wilfulness and Utopian foolishness (that) was one of the most 
difficult of my life: -  
Striving day after day against all of these conditions and these forces, in 
order to bring  into existence a document having in it something of 
constructive thought, something of worthy and workable purpose, was an 




Gompers lumped the British delegation in the with the wilful ‘European Socialists’ on 
the Commission, except when the Dominion leaders were defended for their support of 
his delegations’ proposals for concessions in respect of self-governing and federated 
nations.
162
 Nearing his deathbed he sounded kinder, and was recorded as saying ‘The 
British saw our real difficulty more appreciatively than other groups and Mr Barnes of 
the British delegation helped in the development of proposals to which we could 
agree.’
163
   
 Concluding this overview of some works that informed the background reading 
for this research are several trade union-related publications.  Wrigley’s all-
encompassing David Lloyd George and the British Labour Movement (1976)
164
 filled 
an essential historical gap by examining Lloyd George’s relationship with British 
labour in depth. This work was particularly helpful in assessing the wide-ranging 
implications of the 1917 engineering strikes in munitions industries, a critical juncture 
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that tested Barnes’ capacity for leadership of a national policy directive that boded well 
for his Paris role after the war. Some background to the ASE’s history, and depictions 
of Barnes’ time as General Secretary was provided through Jeffery’s The Story of the 
Engineers (1946, passim), as well as Clegg, Fox and Thompson’s History of British 
Trade Unions since 1889 (1964).
165
 Fraser’s History of British Trade Unionism was 
useful for its concise explanations of the underpinnings of the ‘new unionism’ 
movement that emanated from the amalgamation of the craft unions at the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
166
  Beatrice and Sidney Webb’s Trade Unionism (1920 edition)
167
 
is an interesting historical artefact in itself, notable for its detailed, oft-critical historical 
narratives about the growth of the trade union movement and its relationship with the 
State. It provided essential, contemporary analysis of historical labour legislation, 
assessing the legal as well as philosophical implications. Pimlott and Cook’s Trade 
Unionism in British Politics: the first 250 years (1995) summarised how trade 
unionism evolved as it developed independent political activity. Wrigley’s chapter 
therein assessed that although the Labour Party might have been unhappy about a ‘tame 
Labour man’ like Barnes representing them in Paris, moderate trade union leaders like 
him warmly supported Wilson’s policies in Britain, and it was owing to the British 
labour movement that the demand for a League of Nations was so strong.
168
 
 As this thesis touches upon a number of topics and themes, including but not 
limited to George Barnes and aspects of Labour Party history, the organised labour and 
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trade union movements, the first world war and international diplomacy, a vast amount 
of secondary literature was available which made the process of narrowing them down 
for this review difficult (especially given space considerations). While working with 
such a wide variety of sources proved complicated at times, it was ultimately very 
rewarding. Memoirs that recast events and aim to redress historical grievances can 
naturally be problematic, and while contemporary witness testimonies may add 
anecdotal and narrative value they often require qualification via primary sources. It is 
hoped that the project benefits from an array of older and newer, British and American, 
interpretations of themes, events, outcomes and implications.  
 The earlier writings and testimonies about the ILO and its creation primarily 
supported the Whig / Imperialist narrative, and probably also gave Barnes ample credit 
for his work towards its conception because it was fairly recent. Works through the 
mid-twentieth century exhibited a realist turn, followed by a revisionist, then a critical 
analysis turn.  Studies of the Labour Party increasingly lost interest in Barnes as a topic 
for discussion as writers explored its search for identity: Ralph Miliband’s 
Parliamentary Socialism (1962) was a prototypical example of left-wing writing aimed 
at returning the Party to its original purpose, written during the ‘crisis’ of Hugh 
Gaitskell’s
169
 modernisation efforts and attempt to revise Clause IV of the 1918 Party 
Constitution.
170
  Although not a history, early ILP and LRC figures like Henderson, 
Kier Hardie, R J Clynes, and Ramsay MacDonald are elevated by Miliband.  This trend 
escalated through to the early nineties as the Party continually struggled with many 
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challenges, external and internecine, and leaders who were unable to return the Party to 
‘electability.’
171
 Once ‘New Labour’ was introduced as the corporatist, middle-way 
forward for the Party from 1997, Barnes came somewhat back into fashion, perceived 
as a pragmatic, practical moderate: a revolutionary-turned-good. His temporary 
resurgence in the literature came only after the Labour Party itself experienced a 
decided ‘swing to the right’.
172
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1  Introducing George N. Barnes, MP 
Early Life and Religious Influences 
 Barnes’ relative obscurity in the historiography misses an opportunity to 
provide essential insights into how progressive social and political ideas advanced, and 
at times clashed, in the struggle to keep pace with rapid industrialisation. Barnes stood 
amidst the transition from the nineteenth century to the twentieth. An examination of 
his early life and influences provides the background essential for understanding that, 
despite being a somewhat contentious Labour figure, he was superbly qualified for 
dealing with the challenges presented by the Peace Conference, ultimately securing 
acceptance of the Labour Convention and the Labour Charter into the Treaty of 
Versailles.  This chapter often refers to Barnes’ 1923 memoir to assist understanding of 
influences upon his politics and policies, drawing also from other observers’ insights 
where applicable.      
 George Nicoll Barnes was born in 1859 and reared among poor manual workers 
in the low-lying ‘bog’ of Lochee, in western Dundee. He wrote that he ‘was born into 
that class for which Abe Lincoln said the Lord must have had a special liking, since he 
made so many of them.’
1
 His desire to improve the welfare of others stemmed from 
‘seeing poverty and plenty’ there,
2
 and at the age of seventy-four he vividly recalled the 
pig sties and animals being slaughtered near his home.
3
  Barnes’ mother was from 
Strathclyde, the daughter of a machinist and screw maker, and his father was a 
mechanic of Yorkshire descent, a background described elsewhere as ‘petit 
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 Barnes claimed his father became a Tory because the neighbours were 
mostly Liberals, recalling his old man ‘dearly loved disputation, and was inclined 
always to be in the minority… the kind that generally gathers no gear in the world.’
5
  
Barnes inherited his father’s stubborn nature which helped or hindered him in equal 
measure during his career, but he cherished the open expression of ideas, recalling ‘I 
used to relish in the rough and tumble of the industrial as well as of the old political 
field, as it was common in my younger and more combative days.’
6
   
 The family moved often, following work between Dundee, the Wirral and 
eventually London in 1867, then back to Scotland again by 1872. Barnes only 
experienced Anglican day-schooling for a few years, at a two-mile walk from their 
home in Enfield, North London. He was a ‘poor scholar’, his irregular attendance 
sometimes earning him ‘a whacking.’ Barnes disagreed with the view that church 
schools served to merely indoctrinate followers, believing the churches showed a great 
community example by fulfilling an essential need not met elsewhere.
7
   
 Although he never made a specific declaration of his religious commitment, 
Barnes was raised in an Episcopalian household. He and his father attended the 
sermons of the popular, controversial Baptist Charles Spurgeon
8
 at South London’s 
Metropolitan Tabernacle. Spurgeon spoke conversationally from a small platform 
behind a rail, pacing the room instead of preaching from a pulpit, which impressed 
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Barnes more than his ‘distinctive theology’ which he never understood.
9
 A Christian 
ethos was important to Barnes, and he became a Congregationalist affiliated with the 
Browning Settlement in Walworth, a deeply impoverished south London area. He 
frequently quoted scripture and used biblical references often to make dramatic points, 
evoking the language of Christian Socialism which held that materialism was a false 
ideal, a belief shared by many of his early Labour contemporaries.
10
  
 His formal education as a maintenance engineer was limited to mechanical 
drawing and some lessons in drafting Barnes entered the factory at eleven and worked 
happily alongside his father in Lambeth for two years, receiving his practical training 
during the ‘hey-day’ of London engineering. Strolling the Thames embankment he 
would look across to the Houses of Parliament which seemed ‘something quite outside 
the world’ he had been born into.
 11
 He spent the years 1872-7 back in Dundee in 
apprenticeship at Parker’s foundry, with occasional training sessions, learning the new 
engineering methods. He befriended craft union members and whalers around the 
docks who tremendously impressed him with their graft and ability to withstand 
hardship.
12
 But London had already given him aspirations, and he missed ‘its 
immensity, its freedom from parochialism, its tragic but splendid contrasts.’
13
      
 Always interested in public affairs, Barnes’ first political meeting as a teenager 
was a speech on social reform delivered by the Liberal MP Edward Jenkins at Parker’s 
factory gates.  Barnes saw Jenkins as ‘some sort of super man’, but after he crossed the 
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floor to run as a Tory Barnes said ‘Parliament swallowed him up as it has swallowed 
many more of us who have had some conceit of ourselves before going there.’
14
  He 
eventually found paid work in the Barrow-in-Furness shipyards in Cumbria, during the 
time before collective agreements when even young, fit workers could die under the 
strain from overtime.
15 
 He yearned for change, bought a holiday ticket to London with 
a friend who soon disappeared, and stayed there from 1879.
16
   
 He arrived in London in time to face the great economic depression and a most 
bleak winter. Penniless, Barnes’ trudged all over London in frigid weather having 
‘assumed the role of an Ishmael’, desperate for work along with many thousands of 
others.  He felt the advent of Labour Exchanges in the 1870s foreshadowed ‘a better 
organisation of industry’, giving out-of-work people access to vital human contact, 
while making them visible, their legion impossible to ignore. He wrote in 1923 that the 
Exchanges (and later, the dole) were ‘the outward and visible signs of an inward and 




 Once the economy recovered, industrial engineering boomed and London was 
again ‘a hive of industry.’
18
 Barnes was particularly amazed by the pace of the 
construction of the Albert Docks in Millwall. He worked all over, becoming a 
draughtsman at Woolwich Arsenal and taking training in machine construction and 
drawing.
19
  Barnes seemed quite familiar with the London music halls near his home in 
Clerkenwell, joking that they appealed to his Scotch mind because they were so 
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 He was apparently not in the temperance movement, nor tee-total like Arthur 
Henderson, a Wesleyan Methodist, or Willie Adamson, the Baptist leader of the Fife 
Miners.
21
   
Trade Unionism, Socialism and Politics 
 The existing historiography does not analyse Barnes’ formative political years 
in ways that help us to understand his mindset in the war years and beyond, nor have 
the roots of the non-dogmatic, Communitarian socialism that inspired his avowed anti-
Bolshevism been adequately dealt with. His ideology, as discussed in the introduction, 
has been perceived as a swing to the right, if not a hard break, but it is more the 
continuation of a set of fundamentally consistent beliefs.  The advent of socialism in 
Britain was an awakening, as it strengthened his resolve that social and industrial 
reform was achievable; a belief shared by the founders of the ILP and LRC. He also 
perceived an impractical, ‘fanatical’ adoption of socialist rhetoric and a divisive, 
militant approach within the movement, and his rejection of this was among the 
tensions that characterised his public life.  
 Barnes’ personal and political lives took root in Fulham in 1882, where he 
married, started a family, and became actively involved in labour politics and trade 
union propaganda.
22
 The tempestuous years to 1900 saw the formation of the Labour 
Representation Committee (LRC) as the craft unions grew in power, and employer’s 
groups like the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF) organised against this ‘new 
unionism’. Barnes spoke at ASE gatherings across London and soon joined their 
powerful London Committee. He recalled that labour advocacy required sacrifices: 
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working all day and meeting nightly, and ‘deprivation of home comforts and neglect of 
duties left to harassed wives.’
23
 He met John Burns,
24
 who was ‘somewhat’ violent, but 
‘there had been a good deal in his experiences to make him so… he had to pay the 
penalty usually then meted out to those who pled Labour’s cause.’
25
 Barnes also met 
Tom Mann,
26
 and became his secretary during his 1890 campaign to become ASE 
General Secretary. Barnes became a well-known ASE figure beyond the local ranks in 
every English-speaking country, plus Spain and France.
27
   
 The ‘machine question’ underpinned Barnes’ entry into socialism. He recalled it 
was ‘a never-ending source of trouble’ stoking revolt throughout the engineering 
trade.
28
 He observed that while employers took advantage of cost-saving automation to 
the workers’ great detriment, it also engendered competition between skilled and 
unskilled workers in the same shops which was equally dangerous. The ‘new unionism’ 
expressed impatience with a supine trade union leadership, too reliant on the State, 
which took decisions playing ‘directly into the hands of the capitalist exploiter.’
29
 
Distrust grew between the local Shop Stewards and a remote Executive Council. 
Barnes was an ASE delegate to the crucial 1892 Leeds conference which gave District 
Committees the power to determine local rules, allowing the ASE Executive to fund 
political candidates.
30,31
   
 Barnes embraced the communitarian aspect of socialism but not class war. 
Initially this stemmed from his reaction to revolutionary propaganda. Although 
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influenced by the powerful speeches of the Socialist League’s Harry Johnson,
32
 he  
believed that most of the ‘academic agitators’
33
 were condescending to the men, 
creating distrust and suspicion between workers: the very atomisation they professed to 
oppose. Barnes described his final rally at the Battersea Branch of the SDF, where he 
was ‘battered by the rhetoric of Marx and Engels for several hours’: - 
…so belaboured with words about exploitation, proletariat, bourgeois and 
others of learned length and thundering sound just then imported from 
Germany, that I believe I retired sore all over, and determined to go to no 




Organisations like Hyndman’s Social Democratic Foundation (‘SDF’) expanded and 
included Burns, Mann and other ‘outstanding figures in the Labour ranks.’
35
  Barnes 
never officially joined but regularly attended Socialist League meetings. He believed 
that class-war rhetoric reduced the worker to a self-defeating, materialistic condition, 
separating him from the rest of society and threatening the fibre of the community.   
 Barnes was coy about his involvement in the ‘Bloody Sunday’ riot in Trafalgar 
Square, November 1887,
36
 blaming the descent into violence on ‘the exuberance of 
ignorant ardour.’
37
 He claimed he and his Fulham contingent were ambushed and he 
was badly trampled by a constable’s horse, leaving him with a slightly deformed foot: 
‘We were gaily marching along to the strains of our antiquated instruments... when lo… 
in an instant there was a cracking on skulls and a scattering of feet.’
38
  In retrospect he 
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cited the 1889 Dock Strike
39
 as an important example of extra-parliamentary action, 
backed by public support, effecting positive change. Those ‘feverish’ days did lead to 
improvements to housing and some reform of the sweated trades, crucially shining 
greater light on social and industrial inequalities.
40
  Barnes referred to the new 
unionism as ‘a gingering up of the old unionism, either for revolutionary or 
parliamentary purposes’, preferring the latter, while ‘Some, muddle headedly, 
advocated both.’
41
   
 Barnes’ faith in constitutional processes and the power of the democratic 
mandate grew stronger as moderate trade unionists supported Parliamentary 
representation over direct action. In 1889, Barnes joined the ASE Executive and in 
1892 became its Assistant Secretary. His first bid for the General Secretaryship in 1895 
failed when he stood on a policy of direct Parliamentary representation despite the 
support of prominent figures like Mann. However the August 1896 Clyde-Belfast 
dispute tipped things in his favour and Barnes, an ILP man, became ASE General 
Secretary that year, amassing 8,000 votes over the runner-up.
42
 This denoted a marked 
change in the ASE’s approach while socialists were taking on positions of power in the 
trade unions. Barnes pushed the idea of LRC affiliation to the ASE Executive yet they 
resisted in 1901, deciding against funding ASE members running for Parliament.
43
  
They came around in 1902 when the repercussions of the Taff-Vale
44
 verdict were 
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 Barnes was observed as being more astute than his union 
colleagues about the threat that Taff-Vale presented to collective bargaining and in 
recognising the need for direct political representation.
46
   
 Barnes’ leadership of the ASE to 1908 has received attention in studies of trade 
unionism, as discussed in the introduction.
47
 For this study it is important to 
acknowledge that Barnes was unable to bridge the gaps created by the ASE’s 1892 
Constitution between resentful workers, ‘disobedient’ local officials and a remote 
Executive Council during several potent actions.
48
 Acrimony on the militant Clyde 
intensified, and the rift with the left crystallised once Barnes became MP for Glasgow 
Hutchestown (Blackfriars) in 1906. In 1908 he resigned as ASE General Secretary in 
frustration after the Tyneside men refused a settlement endorsed by the Executive 
(negotiated with the assistance of Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer).
49
 
Barnes urged the district council to accept what he felt was a good deal, but after 
several months the men returned to work badly defeated, without gaining a settlement 
or the community’s confidence. He received no support from his Executive Council 
colleagues during the schism, recalling that they ‘were intimidated by, and surrendered 
to, a section of men and I declined to be a party to the surrender… The new methods of 
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control – or lack of it – had no attraction for me.’
50
  He was left free to focus on his 
Parliamentary activities.  
 Since 1885 Barnes had been working with other socialists including Keir 
Hardie,
51
 Burns, Mann, Robert Smillie
52
 and Ben Tillett,
53
 who formed the ILP in 1893. 
Barnes became an ILP leading light, and the Party had 35,000 members when he stood 
(unsuccessfully) as its candidate for Rochdale in 1895.
54
 The ILP was the only 
‘distinctively socialist’ society he joined, but he left them at the outset of the war in 
1914 over their pacifist position, believing Britain had a responsibility to fight German 
autocracy. Barnes was an important figure during the February 1900 Conference that 
inaugurated the Labour Representation Committee (LRC). Ten days before he wrote in 
the Labour Leader that it had to be a ‘classless’ political party to achieve its aims: - 
Labour …must take its place as a distinct factor in Parliamentary life ‘ere 
the benefits of Parliament can be diffused evenly and justly throughout the 
community. The Conference ...should keep this steadily in view... 
Perfectionist propaganda and bewildering programmes should be resolutely 
tabooed. He will best contribute to the awakening of Labour who leaves the 




He moved at the conference that the LRC should be diverse, composed of ‘men 
sympathetic with the aims of the Labour movement, and whose candidatures are 
promoted by one or more of the organised movements represented at the conference.’
56
 
John Burns’ rousing speech in support declared that limiting membership to the 
working classes would be ‘narrow, intolerant, and exclusive.’
57
 Barnes’ motion was 
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54
 Marshall, Men, p.25; all ILP candidates lost. 
55
 Barnes, FWWC, p.59, his emphasis 
56
 Times, 28.2.1900 
57
 Ibid  
Chapter one: Introducing George N. Barnes, MP 
74 
 
approved by 102 votes to three,
58
 determining that candidates of any party with a trade 
union’s support could stand for Labour. Philip Snowden
 
viewed this as an important 
rejection of sectional interests, contrary to the SDF’s ‘tactless’ vision for the LRC 
which was the mere ‘recognition of the class war with Socialism as its ultimate aim.’
59
 
The SDF left the LRC over this decided difference in approach.  
 Barnes campaigned tirelessly for Old Age Pensions from 1896, urging it as a 
priority until the passing of the Old Age Pensions Act (1908). The ASE pioneered trade 
union superannuation schemes and old age pensions became a cornerstone of Liberal 
reform, along with national insurance.
60
 Barnes chaired the National Committee of 
Organised Labour for Old Age Pensions (NCOL) from 1902 which included many 
trades and unions including the National Union of Women Workers. Margaret 
Bondfield
61
 was also an NCOL Secretary as was F. Herbert Stead
62
 of the 
Congregationalist Browning Settlement, who founded NCOL with Barnes.
63
 Barnes 
made the topic central to his maiden Commons speech in 1906 and delivered a 
corresponding summer lecture at Oxford.
64
 His prominence across the country and in 
the House of Commons led people to say that ‘his name and old age pensions were 
inseparable.’
65
  Barnes also became affiliated with the Cooperative Society, becoming 




 Snowden, op cit., p..91 
60
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Member of Parliament and Biographer 
 In 1905 Barnes was encouraged by Hardie to challenge Andrew Bonar Law
67
 
for his Glasgow seat and became one of the twenty-nine Labour Party members to enter 
the House of Commons in 1906.
68
 Barnes recounted that those days were strenuous for 
trade unionist MPs who ‘had irons in other fires’,
69
 yet they passed the Trade Disputes 
Act (1906) which reversed the worst effects of Taff-Vale.
70
 Through to 1910, Barnes 
helped pass reform bills on compensation for industrial accidents, reduction of miners’ 
working hours and restrictions on white phosphorous in match-making.
71
  His memoir 
detailed numerous Liberal Government measures Labour was ‘in sympathy’ with, not 
least Lloyd George’s 1909 Budget.
72
   
 Barnes was a prolific writer before and after entering Parliament, contributing 
to newspapers, engineering journals and technical reports as the bibliography indicates. 
MPs were unpaid until 1911 so Barnes, to raise money, wrote a number of ILP 
biographical pamphlets after leaving his salaried ASE position, choosing Henry 
George, Karl Marx, and Robert Burns as subjects.
73
 He wrote about the men who 
inspired him in lively fashion, emphasising their humanity, and the practicality and 
inherent morality of their philosophies. A summary follows because the pamphlets 
offer insight into the shaping of his socio-political beliefs and policies. The appendices 
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contain short biographies of Barnes’ subjects, and several further excerpts that denote 
the reverence with which Barnes approached them.    
Henry George 
 Following the historical election of 1906, Barnes declared that Henry George’s 
Progress and Poverty
74
 was the primary inspiration behind ‘the beginning of his fight’ 
for social justice.
75,76 
 George was very popular among progressive Liberal politicians 
as well as British and Irish socialists. In Henry George, Barnes pithily summarised 
George’s policies, admiring his proposals to ‘tax land values to extinction, or till 
economic rent was swallowed up, excepting only such as amount as would compensate 
landlords for collecting, and he argued that thereby industry would be freed from taxes, 
wages increased, poverty abolished, and a state of society brought about from which 
would emerge a free people, controlling affairs on lines of free and voluntary co-
operation.’
77
   
 Barnes’ sympathies with George were several, including Scottish lineage, early 
entry into work, and ‘The Irish Question’ which occupied great space in the hearts and 
minds of both men. The large Irish Catholic vote in Barnes’ Glasgow constituency and 
his support of Home Rule (and Old Age Pensions) was primarily responsible for his 
holding the seat until retirement in 1922, despite his problems with the Clyde men.  
Barnes borrowed much text from the biography of George written by his son,
78
 yet his 
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own unique voice came through and the tremendous impression ‘The Prophet of San 
Francisco’ made on Barnes was undeniable.  
Robert Burns 
 Barnes also said in 1906 that the poetry of Robert Burns, and ‘the various 
Utopias’, particularly William Morris’ News from Nowhere
79
 further shaped him, 
admitting ‘I have been, and am still, a bit of a dreamer, and this perhaps accounts for 
my taste.’
80
  In Robert Burns, Barnes was particularly tender in considering how his 
fellow Scot’s eighteenth-century poetry shone a light on unacceptable social conditions. 
Burns was ‘the champion as well as the songster of humanity. With unerring instinct he 
could see that there was something radically wrong in a state of society which 
condemned the many to a state of penurious toil that the few might revel in luxurious 
idleness.’  Burns, Barnes wrote, had ‘anticipated economic thought by a hundred years’ 
although ‘he probably never read a text-book of economics in his life.’
 81 
Burns viewed 
the sanctimoniously religious, hypocritical “unco’ guid”
82
 the same way Barnes viewed 
militants who professed salvation but led the workers astray.   
 He was touched by Burns’ depiction of the destitute, broken man who 
questioned why a better life was dangled just beyond reach.
83
  Barnes concluded the 
tract sentimentally, saying Burns (who suffered from deep depression) ‘was a simple 
child of nature whose generous thoughts welled up from the fullness of his heart. As 
counsel for poor mortals he was supreme, his simple reflections as well as homely 
                                                 
79
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was the most deeply scrutinising of Barnes’ three 1909 pamphlets. 
He provided a critical analysis of the Communist Manifesto (1848) arguing that Marx 
was simply misunderstood by many socialists and implied that others twisted his words 
to further their individualistic agendas. Barnes respected Marx’s scientific approach to 
economic innovation and applauded the practicality of historical materialism against 
the ‘utopian’ ideas saturating the labour movement; although a self-proclaimed 
socialist, Barnes believed that the worker’s immediate plight did not allow for 
dreaming about a distant utopia, a conviction that became more deeply embedded over 
time. Marx’s love of humanity was illuminated as Barnes countered popular 
impressions of a cold, philosophical statistician. He argued that the core of Marx’s 
theories, and the key to socialism’s success, was inclusivity, not exclusion, which was 
the true inspiration for class-consciousness as Barnes saw it: - 
He knew that Socialism could be achieved only through and by the people 
as it ceased to be sectarian; that is why he shared in movements intended to 
rouse the workers and to induce them to take a distinctive part in public 
affairs… That the workers of the world are now getting on their political 
legs, that Labour is now getting new hope and a greater respect for itself, 
and that society is consciously shaping itself towards unity and order are 





 Concluding his biographical works, at the age of seventy Barnes delivered a 
1928 lecture on the Life and Work of Robert Owen at King’s College London which the 
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Co-operative Printing Society later published.
86
  Barnes summarised ‘The Owenite 
Philosophy’ of life, denoting Owen’s aversions to religious creeds as well as politics.
87
  
Barnes stressed how the founder of the New Lanark system of Co-operativism 
disregarded divisive doctrines and any class system (although Owen was born into a 
comfortable caste himself). Owen ‘believed in paternal government, and an organised 
society based on paternal principles which should provide for moral as well as material 
needs’ and that ‘individual character could be formed on altruistic lines, and that a 
communistic society would arise as a result.’  Barnes respected Owen for being far 
ahead of his time, a pioneer who lived as he preached regardless of how he might have 
been perceived: -  
…they regarded him, and described him, as a political lunatic. And perhaps 
he was. As a politician he was a failure. But he was one of those glorious 




Perhaps what Barnes most respected about ‘the Newtown Utopian’ was his belief in the 
power of man over machine, and his proven method of creating a sustainable 
community under local control. The New Lanark experiment was the physical 
manifestation of a benevolent doctrine, the ‘practical’ application of socialism 
reorganising industrial society for the better.  
 Barnes took inspiration from these men primarily because of their love of 
mankind. Henry George’s economic policies envisioned a kinder, more cooperative 
society. Robert Burns stressed that brotherhood and solidarity was the key to a better 
                                                 
86
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world. Labour’s rise had proven all that Marx had discussed, and Barnes felt the next 
phase of capitalism was due to take root. Robert Owen had provided the blueprint for 
labour’s reorganisation through practical means. All were underpinned by deep 
convictions and a moral objective, and it was immaterial whether a socialist or 
Christian ‘utopia’ dawned upon the horizon. 
Chairman of the Labour Party   
 Barnes has received harsh criticism regarding his stint as Parliamentary Labour 
Party (PLP) Chairman from 1910-11 under the rotating leadership system. Ramsay 
MacDonald
89
 was reluctant to Chair the fledgling Party himself in 1910, preferring to 
hold the whip as Secretary before succeeding Barnes. MacDonald reportedly said that 
by June 1910 Barnes’ chairmanship was ‘a sad failure… He has no energy and no grasp 
of policy. Our action in the House is consequently feeble, and this has a very bad effect 
outside’
90
  Barnes had criticised his colleagues for their ‘slackness, timidity and failure 
to pressurise the Government’, which Henderson complained opened the Party up to 
criticism in the Tory press.
91
 Henderson complained to MacDonald that he had ‘proved 




 Barnes was reportedly ill during the short 1910-11 Parliament, something his 
memoir neglects to mention.
93
  He recalled that his two most pressing issues as Leader 
were Ireland and the King’s Civil List, the latter putting him in conflict with Lloyd 
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George over nationalising the Duchies of Cornwall and Lancaster. Barnes believed that 
the Royal Family should retain ‘ample provision’ through ‘the bounty of Parliament’, 
but that, echoing Henry George, they should not receive vast sums of money from 
private property. It was noted that Barnes’ lacklustre leadership ensured that 
MacDonald stepped in as a fine orator who was also adept at organisation and strategy, 
with a highly coherent ideology that led Labour thinking at the time.
94
  
 Barnes and MacDonald, however, shared the belief that salaried Labour MPs 
were being distracted from their parliamentary duties by spending time on propaganda 
for women’s suffrage,
95
 with Barnes reportedly displaying ‘impatience and 
dissatisfaction’ with the men.
96
 In his memoir he complained of how Hardie’s repeated 
efforts to defend members of the Women’s Social and Political Union (WSPU) were 
taken for granted.
97
  Although the Labour Party and the moderate NUWSS began to 
harmonise somewhat after the 1911 Party conference,
98
 Barnes recalled the ‘trying 
time’ Labour had in the Houses of Commons trying to reverse the Osborne 
Judgement
99
 and pass the National Insurance Act
100
 while the radical WSPU in 1910 
were ‘on the rampage… giving no quarter and asking none… making war upon us, as 
upon other political parties.’
101
 He cited the case of George Lansbury who lost his 
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Poplar seat after standing for re-election as the women’s candidate.
102
  Although Barnes 
and his sympathisers thought support for women’s suffrage confused MP’s priorities, 
they might have realised that women would support Labour’s proposed reforms of 
education, health, housing and social security. 
The Great War 
 Barnes’ war record has provoked criticism, but on the whole it reflected the 
confusion and uncertainty brought on by the unexpected horrors and hardship of total 
war. 
…It was a fight for life on the part of France and Belgium, and if we had 




Barnes emphasised that the war was against German autocracy and the Kaiser, not 
Germany’s people.
104
  He campaigned long and hard to establish a league of 
democratic nations ‘dedicated to the enforcement of international law’ and maintaining 
peace for the future. 
105
 He was always a proponent of Germany’s earliest entry into the 
League of Nations, but his initial uncertainty over its participation in the Washington 
Conference changed gradually and finally once the International Federation of Trade 
Unions (IFTU) threatened a boycott in August 1919, as discussed in the concluding 
chapter. Barnes’ affinity for the Germans ran deep; his appreciation and admiration for 
German industrial methods deepened when he and Henderson surveyed its 
unemployment provisions together in 1908.
106
 In June 1919 when reparations terms 
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were being debated, he toured the formerly occupied German areas with James T. 
Shotwell of the American delegation to see first-hand the war’s effect on its people, 
also discussed in the Epilogue.
107,108
  
 In 1915 Barnes was a member of the Asquith coalition with Lloyd George and 
Bonar Law, among others.  Once the Government took complete control of the wartime 
direction of industry, the 1915 Munitions Act weakened trade union control by 
forbidding strikes and lockouts and initiating compulsory arbitration. As part of the 
Act’s measures Barnes recruited mechanics from Canada and travelled to the French 
frontlines to release men for domestic munitions production. His support for the bill to 
conscript unmarried men underscored his resolve to achieve the war’s final and 
decisive conclusion. The loss of his eldest son Henry on the battlefield at Loos
109
 only 
reinforced his determination.  Looking back he said that if anyone had understood ‘the 
magnitude of the task’ ahead, the Allies would have mobilised all of their forces from 
the outset, instead of in ‘driblets’ after ‘various makeshifts and evasions.’
110
   
 Barnes helped establish a working men’s Savings Association to aid the war 
effort, and lobbied for pensions and allowances for volunteers’ dependents.
111
  He 
served on the conscientious objectors’ appeal board, strongly supporting the pacifist’s 
rights in genuine cases, while insisting that they aid the nation somehow.
112
  He 
commented that even the Quaker community did their part, going into the battle zones 
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to tend to the wounded.
113
 Barnes respected those ‘individuals who feel impelled at all 
costs to render their obedience to an inner law rather than obey the secular arms when it 




 Barnes helped Lloyd George come to power in December 1916 over disillusion 
with Asquith’s performance as wartime premier, and was rewarded with one of the few 
Cabinet posts given to Labour MPs before forming their first Government.  His loyalty 
to the Lloyd George coalition deepened as the division with the left fomented in the 
north-east and on the Clydeside in particular, where his ASE tenure and involvement 
with the Munitions Act had already created a divide. Barnes’ role as a Labour member 
of the coalition grew increasingly complicated as uncertainty and distrust over the 
Government’s direction of the war and industrial policy mounted. 
The Lloyd George Coalition 
 
 The latter half of the war was characterised by vast discontent in the labour 
movement, owing largely to rising prices and rents. An unprecedented surge in 
bargaining power resulted from full employment, and the sense of national unity that 
Asquith, ‘the old captain’, was able to maintain was lost. Organised labour was central 
to Lloyd George’s command of the war effort, and at the outset he remarked that the 
Labour Party’s place in the wartime coalition was not ‘because they are suitable men, 
but because they have a large class who should have a voice in the government.’
115
 
Barnes was integral to the Prime Minister’s effectiveness in resolving conflicts, 
continually asserting that along with satisfying the workers’ material and psychological 
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needs, restoring national unity was central to maintaining industrial peace. Barnes was 
an important, essential resource for the Prime Minister in gauging national and 
international working class sentiment on many issues. He withstood numerous 
challenges and controversies in the war cabinet which exceeded Lloyd George’s 
expectations, and his role as Paris plenipotentiary and leader of the British delegation 
on the International Labour Commission was secured after the December 1918 General 
Election.  
 Labour’s entry into the Lloyd George Coalition Government was conditional 
upon the creation of the Ministry of Labour (‘MoL’) the nationalisation of coal mining, 
and promises opposing universal industrial conscription.
116
 J.S. Middleton, Labour 
Party Secretary for forty years, observed that Barnes was ‘largely responsible for the 
more enlightened policy that characterised that ministry.’
117
 Barnes formed and headed 
the new Ministry of Pensions. Before accepting the post he insisted upon the revision of 
the Royal Warrant for the Army: 1917 saw the introduction of an improved pensions 
and payment system for disabled servicemen,
118  
along with a state-funded programme 
for rehabilitating injured soldiers.
119
 As manpower shortages and munitions needs 
intensified, these advances were easily overlooked.  
 Barnes grew increasingly unpopular with swathes of labour through his support 
for conscription and dilution,
120
 and the bitter split from the ASE was fresh enough for 
many engineers in the North East particularly to recall. The crippling May 1917 
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engineering strikes laid bare the level of industrial unrest across the country, and stoked 
Governmental fears that left-wing revolt could devastate munitions production. 
Sympathetic strikes broke out across industry, driven by inactivity over high food 
prices, extensions to the Military Service Acts, the abolition of the Trade Card 
Scheme,
121
and the introduction of dilution into private enterprise. David 
Shackleton’s
122
 weekly press intelligence briefings to the Lloyd George Secretariat 
were alarming. The Labour press condemned profiteering, rampant high prices and 
poor food supplies as compulsory rationing for the working classes. News about Russia 
and the Provisional Government fired up the left’s presses, and Socialist newspapers 
declared Britain’s Imperialist ambitions went far beyond destroying German 
aggression. Even the mainstream newspapers were critical of Governmental secrecy 
and various departments’ failure to provide information about changes to the Munitions 
Acts: even The Times demanded ‘a fresh air policy and immediate ventilation of the 
facts connected with industrial unrest.’
123
 Although Shackleton and Barnes both 
believed the revolutionary mindset was in the minority, it was vital to encourage 
moderate trade unionists by enlisting Labour MPs who represented trade union 
orthodoxy to speak.
124
 Barnes, in accord with the MoL and other departments, was 
integral to the propaganda campaign to restore national unity, quell restiveness and 
prevent ‘a purely unconstitutional and rebel movement’ from overtaking the Shop 
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  He seized the opportunity to express his personal policies for industrial 
and social peace in an official capacity.  
Home Rule for Industry 
 Barnes spoke at local working men’s meetings, and wrote editorials for his 
constituency newspaper, making public his policy of ‘home rule’ for industry.
126
  It was 
recorded elsewhere that the civil servant Harold Butler developed a Ministry of Labour 
policy of ‘home rule for industry’ in 1918, maintaining the ‘impartiality of the state’ in 
a drive to safeguard minimum standards, devolved from state control.
127
 Barnes was 
probably its pioneer, having circulated his ‘home rule’ policy to the Ministry of Labour 
and the Cabinet months earlier. Barnes’ War Cabinet memo of May 31
st
 about the Shop 
Stewards Movement advocated that devolving some power from the Executive to 
‘responsible’, moderate trade unionists would restore their sense of control and prevent 
militants from taking advantage of the opportunity the Munitions Acts had given them.  
Most workers sought solutions for their hardship, not class war, he wrote, arguing that 
once the industrial objects were obtained the allure of syndicalism would fade. Barnes 
was sympathetic to the goal of giving the workman back his voice, but through 
constitutional methods and within the existing structure.
128
  
 In concert with the recent Whitley Committee proposals
129
 for national joint 
industrial councils, Barnes proposed a Factory Workshop Committee system to restore 
faith in the national Executive, reporting that ‘self-seeking agitators’ had been replaced 
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with ‘responsible men’ in this way in some districts.
130  
Barnes concluded that restoring 
trust and solidarity in the workplace was the only way to keep industrial peace. It was 




 Barnes’ two Glasgow Herald columns sought to restore national support, 
publicise his policies, and keep the Government from over-reacting. He drew upon 
sympathy for honest workers struggling under the weight of capitalistic, industrial and 
world conditions beyond their control. Deflecting the blame for hardship away from 
war policy was perhaps one of the ‘right messages’ Shackleton had recommended.
132
  
Barnes envisioned a better way ahead, something of a precursor to the ‘New Jerusalem’ 
attitude Labour espoused during the Second World War: - 
After the war, and in a world made plastic by common struggle and 
suffering, we are going to stamp upon it the impress of a new order, 
breathing into it a spirit altogether different from that which animated the 
old. In other words, that man is no longer going to be pitted against his 
fellow man, but that we are going to live in a community in which labour 




The first article, ‘The Future of Industry’ reiterated the merits of the Workshop 
Committee and included practical scenarios for restructuring industrial management. 
Foreshadowing innovation introduced with the ILO scheme, Barnes proposed a post-
war tripartite structure of employer, worker and the State cooperating to establish 
greatly improved standards and conditions. To assure that dilution was just temporary, 
he declared that these new standards would ‘remove temptation of substitution from 
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employers and fear of it on the part of skilled workmen.’
134
 Those displaced by 
machines would be trained for new jobs, financed through the more efficient 
production methods. He concluded that after the war: -  
…the nation will be impoverished, taxation will be high, and competition 
will be keen with countries hit less hard (than Britain)… given goodwill 
and co-operation, given a desire to promote an atmosphere of confidence in 
place of that of mistrust, then there is nothing to fear… the anarchists who 
have been troublesome during the war will be troublesome after it: but if we 
set our house in order, labour itself may be trusted to sweep them aside with 




There was a different tone to the second, June 20 column, printed some weeks after the 
Leeds Convention hailed the Russian revolution and resolved for a negotiated end to 
the war.
136,137
  Here Barnes even more sympathetically and philosophically depicted  
the need of disenfranchised labour to be closer to the centre of political and industrial 
life, declaring that the employer must recognise that ‘they must be given a place in the 
scheme of things and made to feel that they have a voice in determining the conditions 
under which they work.’
138
  Barnes felt that radicals would be redeemed through 
returning ‘the human factor’ to industrial reconstruction and creating trust within the 
entire community of workers. ‘Democracy and efficiency must be brought into 
harmony instead of being in conflict’, yet he proclaimed ‘No one is to blame for this… 
It is the inevitable outcome of competitive struggle in a Capitalist 
environment… the large-scale methods have conflicted with human rights 
and human emotions. They produce a smouldering discontent, liable at any 
time to be fanned into flame by irresponsible persons… They are the sort of 
things, however, that must be faced and dealt with before we can have 
industrial peace or political peace… We must aim at giving Home Rule to 
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The Industrial Unrest Commission 
 Barnes’ involvement with the June 1917 Commission of Enquiry into Industrial 
Unrest (‘Unrest Commission’) particularly demonstrated his capacity to lead the British 
delegation of the International Labour Commission after the war. His Unrest 
Commission report expressed some of his own fundamental values, and considered the 
mutual concerns of worker, employer and State much as the 1919 Commission did on a 
much larger scale. Subsequently, Barnes was appointed in March 1918 to a special sub-
commission of the Reconstruction Committee, tasked with making early proposals for 
demobilisation, housing, and reorganisation of nationalised industries in coordination 
with relevant departments and Ministries.
140
  The Labour press was sceptical and 
unimpressed when the Commission was announced, since the Government has been so 
slow to deal with profiteering, and the worst of the engineering strikes ended in mid-
May.
141,142
 However the Unrest Commission significantly floodlighted from official 
sources for the first time deeply embedded evils caused by industrialisation which 
transcended the hardships exacerbated by the war. 
  Barnes presented the combined findings of the eight commissions spanning 
England, Wales and Scotland on July 17, 1917.  His report noted firstly a strong sense 
of patriotism, and that the revolutionary mindset was in the minority.
143
  Anger over 
Governmental opaqueness and the Munitions Acts were reconfirmed, and fears that 
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pre-war industrial protections were forever lost were explicit.
144 
 Barnes noted the poor 
psychological condition of labour: feelings of inequality of sacrifice, and a sense that 
‘their conditions of work and destinies are being determined by a distant authority over 
which they have no influence.’
145
 It was highly recommended that the Government 
announce a housing policy, as ‘industrially congested’ areas were particularly lacking 
good housing. A ‘lack of communal sense’ was apparent in South Wales, evident in a 
‘breakaway from faith in Parliamentary representation’ there. Barnes concluded again 
that better employer-worker relations were necessary for industrial peace, and that 




 Barnes reported that the poor housing situation in Barrow along with parts of 
Scotland and Wales, and the dire industrial and social conditions in Wales, were deeply 
entrenched and required longer-term attention.  The report of the commission for Wales 
was extraordinary in its scientific and philosophical examination of psychological 
conditions in destitute, rural coal-mining communities.
147,148
  The political implications 
of unrest there were so profound that militancy was ‘almost a permanent condition… 
hostility to Capitalism has now become part of the political creed’ across industry. 
Distrust of Government was rife among employers and workers alike, and the 
commission for Wales placed much blame on disillusion over ‘the failure of the Labour 
Party to bring about a complete change in the industrial fabric.’
149
 Barnes later urged 
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Lloyd George to establish a special or even a Royal Commission to help South Wales 
remedy its deplorable social and economic condition.  He reported that the Local 
Government Board was unable to deal with profound housing needs and the ‘grave and 
revolutionary ideas’ shaping the younger generation of coal workers.
150
  
 The Government did take action against profiteering before the Commission’s 
findings were complete, vastly expanding the remit of the Food Controller in June. 
Prices on bread and other goods were immediately lowered but meat prices remained 
extortionate while milk supplies were increased.
151
 Lord Rhondda replaced an 
ineffectual Lord Davenport as Food Controller, assisted by Labour’s J R Clynes,
152
 and 
a more definitive food policy was announced in August.
153
 The establishment of 
industrial councils, as the Commissioners recommended and the Whitley Report 
advocated, materialised into the Joint Industrial Councils between employers and trade 
unions, but not until April 1919.
154,155,156
 Changes to the Munitions Acts by August 
1918 included abolition of leaving certificates (which assigned skilled men to lower 
skilled and lower paid jobs), pension delays were addressed, and workmen’s 
compensation also increased.  Barnes made public statements when any of the Unrest 
Commission recommendations were carried out.
157
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 A contemporary analyst commented that the Unrest Commission provoked 
unprecedented industrial and social questions that were ‘by no means limited to special 
war legislation.’
158
 Although initially part of Harmsworth’s propaganda mission, the 
Unrest Commission prompted considerable policy change and gave Barnes the 
opportunity to prove his capacity for managing a comprehensive Government initiative.  
The all-encompassing domestic propaganda drive was taken up by the cross-party 
National War Aims Committee (NWAC) in August, chaired by Lloyd George, Barnes, 
Bonar Law and Asquith. The NWAC was highly patriotic, its core messages reflected a 
diffuse nationalism and values that Britain’s ‘civilised’ allies shared, guided by the 
principle that what came after the war would be better than what preceded it.
159
  After 
the NWAC ceased its activities Barnes carried forward its ‘patriotic Labour’ ethos as a 
National Democratic Party (NDP) candidate during the 1918 General Election.
160
  
The Split from Labour: Country before Party 
 There was great controversy in August 1917 when Barnes permanently replaced 
Henderson, his closest colleague in the War Cabinet, as Minister without Portfolio. 
Barnes temporarily replaced Henderson in June 1917 when Henderson was sent by the 
Cabinet to Russia to convince the Provisional Government to ‘pursue the war with 
energy.’
161
  He quickly became convinced that the temporary government was near 
collapse, and sensed a tremendous threat from the Bolshevists; the Labour Party 
Conference subsequently resolved in favour of an indemnity-free, negotiated settlement 
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and for the ‘unofficial’ Stockholm peace conference.
162
 When Henderson travelled to 
France with Ramsay MacDonald, representing the Union of Democratic Control 
(UDC)
163
 to meet pacifist Socialists, Lloyd George came under increased pressure from 
the Allies to shun the Labour Party.
164
  Henderson was made to wait in the hall while 
the Cabinet debated his fate; Barnes, who had defended Henderson and the Conference 
decision, was sent out to retrieve him. Henderson’s resignation came twelve days later 
when the Government denied passports for Labour members bound for Stockholm.
 165
    
 The Labour Leader was furious, declaring the residual Labour Cabinet could no 
longer speak as representatives of the Party.
166
 Lloyd George had discarded Labour ‘as 
soon as a snag arose’ despite their war sacrifices.
167
  Barnes withstood accusations of 
betrayal, maintaining his conviction that ‘it would be fatal to Labour to split away’, and 
insisting ‘we are keeping your end up in the Government.’
168
  He had supported 
Labour’s Stockholm referendum vote despite his personal forebodings about letting 
Germany determine peace terms when it suited her most, a move which expressed his 
faith in democratic and constitutional procedures.
169
 Barnes insisted that the role of the 
Labour Party Cabinet members was unchanged, and that the December 1916 coalition 
agreement held: -  
As far as I was concerned, the issues of the war would from then be 
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regarded as too important to be again made from the sport of chance 
conferences, and from that time onwards I would regard my mandate as 
fixed, unless it were to be revoked by some clear indication, by vote or 
otherwise, of change of Labour opinion. There never was such indication.
170
   
 
Barnes has been accused of opportunism and seizing his ‘big moment’ by some 
commentators,
171
 but on a more measured consideration Barnes was Henderson’s most 
natural replacement when his position became untenable. Both downplayed the 
replacement, attributing it to personal decision and minor disagreement.
172
 Opposing 




Amid great excitement, and under circumstances of insult and indignity 
which created resentment among the British working class, Mr. Henderson 
felt obliged to tender his resignation of his place in the War Cabinet, in 
which he was succeeded by Mr. Barnes, who was getting more and more 




…To anyone who knew Barnes the accusation that he had been guilty of 
dishonourable conduct was ridiculous, and in his Glasgow constituency, 
although the Clyde area was one of the principal centres of labour unrest, he 





It was the beginning of the end for the remaining Coalition Labour members, finally 
disowned by the Party left in January 1918 for rejecting the Corn Production Bill. 
Barnes was the target of ‘vigorous attacks’ from the ILP for making Constituency 
speeches against wage demands while soldiers and their dependents remained 
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 James Maxton, ‘with the satisfied tone of some evil enchanter in an 
Eastern tale’ proclaimed Barnes had ‘departed absolutely from the spirit of the Labour 
Movement’ and was ‘going under with the rest of his friends.’
177,178
  Nevertheless in 
March 1918, Barnes appealed to the Commercial Committee in the House of Commons 
not to ‘harden our hearts’ in the wake of the Russian revolution, and instead ‘look with 
sympathy upon all movements which are intended to extend the borders of human 
freedom.’
179
    
 The national press regularly reported on disorderly scenes in Barnes’ 
constituency. By the end of August 1918, Barnes had been fully repudiated by the ILP, 
the Glasgow Labour Party and the Gorbals Divisional Committee. During one volatile 
public meeting, his declarations about post-war economics, industrial control and raised 
living standards were barely heard as ‘The Red Flag’ rang out, and he was beseeched to 
release the self-declared Bolshevist John Maclean from prison.
180
  Barnes did free him, 
but Maclean ran against him as the ILP candidate for Glasgow Gorbals.
181
  Despite the 




 Announcing his Coalition run as the National Labour candidate in November 
1918, Barnes said: - 
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My support of the war brought opposition in my constituency from that 
section of Labour which has now captured the Labour Party Machine. I 
know that this section does not represent the rank and file of Labour in the 
country, and for me to take my marching orders from it would be to act the 
part of the coward. I have no intention of doing anything of the kind. I am 
standing my ground. If the electorate in my constituency rejects me, well 
and good, that will settle it. But whether in the Government or out of it, or 




 Barnes remained MP, and Minister without Portfolio, to the war’s end. He was 
officially appointed to the Reconstruction Committee,
184
 promoted measures for 
miners' welfare, women's suffrage, and educational advance.
185
 He urged the Prime 
Minister to establish a Committee of Employers and Workmen in shipbuilding because 
the employers were ‘very upset about the governmental interference in their 
business.’
186
  In his pivotal War Cabinet role, Barnes advised Lloyd George and his 
relatively informal Downing Street ‘Garden Suburb’ on numerous issues including 
Irish Home Rule,
187
 relations with the ASE,
188
 Litvinoff’s impact on the British 
industrial situation (Barnes thought it was over-stated),
189
 the Food Controller’s 
office,
190
  and Governmental appointments, offering the Prime Minister speech-writing 
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The League to Abolish War and the League of Nations 
 Barnes’ tenacity put him in hot water with his own Government in June 1918 
when they delayed committing to the idea for the League of Nations. Barnes was a 
founder and chair of the small but vocal Congregationalist-based Labour-supporting 
group, the League to Abolish War (LAW), established in 1916 with his friend, the 
pastor F Herbert Stead. The LAW held that international machinery for maintaining 
peace would ‘lay down and guarantee the rights of working men, and thus offer some 
real opportunities for industrial reconstruction.’
193
  Barnes’ agitations for an official 
British declaration combined his extra-parliamentary activity and ministerial 
responsibilities, and when his public speeches were interpreted at home and abroad as 
Government policy the Foreign Office brought him to heel. Despite witnessing the 
Henderson affair first hand, Barnes apparently did not appreciate the sensitivity of his 
position.   
 As both LAW Chair and Coalition Government member, Barnes pressed for the 
publication of the 1917 Phillimore Commission Report advocating a post-war 
democratic League.
194
 Phillimore’s findings were suppressed in Britain and America 
for several reasons, but ultimately anything that might derail the public’s full attention 
from a complete Allied victory was off the table.
195
  Barnes determined during the May 
1918 LAW Conference that an inter-allied commission should draft a League 
document, and that President Wilson should ask the Dutch to arrange meeting in the 
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Hague to consider it, in part as an inducement to the Central Powers.
196
 Stead 
communicated this to Balfour at the Foreign Office, suggesting that this committee 
should fully comprise ‘the people’s life in each nation - representatives of organised 
labour’, not just diplomats, lawyers and the military.  What the LAW suggested, from 
the Government standpoint, was an ‘unofficial’ conference including political outsiders 
of the type the UDC, the Labour Party and international Socialist parties advocated. 
The proposal was made just as the German Kaisserschlacht pummelled Allied forces. 




 Barnes’ vigorous campaign for public support was immediate, attracting great 
press attention. He called for the Hague Conference, stressing the ‘growing feeling on 
the part of organised labour and democracy’ that they be involved in governmental 
consultations about the future peace of the world. He named the United States’ Samuel 
Gompers and France’s Albert Thomas as men who ‘should bring into the discussion the 
real, live feeling which they alone could give from direct contact with the people.’
198,199 
The Manchester Guardian took this as a sign that the Government was ‘anxious’ for a 
concrete League of Nations, and saw positive indication that the tactics of international 




 A sharp May 22 Foreign Office memo regarding Stead’s letter made clear that 
any ‘tangible scheme’ would be determined by the Allied plenipotentiaries, and it was 
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‘no use for the pacifists to delude themselves’ over a Third Hague Conference. Any 
scheme like theirs was beyond the boundaries of ‘practical statesmanship’, and would 
be ‘politely buried among the visionary schemes of the dreamers.'
201
 Stead later 
informed Balfour that the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and PLP officially supported 
the LAW’s plan,
202
  but the reply came that only the sanctioned Peace Conference 
would assess the feasibility of any peace-enforcing league.
203
  
 On the European continent, Barnes’ May remarks were interpreted as a volte-
face on war policy, the Government seen as buckling under the weight of domestic 
critique. The Berliner Tageblatt believed that the Dutch would have no choice but to 
invite Germany, and Barnes’ declaration that ‘the time was ripe’ inferred that the 
Cabinet was nudging Wilson towards negotiated terms in ‘the strongest peace offensive 
to which the Lloyd George Cabinet has hitherto had to bring itself.’
204
  Even worse, 
Barnes had called for the Hague Conference during a commemoration of Karl Marx’s 
centenary. The French minority Socialist newspaper L'Humanité’ took this to heart, 
their correspondent perceiving an Allied call for an accord orchestrated with the 
Central Powers.
205
 Barnes’ remark that labour specialists be included in any peace 
discussion was taken as support for the Stockholm Conference ‘and similar projects.’
206
 
L'Humanité’ revelled in a normally ‘jingo’ English War Cabinet member’s call for 
nationalisation of weapons-making and disarmament, and Barnes’ advocacy for a 
Germany-inclusive league was applauded.  The Socialist paper concluded that a wise 
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Germany would immediately organise a conference of neutral and central powers with 
the Dutch independently.
207
   
 Barnes was reprimanded, as his address to a large Dartford assembly made 
clear. He clarified that he had been speaking without authority and stated definitively 
that a negotiated peace was off the table: any ‘early’ conference suggestion he made 
was taking account of exhausted, war-weary diplomats.
208
 Barnes declared he ‘could 
not talk peace when there could be no peace’, and that defeating German domination 
was the priority. He was definitive that Germany’s entry to the league was dependent 
upon a show of repentance, not as a favour but as a requirement.
209  
 Once German 
defences faltered during the summer of 1918, however, Barnes returned to publicly 
agitating for the League, taking on the officials during his August Cambridge 
University address -  
The man in the street is thinking far ahead of Foreign Office and 
Governments on these matters, and will at once assert himself if the 
question begins really to be discussed through the public Press and platform 
in the form of concrete, practical proposals. The peoples are not going to be 
content with mere rinsings of historical dustbins, but will insist on a scheme 
based on present needs… I want the League of Nations idea to be brought 




It has been observed that this ‘surely must have violated all the tenets of collective 
Cabinet responsibility.’
211
 Barnes spoke of collective security and diminished necessity 
for sovereignty after the war, and that ‘regulation and restriction must take the place of 
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 ‘The new order’ after the war, Barnes declared, required labour’s full 
participation: -  
Labour is not going back to the old position of dependence and 
subordination. It will take its rightful place in the world of industry as a 
partner and sharer in the responsibilities of management in all that relates to 
its citizen rights and in the maintenance of decent standards of life… All 





Labour and the New World Order 
 By September 1918, Barnes had safely retained his War Cabinet seat, confident 
about his position as the interconnected reconstruction ministries considered labour’s 
place in the post-war settlement. Barnes made public declarations about the 
Government’s plans for the Paris peace discussions. ‘We have had international 
industrial congresses and commissions in the past, but beyond passing resolutions they 
have done little or nothing. What we need is some kind of international machinery that 
will set up and enforce a decent standard of life.’
 214
 A special commission would 
consider how to secure that goal, and report its findings to the League of Nations to be 
put into operation ‘as part of its duties.’ Barnes said his first task was ensuring the 
British delegation had a detailed proposal for ‘some definite plan of organisation’ by 
December, minimising the odds that the Peace Conference would pass without yielding 
a ‘practical result.’
215
   
 Woodrow Wilson declared on September 27 that the League of Nations 
Covenant would be incorporated into the Peace Treaty, and the Germans agreed to a 
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peace based upon his fourteen points on October 6. Barnes presided over a prestigious 
meeting at Westminster’s Central Hall where Lord Grey announced Wilson’s policy to 
massive cross-party support.
216
 Barnes was again coy, joking that his position ‘of some 
responsibility in the affairs of State’ was ‘temporary, accidental, and …sometimes 
embarrassing.’
217
 Lord Grey praised Barnes, noting the respect he had commanded 
from the entire House of Commons as a member of the Labour Party (some weeks 
ahead of his Party resignation, discussed below). Grey’s speech signified that labour’s 
progress had entered a new phase: - 
I think Labour is undoubtedly going to take a larger and more prominent 
share in Governments than it has before. It may be that here, as elsewhere, 
we shall have Labour Governments… Is it not possible that as Labour takes 
a larger and more prominent share in government, it may find a League of 
Nations useful as a means of giving a more official character to these 
international consultations in the interest of Labour which independent 




The 1918 General Election 
 After the November 1918 armistice, the December General Election that 
followed returned a tremendous victory for the Lloyd George Coalition. The 
implications of the end of the electoral truce, for the nation and for the Labour Party, 
have been widely discussed.
219
 Less than two weeks after the Coalition’s victory, 
Barnes was chosen to go to Paris by Lloyd George, as British Labour’s representative 
at the Peace Conference.  J S Middleton succinctly stated that he remained in the 
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Coalition ‘with the avowed object of influencing the peace terms.’
220
  Barnes quipped 
cheekily after the Liberal Prime Minister and Conservative Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain,
221
 made their maiden campaign speeches that they 
had virtually adopted the same socialistic language he had long employed: ‘May I say 
they have been converted to our point of view?  Or is it that we have been so much 
misunderstood? I might almost sit down now after saying “ditto” to all they have said.’ 
Barnes’ departure from the Party he had helped create was official, and this heartfelt, 
significant declaration warrants reproduction: - 
My appearance today on this platform marks for me a definite break – 
temporarily, at all events – from my political past…  I owe all I am and all I 
have to Labour. I want nothing better than to serve Labour, and I feel 
perfectly convinced that I shall serve them best by staying in the present 




Despite reported cries of ‘stick it’ from the crowd, he carried on: -  
 
…When I say peace, I include industrial and social peace, because to my 
mind, it would be a tragic thing if this war abroad were followed by 
industrial convulsions at home. But there is no change to my attitude… I 
think that coming out of the Government now would be a bad thing for 
Labour, because it would deprive Labour of a voice in the conditions in the 
period of transition from war to peace.
223
   
 
…The Peace Conference is going to give us a new world, in which each 
nation will be free to paddle its own canoe and live its own life under its 
own form of government… we shall be able for the first time, I hope, to 
apply our minds to lifting life and labour from the lower animal struggle for 
the bread that perisheth…
224
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He announced that when peace was secure, and reconstruction safely underway, he 
would probably retire.   
 Barnes was not sorry that such turbulence left him free to follow his own 
course.
225
 Looking back in 1923, he accepted the criticism that Coalition Labour 
received. ‘We had to help carry out laws and regulations contrary to Labour’s cherished 
ideals’, an ‘inevitable condition of coalition government intent on the full prosecution 
of war.’
226
   Barnes was adamant he would fulfil his mandate and secure for labour that 
which had been promised: - 
That particular part of the garden of peace allotted to me was that of 
Labour… what I feared was that the Peace Conference would be confronted 
only with time-worn rhetorical phrases which would lead to no practical 





Chapters two through five that follow discuss chronologically the role Barnes played in 
preparing for the Peace Conference while in Britain until January 1919, and while in 
Paris in late March 1919 when the Labour Commission officially ended its work there. 
Chapter Six then examines Barnes’ life and work after the 1919 Peace Conference, 
comprising a review of additional sources discovered and research needed to create a  
full biography of George N. Barnes that covers in depth his latter years as an 
international diplomat, and  as a spokesperson, educator and representative for world 
labour.  
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Conclusions   
 Barnes’ social awareness, political career and policy choices were shaped in the 
nineteenth century, as a labourer before trade unions had amassed great power, and 
before industrial protections and provisions were part of working class existence. A 
communitarian, ethical ‘practicality’ underpinned his entire perspective, before and 
following the Labour Party’s creation, for his class comprised most of society yet was 
deprived of life’s most basic provisions. As his activism advanced, the desire to do the 
most good for the most in the community was reinforced when he saw ‘revolutionary’ 
types pitting man against man in (what he assessed as) a cerebral and selfish class-war 
exercise. A practical understanding of Parliament reinforced his belief that for Labour 
to succeed with progressive reform, it had to be ‘a broad church’, a class-free coalition 
appealing to those sympathetic with the working-class and not exclusive to it. A 
turbulent turn on the ASE Executive reinforced his preference for and faith in 
constitutional practices and structures when he saw a handful of men once again put 
their interests, whether on the Executive or the shop floor, before those of the 
community-at-large.   
 As a Parliamentarian, Barnes supported ‘new’ Liberal policies to advance 
Labour’s agenda. As the rift with the Clyde mounted he persevered, almost relishing 
the challenge, believing that militancy must remain in the minority lest it confound the 
course of the Party.  As the Labour Party struggled to find its feet he too struggled to 
lead it, as nineteenth century ideas tried to adjust to twentieth century priorities. 
Political Labour came about during rapid industrial, social and technological change, 
and the implications of such rapid change (Barnes pre-dated electricity!) were most 
challenging. Similarly, the war exceeded even the wildest imaginations in scale and 
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ferocity, and Barnes again struggled to balance human mortality with Cabinet 
responsibility.  Such was the horror of the thought of another such conflagration that 
Barnes fought for a democratic league of nations even after incurring the wrath of his 
own Cabinet. Had the November armistice not arrived when it did, his path may indeed 
have taken a different course: given his obstinacy he could have wound up outside 
Government and Party.  
 While Henderson’s attempt to ‘serve two masters’ ultimately led to the 
reorganisation of the Labour Party machine, Barnes’ attempt took him toward the 
institutionalised reorganisation of international labour. His small ideas about national 
Workshop Committees and their constitutional structures, underpinned by his 
ideological beliefs about ethical morality and edification, translated into large visions 
mirrored in the International Labour Conference’s composition of socialists, academics, 
government members and trade unionists.  Barnes’ abilities and ideological beliefs 
were constantly tested in the Lloyd George administration, and his complex War 
Cabinet role consolidated his work as propagandist, labour conciliator and policy 
coordinator, ultimately preparing him for the work in Paris. He was admittedly 
opportunistic, recognising the potential to broadcast his personal propaganda about the 
redirection of industry, and adamant that the State had acknowledged labour’s right of 
inclusion in the decision-making process.  
 Barnes’ high visibility during the war’s final phases, and consistent use of anti-
Bolshevist messaging, helped secure moderate, majority support for the idea that 
British labour could sit comfortably within the centres of power. Barnes elevated 
British Labour’s profile on the international stage as the war ended, an ‘acceptable’ 
face of socialism standing alongside David Lloyd George and President Woodrow 
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Wilson, elevating the Party’s appearance of responsibility. He also knew that Labour 
could not remain outside the Peace Conference as a mere pressure group or as the 
Royal Opposition. The competing tensions between socialism, trade unionism and 
parliamentary democracy that characterised Barnes’ domestic public life ultimately 
propelled him toward the international sphere. While channelling many international 
ideas during his time serving the Labour Commission in Paris, however, Barnes’ 
relatively restrained ‘internationalism’ at that stage always maintained British, 
‘national’ overtones, very much attuned to the general setting of the Allied Peace 
Conference. The following sections discuss how his experiences there may have shaped 
his outlook and direction. 
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 2 Preparations ahead of the Peace Conference  
No single item provoked the War Cabinet to declare an official policy on the 
reorganisation of labour and its place at the Peace Conference, but as the Labour Party 
and the Second International pressed for an independent, concurrently running labour 
congress, Barnes worked from within to influence and expedite the Government’s 
proactive stance. Barnes had been broadcasting that his Government would devise a 
plan for restructuring labour since 1917, as discussed above. From November 1918 
Barnes communicated confidentially with Henderson (Chairman of the Labour Party he 
had just left), about such plans, before Balfour made Henderson an official adviser to 
the Labour Commission in late January 1919.  Henderson had become a well-
established figure within the Second International and his correspondence with Barnes 
indicated that a joint effort to influence the Government position was afoot.  
The inception of the Labour Commission  
 Further documentation showed that as early as February 1918 Barnes had argued 
during War Cabinet meetings in support of a world labour conference including Allies 
and former enemies. He cited the need to respond to shifting international opinion, 
pointing out the diplomatic value in guiding former hostiles towards ‘responsible peace 
terms,’
1
 and that denying such a conference would only ‘create friction and strengthen 
the disaffected element in the community.’ Furthermore, a Bolshevist-led conference 
would probably exclude people like Henderson and Hjalmar Branting, leader of 
Switzerland’s Social Democratic Party, Barnes explained.
2,3
 Barnes fully supported the 
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September 1918 International Socialist and Labour Conference (ISLC) decision for a 
Paris labour congress to run concurrently with the pending Allied peace talks. He 
personally directed the Foreign Office to ensure passports for Henderson and William 
Gillies when the time came, suggesting that Camille Huysmans
4
 use Barnes’ 
handwritten letter if the Belgian authorities gave him any trouble.
5,6
  
 Germany had also announced they would take a stand concerning the future 
direction of labour in Paris, a point wielded by the TUC which prompted further 
Governmental introspection. On November 1
st
 a TUC and Labour Party delegation had 
intimated to the War Cabinet that Germany might take credit for the formal labour 
declaration in the Treaty if Britain hesitated. Their declaration inferred their expectation 
of directly influencing the British Commission responsible for the Treaty’s labour 
section, also asking the Prime Minister officially to sanction the conference they and 
other ‘responsible’ labour organisations were promoting.
7
 The TUC statement 
highlighted Chancellor Prince Maximilian Wilhelm of Baden’s proclamation that 
German plenipotentiaries would raise the question of minimum standards for world 
labour during the Peace Conference.
8,9
   
 Barnes informed Henderson that the Imperial War Cabinet discussed the TUC’s 
declaration ‘at length’ in early December.
10
 During the meeting, Barnes pressed for 
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religious, labour and other conferences to be allowed to convene freely and make 
presentations to the Peace Conference, seeking an official statement that the Treaty talks 
would thereby ‘harmonise’ in principle with mass workers’ opinion.
11
  He was steadfast 
when met with resistance, explaining (in Clemenceau’s presence) that he only wanted 
the British Government to do what France’s Prime Minister had done, alluding to Leon 
Jouhaux of the Confédération générale du travail (General Confederation of Labour / 
CGT)’s unofficial counsel.
12
 Barnes’ boldness paid off, and the British, Italian and 
French Governments all assented. Lloyd George remarked that he held no overt 
objection to Barnes’ suggestion, but warned that it was ‘very dangerous to have too 
much to do with these “Soviets.”
13,14 
   
 Barnes informed Henderson immediately, even drafting a letter for Lloyd 
George’s signature to make it official. The letter was withheld on account of the Allies’ 
refusal to take any decisions until American opinion was clear; nevertheless, the Prime 
Minister consented to Barnes’ and Henderson’s unofficial liaison. He let Barnes warn 
Henderson early on that the Allies would insist that the labour conference be held in a 
neutral country. Barnes wrote that the Prime Minister ‘…agreed that I might let you 
know on the quiet, so that as much time as possible might be given to you to make the 
necessary arrangements, as I put it to him that would be only fair and was in fact 
necessary.’
15
 Barnes suggested that holding it on neutral territory might help ‘ensure 
that the terms of the Peace Treaty harmonised with the wishes of the mass of the 
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workpeople in Europe’, and he assured Henderson that the Allies would thereby present 
‘no obstacle’ against its proceeding before the Treaty was signed.
16
   
 The Home Office and MoL joint memorandum of December 9, Labour Matters 
and the Peace Conference (‘joint memo’), opened by reiterating the German statement, 
making clear that the Government had taken the TUC’s warning seriously. It 
determined that a British-led labour commission would announce its aims early in the 
Peace Conference, proposing specific labour provisions for the Treaty, before the 
League’s membership was fully determined. It made the political, economic and 
diplomatic cases for Britain to take the lead ‘in advocating international regulation on 
labour matters’ by setting up the commission to establish a permanent body under the 
League of Nations. The joint memo supposed that including labour representatives on 
the proposed body would quiet some of the rabble by educating them about the 
‘difficulties’ proposed by their demands, as well as guaranteeing that their interests 
were fully accounted for.
17
 The commission’s announcement also fulfilled a propaganda 
aim by lessening impressions that ‘the economic terms of peace will be framed solely in 
“capitalist” and commercial interests.’
18
  The joint memo represented a Governmental 
attempt to acknowledge, and at the same time restrain, labour’s power. The War Cabinet 
agreed to its recommendations, and officially decreed on December 14 that a British 
labour section in Paris would ‘consider and frame the proposals for a permanent 
international organisation for the consideration of labour questions.’
19
   
 Barnes once again wasted no time in comparing notes with Henderson.  
Alluding to an earlier conversation, he wrote: - 








 ILO 1.04.D05, 14.12.18  
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I forgot to mention the other day that there should be employers represented 
as well as employees in the drawing up of labour conditions. They will be 
concerned equally with labour – especially in the subsequent carrying out of 
conditions laid down because they will be interested in preventing unfair 
competition. Of course nothing is settled but I thought it worthwhile to put 





Gillies replied to Barnes that Henderson ‘appreciates the point that on any official 
Commission for the preparation of the labour clauses of the Peace Treaty employers as 
well as employees must be represented. He thanks you very much for drawing attention 
to this fact.’
 21
  Henderson reciprocated in the information exchange by giving Barnes 
the names of the Labour delegates and secretariat for the independent labour and 
socialist conference (ILSC) being planned for Switzerland.  
 This evidence demonstrates how Barnes was an integral link between the TUC 
and Labour Party, the majority socialist movement, the British Government and the 
European Allies during pre-Peace Conference preparations. The 1918 Barnes-
Henderson correspondence revealed little if any animosity, contrary to the acrimony 
sometimes portrayed, indicating that some of the older historiographies were based on 
sensational newspaper accounts of a rift. Very little of this original correspondence 
survives in the Henderson papers at the PHM, Manchester, and the copies preserved in 
Shotwell’s ILO Origins files offer insight into the potentially valuable records lost with 
Barnes’ personal archive.  
The ‘great working-class world charter’ 
 
The germ of the plan which became the International Labour Organisation, 
and was inscribed as Chapter 13 of the Peace Treaty, had first begun to take 
shape and form on a couple of sheets of typescript in No. 2 Whitehall 
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Gardens, in the last days of 1918, as a result of conversations between 
myself and Messrs. Butler and Phelan, and Sir David Shackleton, of the 
Ministry of Labour… My faithful secretary, Mr G. M. Hodgson, assisted in 
its production. 
 




Joint agreement between the Foreign Office, Home Office and MoL determined Barnes’ 
dual role as British Empire Delegation plenipotentiary and leader of the quasi-
independent British labour section. He was chosen third, after Shackleton’s London 
responsibilities appeared too demanding, as did (Lord) Robert Cecil’s activity with the 
League of Nations Council.
 23
 Robert Cecil and Barnes had long promoted the League 
of Nations concept, and they regularly consulted on questions regarding the ILO and 
League relationship. Trade unionists and ‘men of wide views’ were also considered for 
the Labour Commission, but neither British organised labour nor employers’ groups, 
nor the Dominions, were directly represented on it.
 24
 
 As the New Year broke, Barnes made public proclamations about ‘the great 
working-class world charter’ the British would bring to the Peace Conference, even 
though its start date was still unknown.
25
 He neatly summarised the combined Foreign 
Office, League of Nations Council, Ministry of Labour and Home Office plan: -  
The Peace Congress will be first invited to agree to the principle of an 
international standard for labour, and then it is proposed to refer the matter 
to an Industrial Commission to consider and report on the measures to be 
taken to secure this end… This Commission would sit at the same time as 
the Peace Congress, and report to it. Then it will be the duty of the Congress 
to adopt these recommendations – and possibly hand them over to the 
League of Nations to put them into operation as part of its duties. 
 
Permanent international machinery established by the Peace Treaty’s signatories could 
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 The Daily Chronicle (Glasgow), 1.1.19 
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‘enforce a decent standard of life’ through compulsory measures, underpinned by 
freedom of combination, making up for the ‘pious resolutions’ of the past. Recalling 
being bundled out of sight as a boy when a rare factory inspection occurred, he declared 
‘You may pass any amount of industrial legislation, but if there is no organisation 
capable of seeing that it is put into operation, it will be useless.’  Past Berne Conference 
resolutions on children’s and women’s labour would become binding, and Barnes 
depicted progressive, practical measures including insurance to pay for industrial 
workers’ holidays, bringing them ‘to the level of the clerk and the civil servant.’ 
Themes of international unity were evoked as Barnes stressed his wish to adopt ‘the 
principle laid down by Mr. Gompers that labour shall no longer be treated as a 
commodity.’
 
 ‘I have every hope,’ he concluded, ‘that we shall be able to put the thing 




 The MoL’s Edward Phelan was in Paris from January 2
nd
 preparing residence 
and offices for the British labour section, distilling numerous memoranda into a single 
lengthy document.
27,28
  Barnes was summoned from London by Lloyd George on 
January 15 to lead the Commission as Minister without Portfolio. The TUC PLP was 
still demanding independent Peace Conference representation, and Barnes’ appointment 
caused considerable upset; it was reported that ‘a protest would have been probable’ had 
he been named the official British Labour delegate for Paris.
29
  Barnes defended his 
electoral mandate to represent organised labour, asserting that the Labour Party’s 
decision to ‘sever its connexion’ with the Government undermined their complaint: -  
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It is ridiculous for an outside body, as the Labour Party is, to suggest that it 
should be specially represented on a Government delegation… (if they were 
admitted) other organisations, such as the Liberal Party and the Churches, 
would have an equal right to be represented. The Government could not 
allow one section of the community to attend the Peace Conference without 
extending a similar privilege to all other sections… 
 
…It can not be too strongly emphasised that the promise to the Labour Party 
of a Labour representative at the Peace Conference was made conditional 




Barnes spoke in the heat of the moment, but his conundrum was apparent. Reconciling 
the gap between direct and indirect representation of a plethora of labour groups and 
interests, while satisfying various national governments in an international conference 
setting was a formidable as well as unprecedented task. His recent divorce from the 
Labour Party considerably complicated things. 
 A flurry of preparatory meetings took place in January before the formation of 
the Labour Commission (‘Commission’ from here) in February. Ahead of Barnes’ 
arrival, informal but important meetings between Phelan, Harold Butler of the MoL, and 
American delegation members including Professor Shotwell took place. Few official 
records of these sessions exist, so the personal testimonies and notes of Barnes, Phelan, 
Shotwell and Butler are relied upon. Shotwell’s behind-the-scenes mediation 
immediately proved invaluable and he remained intimately involved with the British 
ILO scheme despite his numerous Peace Conference obligations on behalf of the 
American delegation.  Shotwell recalled ‘From the very first the British were ready to 
lay all their cards on the table… With the customary efficiency of the British Civil 
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Service they had gone much farther than merely to outline a program of labor clauses 
for the Peace Treaty.’
31
  




 dined with 
Shotwell and his colleagues Dr Sidney Mezes,
33
 and Dr Isaiah Bowman,
34
 discussing 
the scheme late into the night before Barnes landed.
35
  Butler recalled that Shotwell 
‘quickly saw (the draft’s) importance and began to stir the notice of the American 
delegation.’
36
 His belief in the scheme was instrumental towards raising the 
Commission’s profile at the Peace Conference: he, like Barnes, knew that the British 
scheme required a ‘strong and effective body of international public opinion’ behind 
it.
37
  Shotwell wisely insisted that conservative elements worldwide would only support 
a plan building on proven precedents and existing international labour agreements, not a 
‘new and utopian scheme’, or anything ‘revolutionary.’
38
 Notably, Shotwell was the 
first to acknowledge that federated states might argue against international legislation 
agreed by treaty, but at the same time did not feel the envisioned Labour Conference’s 
recommendations would be so controversial as to ‘prove insuperable.’
39
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Barnes in Paris and the progression of the British draft  
 This study examines only briefly the technical aspects of the draft’s progression, 
focussing instead on the challenges Barnes and the British labour delegation faced.
40
 
Barnes, Phelan and Butler further considered their Commission’s remit, and Butler’s 
January 17 memo weighed up the scheme’s philosophical principles and diplomatic 
aims in depth over twelve pages.
41
 The numerous scribbles and margin comments on 
Butler’s draft make the scale and scope of these talks evident; the addition of non-
governmental representatives to the Labour Conference is a stand-out feature. An 
outstanding final page entry also read: ‘Barnes – freedom of association to be a 
principle.’
42
 This key ideal of international trade unionism was added to the preamble of 
the scheme and remained a core tenet despite many reconfigurations, becoming the 
second point ‘of special and urgent importance’ when the Peace Conference gave final 
approval to the Labour Charter’s nine points, which are discussed in a later chapter.
43
   
 When Sir Malcolm arrived from London he was reportedly ‘shocked’ to find the 
scheme gave the conference vote to non-governmental delegates, believing that labour 
and capital’s representatives should be advisers only lest they diminish the decision-
making ability of States.
44
  Phelan’s recollections stated that Barnes argued that the 
scheme would fail in that way, while Sir Malcolm assumed that governments would not 
honour their minority conference position. Barnes ‘pondered gloomily’ as the scheme’s 
core innovation was challenged, reportedly suggesting two votes for each governmental 
delegate to prevent a standoff. Sir Malcolm called Barnes’ suggestion ‘ingenious’ for it 
                                                 
40
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balanced employer and employed while leaving the States with enough investment to 
respect Conference decisions.
45
  When the British draft was first presented to the 
Commission, this ‘plural vote’ became problematic very quickly.  
 The British draft scheme ‘marked a break with all previous diplomatic tradition 
and practice’ as it came to involve the participation of the State, employers and 
workpeople, holding an annual Conference where international Conventions, adopted 
by a two-thirds’ majority, would subsequently be considered for ratification by national 
parliaments.
46
  Workers’ representation at the Conference was central to the ILO 
Convention and arguably the most important, democratic aspect of the scheme; 
therefore the number of labour versus State delegates was fiercely debated once the 
scheme faced its first reading by the Commission. Equally important, the draft 
attempted to discern that ‘a scheme on these lines does not infringe the real sovereignty 
of any country. It provides for the freest possible expression of opinion by all the parties 
concerned, and would make it possible to develop a really international public opinion 
on industrial questions, without which no attempt at industrial labour regulation could 
ever become effective…’.
47
 Initially loose verbiage led to a three-way clash involving 
democracy, sovereignty and constitutionality which weighed heavily upon all of the 
Commission  discussions which Barnes continually struggled to negotiate. 
 Prolonged pressure for a sign of Peace Conference action was in large part 
delayed by the first British General Election since 1910. The initial, preliminary plenary 
session of January 18 had a ‘fragmentary and hastily improvised’ programme giving the 
appearance that things were going badly behind the scenes, prompting suggestions of a 
                                                 
45
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sham staged to distract from ‘the real progress of negotiations rather than to furnish a 
proper clue as to what was actually taking place.’
48
  The summoning of the plenary was 
surprising, as was Clemenceau’s announcement that the third Order of the Day was 
international labour legislation, after responsibility for war and penalties for war crimes: 
‘The third question… can even be treated from the point of view of the organisation of 
labour; it therefore covers a wide field.’
49
  Such vagueness created ‘great panic in the 
newspaper world, as no one knew what was meant’, Shotwell recalled.
50
  The British 
submitted their concise ‘Treaty’ version of their scheme to the Conference Secretariat in 
only three days.
51
 Shotwell’s American press statement framed international labour 
legislation as a continuation of existing proposals, providing a historical summary that 
emphasised the positive outcomes of past Berne and Leeds negotiations.
52
  He depicted 
the British proposal as the antithesis of Bolshevist-style plans aimed at changing the 
political order: the associated ‘Shotwell Recommendations’ he penned were mild 
enough to be incorporated into the ‘Black Book’ of technical documents that the 
American Plenipotentiaries regularly referred to.
53
   
 Barnes issued a compelling memo to the full British Empire Delegation (‘BED’) 
as the Conference received the draft, urging the Prime Minister’s assistance in attaining 
further input from British employers and labour representatives as soon as possible: -   
…This is in accordance with declarations and promises made. It has been 
matter of common agreement that the respective Governments should accept 
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suggestions and representation made by the voluntary organisations of their 
respective countries.…  I suggest that we should invite representatives from 




Barnes’ memo emphasised industrial militancy for the sake of his audience and his end 
goal.  Employers, he wrote, were ‘much more willing than they have ever been before to 
co-operate in the higher standards of life’, but labour’s support was especially vital as 
they had separated from the government politically, were ‘restive’ and ‘indeed 
somewhat aggressive’: -  
…an opportunity now offers of getting the Trade Union elements to co-
operate in practical measures of amelioration and improvement… (We 
should consult) Labour representatives now before committing ourselves to 
plans which require their co-operation to make them successful… or 





Phelan recalled that the employers could not arrange a Paris delegation quickly enough 
but sent in suggestions, the most interesting being that ‘the organization would be of 
little use unless it was given mandatory powers,’
56
 implying little trust in government 
and/or frustration with existing arbitration procedures. When the Peace Conference 
finally opened on January 25, it declared that the League of Nations would be an 
integral part of the Treaty and the International Labour Commission was officially 
formed.
57
   
The joint TUC – BED sessions  
 Barnes’ natural pragmatism and leadership ability came to the fore during a 
                                                 
54
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series of joint meetings of leaders of the British TUC and of the Dominion governments 
which he chaired from 27th to 29th January.  Phelan minuted these and believed that 
Barnes’ decision to join the two groups for expediency’s sake was both ‘ingenious and 
politically highly astute.’
58
 Barnes complained in his memoir that it was virtually 
impossible to get the fragmented BED to meet, and they ‘ceased in a practical sense to 
be a separate entity’ unless the Prime Minister rounded them up.
59
    
 Before the Commission was officially announced, Barnes had issued invitations 
to each of the Dominion Prime Ministers to meet with a small TUC delegation to 
discuss the scheme, feeling they should be quite familiar with the draft he had been 
circulating.
60
 The three-way ‘clash’ referenced earlier came into play during these pre-
Commission joint sessions: the constitutional challenge for federated states, differing 
views as to the balance of powers between the state and the producers of capital, and the 
perceived threat to national sovereignty – something the Dominion leaders in particular 
resisted. ‘Disagreement on many issues’ was recorded emanating from the Dominion 
delegates regarding their status within the scheme and within the League of Nations 
while both were still in development. Phelan recalled that it seemed from the outset that 
the Dominions would give a plan for international labour legislation short shrift. He also 
questioned what impression Barnes ‘with his quiet gentle manner’ could make on 
comparatively ‘strong personalities’ like Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, 
and William “Billy” Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia.
61 62
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 The scramble to get the Labour representatives to Paris quickly indicated the 
War Cabinet’s resolve to build a solid case for the British scheme before the Peace 
Conference. Shackleton at the MoL was alerted to Barnes’ request for three TUC and 
PLP representatives to arrive within days at the Prime Minister’s behest.
63
  The full, 
hastily assembled, Labour Party and TUC delegation comprised C W Bowerman,
64





  Arthur Henderson and J H Thomas.
67
 Stuart-
Bunning recalled having no opportunity to circulate a brief, testifying to the difficulty 
they had completing their trio: Shirkie was conscripted with two hours’ notice simply 
for being present when Barnes’ telegram arrived.
68
 Henderson was in Switzerland 
arranging the Berne conference
69
 and diverted Thomas who was in transit.
70
 There was 
surprise at the sudden redirection of Henderson and Thomas, neither of whom were 
TUC Parliamentary Committee members.
71
  The Foreign Office, War Trade Intelligence 
Department
72
  and Lord Curzon,
73
 were all advised to expedite their travel.
74
  George 
Lansbury
75
 also travelled from Berne to Paris with Henderson and Thomas. The three 
met informally with Barnes, but there are no notes of these meetings.
76
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 Several definitive technical aspects of the scheme were introduced, refined and 
carried forward, and the concise meeting records captured some of the more important 
changes, for example in the composition and role of the Governing Body, giving it a 
more administrative role, which was largely instigated by Henderson.
77 
 He was also 
responsible for the reference to the prevention of unemployment in the Labour 
Convention’s Preamble.
78
  Stuart-Bunning proposed a stipulation that once ‘ideal or 
minimum standards’ were attained, nothing would prevent a country from legislating 
further, and that ‘each state would be free to adopt such better conditions as it sought 
fit.’
79
  Sir Malcolm reported after the first meeting with the Labour representatives that 
things were ‘moving fairly fast’, remarking that ‘Barnes had taken charge of the 
(labour) question’ before his arrival, gaining Lloyd George’s approval to carry on 
independently more or less as he saw fit.
80
  The League of Nations section had also 
agreed to their proposals, and Sir Malcolm was confident that things would be pushed 
along ‘as rapidly as possible.’
81
  
 Once the Dominion leaders were brought in, however, clouds began to appear 
on the horizon. Canada’s Borden presaged one of the Commission’s greatest hurdles, 
suggesting that federal states such as Canada, Australia and America might have trouble 
applying the scheme, but he ‘considered that the difficulty could be overcome.’
82
 Sir 
William Lloyd of Newfoundland
83
 then suggested it be made clear that the Dominions 
were each entitled to representation as separate states at the Labour Conference.
84
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 proposed twenty-four members for the Governing 
Body, equally divided between Government, employer and employee with eight each in 
an equilibrium the TUC supported.
86
  Barnes pointed out that ‘it would be impossible to 
defend this scheme’ if the Allies felt their power was somehow compromised, 
referencing the rationale for the plural vote, but, after much disagreement, he drew the 
conversation to a close. The record bluntly noted ‘the principle of labour representation 
had been agreed to.’
87
   
 On the final day, the proposed agenda topics for the first Conference were 
removed owing to time constraints, and numerous changes to the Preamble were 
dropped and substituted, with the caveat that it would eventually ‘include within its 
scope all subjects’ that a Conference might determine.
88
 The Prime Ministers of 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand reportedly ‘wished the scheme every success’ as 
the session closed.
89
 The British draft was ready for the International Labour 
Commission’s reception, and Sir Malcolm remarked that the Preamble had become 
‘rather flowery but the labour people like it.’
 90,91
  A keen British labour section and a 
somewhat less enthusiastic Dominion group had found enough agreement to pass the 
draft, and Barnes’s coordination and direction significantly eased some of the 
Commission’s initial work. 
 Stuart-Bunning’s criticisms some years later insinuated that Phelan’s minutes 
were severely edited. After seeing them, he expressed his upset to Gillies, claiming the 
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Preamble showed little of the British Labour group’s input, bearing the mark of 
American influence despite their not being involved. He said it was ‘in practically the 
form in which it left the British Empire committee except for the reference to Labour 
not being a commodity… 
When I saw the phrase I objected that it was meaningless, and was told that 
was why it was inserted. It meant nothing and pleased the chairman of the 




He was also surprised and upset to see how Kershaw’s suggestion for equal, tripartite 
representation on the Governing Body was dismissed, citing the irrational fear of  




 From the end of January 1919, Barnes took full charge of the ILO scheme’s 
progression, assisted by Sir Malcolm, Phelan and Butler. Phelan recalled Barnes’ 
sudden impact, having earlier ‘wondered more than once whether he had the energy, 
political ability and intelligence to drive our scheme successfully through the peace 
conference’, yet he was soon impressed with his ‘quiet firmness’: -  
Until now he had made no positive contribution to its elaboration; he had 
listened patiently until he had fully understood what was proposed and then 
he had given his agreement in the fewest possible words… Now that he had, 
for the first time, taken an important decision without the concurrence of his 
official advisers, I saw that I had underestimated his quality. This view was 
confirmed by the steps which he now took on his own initiative to obtain the 
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Barnes confidently issued a press statement declaring ‘that full weight has been given to 
the views of organised British trade unionism’,
95
 something he often referred to when 
challenged by the American members of the Commission, discussed below. It was 
reported that the British plans would ‘assure far better conditions than hitherto for the 
working classes of the world over’ and were ‘more sweeping than those of any other 
country’, based on remarks from unnamed Allied representatives.
96
  On January 31
st
, the 
full BED unanimously approved the scheme, and, as Phelan observed, amidst so much 
negative press coming out of Paris at the time, it was seen worldwide as a very positive 
development.
97
    
Conclusions   
 Barnes was resolved to fulfil his electoral pledge as the Government’s 
representative in Paris and ensure British Labour’s influence on the post-war settlement. 
He demonstrated his commitment to the Party’s aims despite his divergence from them. 
Barnes effectively channelled his League to Abolish War ethos, insisting that the Peace 
Conference’s commitment to labour was an expression of mass representation and the 
acknowledgment of the decisions of independent congresses. The threat of industrial 
militancy was used to persuade the War Cabinet to announce a policy much as the TUC 
used Baden’s declaration to push the issue. Barnes’ personal feelings about containing 
revolutionary action and the Bolshevist mindset chimed with popular sentiment, as well 
as the majority Labour Party opinion supportive of a ‘responsible’ worker’s movement. 
Assertions that Barnes was ‘right wing labour’ are easily challenged through careful 
consideration of his actions and motivations. He was not out of step with the bulk of his 
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Party contemporaries nor did he depart from the ‘spirit of the Labour Movement’ as 
Maxton contended; he departed from minority views in the party. 
 Meeting notes, surviving rough drafts and anecdotal recollections from this 
period of the creation of the Labour Convention help to flesh out a fuller picture than 
official records allow. While personal testimonies are colourful, they can of course be 
unreliable and contradictory.  Testimony from Phelan and Shotwell did speak to Barnes’ 
affable yet direct nature, and his quiet, firm resolve to complete the task to which he 
was assigned and so strongly believed in. The TUC-Dominions joint sessions 
demonstrated that serving both Empire and the working classes was, and would remain, 
complicated. Barnes undoubtedly took advantage of his political position, to give 
positive expression to the desires of the working classes and expand his role in ways he 
had not previously anticipated. World labour might have initially appeared the least 
controversial of the Peace Conference’s agenda items, but the announcement of the 
Commission a positive development which sought to address issues political and 
economic as well as social. The Labour Convention for the ILO soon developed 
controversies of its own, and Barnes balanced the demands of international diplomacy 
against the limits of constitutional democracy in an unprecedented setting in a unique 
way.
Chapter three: The Labour Commission 
129 
 
3 The Labour Commission  
 
Barnes and International Diplomacy   
 
 It can been argued that Barnes’ transformation from oft-struggling domestic 
British politician to international spokesman for organised labour began in earnest 
during the final months of 1918 in Britain, and his elevated profile and involvement in a 
number of Peace Conference delegations in Paris in early 1919 further crystallised this 
transition. The International Labour Commission appointed by the Peace Conference on 
January 31 held its first meeting the next morning, composed of two members each 
from the five great powers and five apiece from the others.
1
 Barnes and the British 
delegation sat at the head of the table with their fleshed-out draft scheme for labour’s 
global reorganisation. President Wilson’s surprise appointment of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) leader Samuel Gompers and his counterpart, Mr A.N. 
Hurley, a shipping employer
2
 to the Commission soon became problematic for a 
number of reasons.  Phelan recalled that in particular, the Americans’ lack of political or 
legal experience suggested ‘some confusion in the American delegation concerning the 
task which the Commission was expected to perform.’
3
 It had been assumed that 
participating labour delegations would dispatch national Governmental representatives 
‘familiar with labour law and administration’,
4
 and the British delegation naturally 
expected Barnes, the only plenipotentiary of the great powers appointed to the 
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Commission, to preside over it. The British were further ‘disconcerted’ by the 
immediate, impromptu nomination by the French delegation’s Pierre Colliard
5
 of 
Gompers for Chairman during the first session.
6
  
 To some extent, differing American, British and European perceptions and 
experiences of socialism and trade unionism underpinned many of the Labour 
Commission struggles Barnes and his colleagues endured.  Barnes' challenge in leading 
the Commission was undoubtedly complicated by the Gompers appointment, for the 
AFL leader was conflicted. He had initially landed in London to meet with the British 
TUC on January 17 1919, convinced he would be involved in establishing a new 
international trade union that operated independent of State involvement. Instead, he 
was soon appointed by his President to head a world labour commission stacked with 
European cabinet members (many of whom were prominent socialists) with the goal of 
establishing a permanent labour institution directly involving governmental 
participation - anathema to the AFL’s guiding principle.
7
  
The Gompers Presidency 
 Some examination of Samuel Gompers’ background is helpful towards better 
understanding of how rapidly changing and complex ideas about ‘internationalism’ 
affected the Paris 1919 labour commission, and how Barnes sought to manage the tricky 
situation before him. He recalled Gompers affectionately in his memoir -  
Sam exhibited at Paris but little signs of advancing age except that his one-
time raven locks had gone, and left only little tufts of grey on an otherwise 
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bald head suggestive of a moulting eagle… He is a born talker and talks 
uncommonly well, but, like most talkers, he likes to talk. He had a quaint 
way of presiding over our proceedings of stepping aside from the chair now 
and again to ‘present a thought’ that generally meant a ten minutes’ oration 




Barnes first met Gompers in 1902, and his familiarity with American ways was crucial, 
especially as Gompers’ views were often lost on the bulk of the Commission members. 
Butler recalled the ‘bewildering effect’ brought on by an unfamiliar American 
dimension, noting the importance of those casual evenings the British spent with 
Shotwell and his colleagues:  ‘…but for such dinner conversations… I doubt whether 
we should ever have understood the difficulties with which our labour proposals 
confronted the Americans. Without contact, pure reason is a blunt instrument of 
negotiation.’
9
     
None of us realised what a different type of Western civilisation had grown 
up in the United States during the nineteenth century, how under American 
conditions a different social philosophy and a different political system had 
been evolved… this was the first time since its early years that the American 
Republic had intruded on European affairs… A new force had entered into 




By contrast Barnes had a decent understanding of cross-Atlantic socio-political 
differences, having travelled extensively in the United States more than once.  He first 
gained exposure to American ideals and industrial ways in 1902, touring and recording 
data for the Mosely Industrial Commission,
11
 and attending the National Civic 
Federation (‘NCF’) Conference during the height of the country’s ‘progressive era.’
12,13
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During the Mosely tour, Barnes met with individuals across all industrial levels and 
political ranks in many industrial centres and ports. His in-depth Report showed an 
understanding of the attitudes of American workers and employers, and a realistic grasp 
of the United States’ role in labour affairs and legislative functions.  
 Despite a shared commitment to raised standards for workers welfare, there were 
core divergences in labour ideology and trade union practice. Differing historical ideas 
about the role of the state versus voluntarism in industrial relations were at the core of 
some of their difficulties.
 14
  Gompers’ deep-seated commitment to voluntarism and 
political neutrality in labour affairs expressed the ethos of the AFL’s Charter, as 
discussed, while the British Labour Party was formed specifically as the political 
expression of the Trade Union movement inside Parliament. Furthermore, across 
Europe the war had increased State and political intervention, and moderate Socialist 
governments had made advances. The Commission had to span an ideological chasm 
shaped by disparate political landscapes.  
 Gompers was disturbed by the strong link between British trade unions and the 
political Labour Party, and wary of the socialist influence on European governments. 
He felt the British might try to engineer a new, supranational body in collusion with the 
Europeans that could be usurped by political influence and drive statutory legislation. 
Labour legislation enforced by international Treaty not only betrayed the notion of 
voluntarism, but Gompers also perceived a form of extended economic colonialism in 
the British draft, crafted to suit their specific needs: - 
                                                                                                                                               
13
 Formed in 1900, the relatively progressive alternative to the National Association of Manufacturers 
sought co-operative solutions to see off strikes. It comprised members of the public and a bipartisan mix 
of politicians, as well as reform-minded businessmen, bank, railroad and utility owners, and AFL 
members.   
14
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The British did not oppose the principle of super-government, but sought 
protection by establishing through colonial representation a control within 




He admitted his conflict from the start, convinced that the United States Senate and 
Congress would reject the ILO’s ‘invasion’ of their treaty-making power, and 
constantly feared that ‘our work would be used as an argument against the League of 
Nations which President Wilson considered essential to carrying out his policies’: -
16
  
Time and time again I felt that the situation with the International Labour 
Commission was impossible and that no constructive results could be 
secured, but, on the other hand, I felt constrained to stay by the work 
because my withdrawal would react to the detriment of the purposes of 
President Wilson.
17
   
 
Under uncomfortable conditions, Gompers had to lead an International Labour 
Commission as a high-profile delegate to the Peace Conference, supporting its higher 
aims but not its immediate, specific mission. However the Gompers appointment was a 
boon in one respect: it freed Barnes, so well-acquainted with the scheme’s minutiae, to 
focus his attention on steering the draft through the Commission to completion, a ‘by no 
means easy task which he performed with admirable parliamentary skill’: -  
Barnes was never at a loss and members of the Commission were constantly 
amazed at the way in which he could sum up a discussion which had roved 
back and forth in the most confusing fashion, and lucidly set out the 





Italian and British Cooperation 
 Barnes was appointed Vice President of the Commission on February 4 and the 
British draft,  the most advanced text and the only one circulated in both French and 
English, was adopted as the basis for immediate discussion (with some minor 
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18
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reservations) upon his motion.
19
  The British were undoubtedly confident that the 
French delegation would support this motion, since French and British officials long 
held similar ideas about the direction organised labour should take, and 1906 and 1913 
Berne Conference delegates Arthur Fontaine (Commission General Secretary)
20
 and Sir 
Malcolm confidentially compared Paris notes from November 1918.
21
 Italian support, 
however, was not so easily presumed and had to be secured during several earlier, 
private meetings ahead of time.  These meetings made it further apparent that Barnes’ 
transition from advisor on domestic working class matters into international labour 
negotiator and diplomat was well under way.   
 Although not considered a state of industrial importance, the Italian delegation 
altered the Commission’s course beyond its original remit owing to national matters and 
concerns about militant labour. Italy’s Signor Cabrini
22
 made clear that his delegation 
would only support the British plan if matters of particular interest to his country, which 
included territory, the eight-hours day, and labour emigration, were later discussed in 
depth. The February pact between the British and the Italians was largely responsible 
for the introduction of the specific points in the ‘labour clauses’, also known as the 
Labour Charter, for inclusion in the Peace Treaty in March.
23
 The repercussions of the 
Anglo-Italian agreement were not immediately obvious, but the controversy around the 
Labour Charter lingered and presented Barnes with some of his most difficult 
challenges which are discussed in a subsequent chapter. It is important to note how 




 Arthur Fontaine (1860-1931) French engineer, Assistant Secretary to the Labour Commission; Director, 
French Ministry for Labour, 1899-1920; co-founder of the IALL, 1900; Berne Conference delegate 1906 
and 1913; see appendices. 
21
 ILO 1.10.F01-6, correspondence 11.19-1.19; Sir Malcolm stated that neither Barnes nor the British 
Ministry of Labour knew about his efforts to secure France’s preliminary support: Shotwell note in ILO 
file 27. 
22
 M A (Angiolo) Cabrini (1869-1937) Italian Labour Commission member, Commission Deputy and 
Vice-President of Italy’s Supreme Labour Council. 
23
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deeply concerned Italy was over clauses in Wilson’s Fourteen Points which would 
nullify the Treaty of London (1915), the agreement that persuaded Italy to leave the 
Triple Alliance to fight with the Triple Entente by promising them large swathes of 
Northern land upon victory.
24
 
 During the first of the Anglo-Italian meetings, Cabrini warned that Italian and 
French labour would both ‘suffer severe disillusion’ if the Commission merely 
established conference machinery. He informed the British that Italian employers were 
prepared to accept ‘progressive measures’ for labour, in fear of ‘something worse’, 
inferring revolution. Cabrini suggested that Britain and Italy together introduce the 
points for discussion, since Italy’s relatively weak industrial position might give the 
impression of them ‘adopting a pose.’
25
 On territorial matters, Cabrini advised Barnes 
that the Italian proletariat were anti-imperialist, and that the masses had little or no 
interest in Anatolia and Smyrna. He remarked candidly that he would prefer ‘nothing to 
do’ with them ‘provided that England and France would adopt the same attitude.’
26
  He 
felt that annexation should only extend to the Italian-speaking regions, excluding 
northern areas which would maintain Allied control of the Brenner Pass. When Barnes 
commented that this would involve Italian rule of some 200,000 Germans, Cabrini 
suggested that this could protect against invasion.
27
 He said his people were ‘quite 
prepared to allow the German population autonomy under Italian control’, citing the 
                                                 
24
 The April 1915 Treaty of London is available online at the WWI Archive :  
< https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Treaty_of_London_(1915) >  accessed 9.12.16 
25
 Ibid. 
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27
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‘democratic freedoms’ enjoyed in the French-speaking districts as ‘a sufficient 
guarantee that full liberty would be accorded to their new subjects.’
28
   
 Barnes informed Lloyd George confidentially the next morning that on territory, 
the Italian masses were largely unconcerned save ‘the upper part of the Adriatic and the 
hinterland up to the Brenner.’
29
 Just ahead of the February 4 Commission sitting, Butler 
and Sir Malcolm again met privately with Cabrini as well as Signor Mayor des 
Planches.
30
 A short meeting note only recorded the Italians’ expression of their ‘entire 
approval’ for the British draft, its few lines capturing their statement with the 
reservation that they were ‘free to raise other matters, such as the eight-hour day and 
emigration in which they were particularly interested.’
31
 The Italians presented their 
declaration to the Labour Commission that afternoon, after which Gompers made his 
first announcement of many that the AFL had also ‘drawn up a certain number of 
propositions’ for the Treaty.
32,33
  The British met privately with the Italians again a few 
days later when their desires were further discussed, which interestingly included the 
universal ‘democratisation of industry’ as detailed in the British Whitley Scheme. 
During that session, Cabrini reported that his delegation felt Gompers’ proposals were 
too ‘philosophical in character’ and ‘outside the terms of reference of the 
Commission’,
34
 an argument used by Barnes and others later in the discussions.  
 This evidence is compelling on several counts: for one, the records show how 
the Italians and the British engaged in political horse-trading and came to a number of 
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decisions behind closed doors.  It can be argued that British backing for the Italian 
labour declaration and their specific concerns may have been a reward for joining the 
Allies, and for the exchange of information on how a militant proletariat might view 
territorial decisions.
35
  A full review of the political ramifications of these meetings 
would make for interesting further research, but for the sake of this exercise only the 
implications for Barnes and the Labour Commission are delineated. This evidence also 
underscores the importance of Barnes to the War Cabinet and Lloyd George, and from 
Barnes’ perspective, it may help to explain why he ultimately supported the 
controversial Labour Charter despite his personal belief that it was unnecessary. These 
documents also challenge the prevailing view in some American histories of the Peace 
Conference that Samuel Gompers’ passionate yet oft-misplaced oratory was the key 
factor underpinning the Labour Charter’s guaranteed place in the Treaty.
36
  
Czechoslovakia and Japan 
 The British delegation also met with Dr Benes of the Czech delegation
37
 on the 
evening of February 4, when the opinion of the proletariat was also considered. Benes 
stressed the ‘bad effect’ the plural vote (where the State representative at the labour 
conference receives two votes compared to labour and capital’s one apiece) would have 
on the Czech working classes.
38
 Sir Malcolm’s rationale was that the plural vote would 
give governments an investment in the labour conference, since they undertook the 
obligation of carrying out the conventions. Benes insisted that the Czech workers would 
                                                 
35
 The partition of the Ottoman Empire again threatened the region three months later; the Allies 
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already see governmental conference delegates as ‘representatives of the bourgeoisie.’ 
He concurred with the Italians that a Treaty declaration of specific points was desired, 
similarly stressing the universalization of the eight-hour day, since it was already 
standard in his country. Czech labourers would otherwise suffer, and industrial 
competition from Germany in particular would weaken the provisional Czech-Slovak 
Government.
39
  It was crucially important that the emerging Czech voice be heard, 
potentially explaining a seemingly out-of-place remark Benes made on the 
Commission’s first day: he reportedly ‘emphasised the industrial importance of the 
Czecho-Slovak Republic which comprised the greater part of the industrial production 
of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.’
40
 This statement may have suffered 
through translation by an interpreter, as Shotwell’s records often complained, or through 
selective reporting by the British secretariat as comparison with the American records 
showed, nonetheless it is an understandable sentiment given the context.
41
 
 A British meeting with the Japanese labour delegation the next day revealed 
their particular concerns. It was argued that such an intricate scheme as composed by 
the economically-advanced Europeans would be challenging to apply to Japan’s vastly 
different industrial conditions.  In ‘some detail’ they explained their objection to the 
imposition of the eight-hour day, noting that Japanese workers spent many long hours in 
the factory, but their whole time was not ‘engaged in actual work.’
42
 In subsequent 
Labour Commission sessions and later Peace Conference sittings the lines between 
labour matters and issues of national identity increasingly blurred and complicated the 
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scheme’s progress, further delineating the complicated yet necessary duality of Barnes’ 
shifting responsibilities. As the Peace Treaty’s signing neared, his labour responsibility 
was increasingly eclipsed by international relations difficulties as later chapters discuss. 
The records of these early, private meetings with the smaller powers demonstrate how 
Barnes negotiated with multiple entities to shape and advance the British scheme 
toward its passage, and how satisfying the demands of world labour through industrial 
regulation after the war was used as a tool of high diplomacy.  
The British Scheme’s First Reading  
 The initial test for Barnes and his British colleagues was to justify their draft 
scheme’s proposed structures and their underlying principles. Enduring sticking points 
included (but were not limited to) the distribution of the vote at the annual Labour 
Conference, whether such a Conference would supersede national sovereignty, the 
constitutionality of the proposed scheme in nations with a federated government 
structure, and whether it respected the autonomy and national identity of all self-
governing entities – all matters of grave significance as the world was being recast in 
the shadow of the war.  A number of concessions were made to the Labour Convention 
(‘Convention’ from here) along the way to prevent insurmountable impasses, and of 
equal importance, present the appearance of consensus before the Peace Conference. It 
bears repeating that the International Labour Commission was not created to establish 
specific world labour standards owing not least to differing industrial and legislative 
conditions. National priorities and concerns nevertheless impacted the overall 
‘international’ nature of the document that became Chapter XIII (‘The Labour Chapter’) 
of the Versailles Peace Treaty. 
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 Samuel Gompers recalled in his memoir his immediate discomfort with how the 
British had taken charge early on: ‘The British delegation had prepared proposals which 
had been circulated in both French and English before the second meeting and these 
served as the basis for all discussion. In a perfectly obvious way that draft controlled the 
thinking of the conference and it certainly made my task more difficult and 
unpleasant.’
43
  His outsider perspective was made evident in the American minutes of 
the Labour Commission sessions, owing to an oft-differing emphasis from that of the 
official British records which most heavily informed Shotwell’s Origins.
44
 The British 
record, for example, omitted Gompers’ remark that ‘the adoption of the English plan 
was not intended to exclude the use of the French plan’, whereas it is preserved in the 
American record by comparison.
45
  However the British scheme’s first reading and 
general discussion of its aims resulted in its acceptance in principle as the Labour 
Convention for the International Labour Organisation’s founding document.   
The Power of the Conference Vote: Articles III and IV 
 The constitution of the Labour Conference vote as detailed in Articles III and IV 
was the first and one of the most persistent sticking points the Commission faced, 
inspiring prolonged, passionate debates about democracy and the role of the State in 
labour affairs. Article III determined that for each nation there would be a Conference 
delegate representing each the State, the workers and the employers, and Article IV 
established the distribution of votes between them, giving the State delegate two votes, 
the ‘plural vote’ as described. The Czech delegate Dr Benes argued that the State 
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representative should only have one (single) vote in order for it to be democratic, fair 
and effective (referred to as ‘1:1:1’). 
  The paradoxical nature of Gompers’ Presidential role became apparent when he 
immediately voiced his distaste for a labour conference granting the State delegate more 
than one vote, and his bitterness toward it steadily grew throughout the proceedings.  
Gompers agreed with Dr Benes, declaring that the plural vote united employers and the 
State against labour, their natural opponent, asserting that ‘in almost every case the 
employers and the workmen would vote in different senses.’
46
 Barnes responded with 
an economic justification for the plural vote, arguing that the greater sense of obligation 
it bestowed on the State could help fund the Conference, especially in the case of 
powerful nations. Gompers rejected his theory, since ‘the question of money could not 
determine the matter of votes.’
47 
 Typifying his pervasive Commission role, Barnes 
moved to end the first reading’s general discussion in order to review the draft article by 
article.
48
 The British and American records both noted that Gompers at that stage read 
aloud a number of specific labour points the AFL wanted included in the Treaty. The 
American minutes alone recorded his statement that ‘the American delegation of 
labour… had full power of adopting or rejecting questions relative to labour 
problems.’
49
 The scheme’s first reading drew to a close indicating that clashes over vital 
principles and power struggles might be on the horizon. 
The Fraught Second Reading  
 The ultimate goal of the scheme’s second reading was to find consensus and 
forge a complete draft Labour Convention by February 28, when the Commission 
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would take a ten-day recess while participating national governments considered their 
Report. During the second reading the draft articles were individually debated.  Their 
discussion explicitly revealed numerous ideological and political divisions between the 
American, British and European delegations.  Barnes and the British were usually 
caught awkwardly in the middle, trying to keep their scheme intact while making 
concessions to satisfy numerous divergent opinions and priorities. The emotional pitch 
of heated exchanges between Barnes and Gompers escalated as the latter’s deeply 
embedded distrust of the State’s involvement in labour matters and distaste for socialist 
ideology surfaced. As the other delegations naturally defended their own interests, 
matters grew increasingly complicated. The full Article III and IV debates as Shotwell 
analysed them in depth served as good case studies for better understanding of the 
diffuse and divergent threads of international Trade Unionist and Socialist thought as 
they stood at the time.  This thesis offers a summary of how these debates represented 
differences in transnational practices and ideologies at the war’s end, and how Barnes’ 
personal trajectory may have been affected. Gompers was particularly passionate since 
he felt only the American delegation could defend organised labour: to his mind, only 
the AFL’s vision of trade unionism based on voluntarism and freedom from political 
intervention defensible.   
 To counter criticisms that the plural vote was undemocratic by favouring the 
State, Barnes presented an Article III amendment devised by Belgium’s Emile 
Vandervelde
50
 which added a second State delegate with their own vote. This became 
known as ‘2:1:1’ and naturally remained the British preference.
 51
  The avowed Belgian 
socialist Vandervelde explained that 2:1:1 gave equal voting power to the employer and 
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worker combined, matching the government’s power.
52
  He rejected allegations from 
French and American delegates that governments always represented capitalist interests 
because in his experience they ‘frequently adopted, at least partially, the point of view 
of the working class against that of the employers.’
53
 Nonetheless Gompers was 
vehement that 2:1:1 gave the State an automatic veto over proposed legislation at the 
Conference. It was an unnecessary provision, he argued, since ‘there was plenty of veto 
power in their respective governments’ to reject adopted conventions.
54
 In typically 
dramatic fashion, Gompers insinuated that by adopting 2:1:1, the Commission would 
have ‘lost its opportunity to better the conditions of the working people: - 
…If the government has a dominating voting power our workers will be left 
out and standing alone, and will say to us, the members of this Commission, 
that it is another capitalistically controlled affair… as a rule, governments 
appoint delegates whose sympathy is against the labouring class, and it is 
obvious that labour would stand alone if the British system of plural voting 
was adopted.
55
     
 
He insinuated the scheme was out-of-date, declaring ‘we did not want to find conditions 
in a rut as before… we were living in a new era and we should do all in our power to 
protect human life and freedom of the working man.’
56
  
 At that stage, the French delegations’ persistent lack of coordination became 
problematic. Phelan’s recollection noted that it was a ‘permanent and disconcerting 
feature… it was not uncommon for one of them to strongly oppose the thesis that his 
colleague had defended vigorously the day before.’
57
 Colliard (who was also 
responsible for Gompers’ presidential nomination) jumped to the AFL leader’s defence, 
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contradicting the position his counterpart Loucher took during the previous session.
58
   
During the Commission’s fourth meeting a recurring trend for the coming weeks was 
established: the United States and one half of the French delegation opposed the British, 
Belgians, Poles and Czechs, while the Italians vacillated, requesting assurances that 
they could discuss giving the labour conference virtually statutory powers at a time of 
their choosing. The Italian vision of a ‘European super-parliament’ provoked outcry 
from the American delegation, and became a permanent source of disagreement 
(discussed below).  The Japanese delegation, meanwhile, refrained from much comment 
unless they had received orders from their Government, while the Cuban delegation 
backed the Americans whenever constitutional matters arose since the two nations 
shared a federated national structure. This epitomised the quagmire of conflicting 
ideologies, practices and national constitutions Barnes sought to navigate.   
 The comparatively soft-spoken Barnes held his own during at least one ‘very 
heated set-to’ with Gompers over 2:1:1, with others ‘joining the fray’
59
 on February 7. 
Shotwell’s personal diary recorded that the Belgians’ stenographer also noted ‘the 
bitterness of some speakers.’
60
 Gompers proclaimed that if 2:1:1 passed, ‘the scheme 
was foredoomed to failure… it would be useless for the Commission to continue its 
work.’
61
 -   
If we formulate a proposition by which the working people will be in a mere 
insignificant minority, we will have met here entirely in vain. Have we not 
changed? …Do we not know that the world is now seething, particularly 
among the labour classes, for improvement? Shall we not take into account 
all that has passed in the last few years? The world now is in the remaking 
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Despite his presidential role, Gompers maintained that employers were complicit in an 
anti-labour conspiracy, as they ‘never had secured legislation in the interests of the 
working people… they were always opposed to labour legislation and labour reforms.’
63
 
The debate raged for days, as Gompers adamantly confronted Barnes over the scheme’s 
power imbalance which ‘struck a blow at the very work this mission was to perform’, 
while challenging Vandervelde’s ‘favouritism in an increase of power of the State 
against labour’, something he found shocking. The American records noted Gompers’ 
comments aimed at Barnes as he threatened to withdraw the AFL from the ILO 
scheme.
64
 Shotwell recalled an unprecedented incident: -   
Mr. Gompers' suspicion of ‘socialist’ thinking on the part of his colleagues 
on the labour body was never concealed from them, and at this meeting he 
had practically charged Mr. Barnes with betraying Labour into the hands of 
government officials. Mr. Barnes' reply had drawn an apology from 
Gompers, but the question was still in the air. 
 
Barnes delivered a rousing defence in his plain-speaking, matter-of-fact style. Surprised 
by ‘the heat of the debate’, he nevertheless bristled at accusations that the scheme was 
anti-labour which ‘cast a reflection on the authors of the British proposition.’
65
 The 
Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, ‘the highest authorities in 
England on labour questions’, had fully endorsed it.
66  
To make the point that 
governments were not always hostile to labour, Barnes referenced the Commission’s 
composition where nations had appointed members of State, prominent Socialists and 
                                                 
62








Shotwell diary, pp.168-9 
Chapter three: The Labour Commission 
146 
 
leading labour representatives to find common goals.
67 
His benevolent opinion of the 
state was clear: ‘…governments were getting more friendly and not more hostile to 
labour’, and that soon enough, ‘the governments might be run by labour.’
68
  Barnes’ 
eternal mantra was evident: friendly relations between the Conference and the State 
would protect workers’ better interests, by balancing labour and capital, while 
suppressing the potential for militancy. He finally asked Gompers whether his own 
nation ‘would take up such a proposition with two-thirds of it made up of outside 
government representation.’
69
  Sir Malcolm also reported on the AFL leader’s 
‘outrageous attack’ on the British TUC, remarking that a vote taken right after Barnes’ 
amusing and ‘most excellent’ speech would have easily carried the 2:1:1 proposal.
70
  
 Sir Malcolm, Butler
 
and Shotwell met the next morning to discuss preventing a 
Commission break-up ‘given the heated exchange of personalities.’
71
 In 1921, Gompers 
reflected upon what he saw as a characteristically egotistical British delegation 
viewpoint: ‘It was to the effect that Socialists shortly would be in control of most of the 
governments of the world, and therefore the workers would have the majority in all 
international labor conferences.’
72
   
The British Voting Memorandum 
 The British delegation demonstrated its technocratic skill through circulation of 
Sir Malcolm Delevingne’s complex Memorandum on the Conference vote (‘voting 
memo’) on February 12. It explained in depth how 2:1:1 was ‘the most satisfactory’ of 
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all the configurations under discussion.
73
  Written from the perspective of 1906 and 
1913 Berne conference attendees (comprising Sir Malcolm and most of the Europeans 
on the Commission), its over-arching sentiment was  that the global working class 
should form a closer, if not direct, bond with the State, enabled by the Labour 
Conference as the British draft conceived.  Barnes stressed during the voting memo’s 
presentation that the governments of industrialised countries were ‘already greatly 
influenced by the opinions and desires of (British) Labour and will be more so in the 
future’, and that developing economies held similar aspirations. In practical terms, he 
expressed how the scheme also had to consider nations joining the League and ILO 
later, including neutrals and former enemies who would reject a Conference without 
strong State representation. Barnes’ main contention was that 2:1:1 could develop the 
power of labour through increased politicisation in ways that 1:1:1 could not: - 
…The institution of an International Labour Organisation (is) to secure 
International Labour Legislation - in other words, to secure political action 
from the State for the improvement of labour conditions. Without the 
support of the State Governments the labours of the Conference will 
produce no results. The ideal we are aiming at is that, both nationally and 
internationally, the Governments of the world will use more and more the 





 The memo having been circulated, it was decided that the Article III’s voting 
configurations could not be finally determined until Article XVIII’s provisions 
(discussed below) were finalised.
75
 Article XVIII’s most contentious clause, ‘Each of 
the High Contracting Parties undertakes that it will within the period of one year from 
the end of the meeting of the Conference communicate its formal ratification of the 
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Convention to the Director and will forthwith take all steps necessary to put the 
Convention into operation, unless such convention is disproved by its legislature’, 
essentially determined the power of the Labour Conference in relation to national 
sovereignty. This was a tremendous hurdle for the Commission to clear, and it proved 
impossible to discuss Articles III (or IV) without touching upon Article XVIII. Circular 
arguments about sovereignty and constitutionality dominated a great deal of the 
Commission’s time. Article XVIII’s implications and trajectory are examined more 
closely below.  
 With Article III yet hanging in the balance, Gompers determined that the 
Commission secretaries record names against votes during divisions on such ‘important 
questions.’
76
 Given his post-Peace Conference remarks about his Labour Commission 
struggles, this could be interpreted as arising from his desire to document his loyalty to 
American workers’ interests for posterity. Concluding the session, Samuel Gompers 
circulated the AFL’s 1918 pamphlet depicting their ideas for post-war social 
reconstruction, and as it was Abraham Lincoln’s birthday, the fifth American 
President’s virtues were recalled as all rose in a show of respect. The Commission was 
then suspended for five days while Gompers left Paris.
77
 
 On February 17 the Commission reassembled to be confronted with a most bold 
advocate for the 1:1:1 vote composition, France’s Leon Jouhaux, head of the CGT 
(Confédération Générale du Travail).  French Trade Unionists were already unhappy that 
French labour was not directly represented on the Commission.
78
 Gompers found an 
ally in Jouhaux, and reiterated his earlier points, alluding to anti-labour forces which 
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indicated his fear that the Third International threatened a takeover of the labouring 
classes. He believed the ILO could never contain Bolshevism under 2:1:1 since 
Socialists had permeated European institutions.
79
 He warned there was a ‘dangerous 
element abroad throughout the world’ and that ‘folly and revolutionary thought, like 
epidemics, do not stop at international border lines.’
80
 Perhaps sensing that 1:1:1’s 
defeat loomed, Gompers refused responsibility for any unfortunate outcomes, declaring 
‘I will at least be on good terms with my own conscience’. The American minutes 
recorded that Gompers bestowed upon the Commission a plethora of historical ‘facts’, 
an oration that the British notes pithily condensed: - 
Was it not a fact that, in general, labour legislation had been opposed by 
employers? Was it not a fact that Governments had been very often opposed 
to this same legislation, and that it had only been after a bitter struggle and 
by the danger of revolutions that it had been possible to secure from them 
little by little the measures which had been obtained up to the present? 
…The unrest and agitation of the masses should not be lost sight of. If the 
Commission did not rise to the height of its opportunity its work would be 






Leon Jouhaux was backed by half of the French delegation via Pierre Colliard. Jouhaux 
nevertheless sensed that he was in the minority despite claiming to speak for the entire 
French working class, huffing that he ‘saw no good in discussing it.’
82
   The 
comparative labour-State dynamic in the American and European spheres was then 
debated at great length. The philosophical deliberations frustrated Barnes greatly, who 
questioned whether the single vote advocates had misunderstood what they were there 
to achieve. He insisted that the Labour Conference’s purpose ‘was not to express the 
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aspirations of labour, but to realise them’ through ‘some sanction, some authority to 
give due effect’ to them: -  
Pious aspirations have done precious little; what has been accomplished has 
been done through pressure on our own governments… We are now called 
upon to make a new departure – to bring voluntary organisations into willing 




He also explained pragmatically that their Labour Convention had to please the heads of 
state attending the Peace Conference, arguing that the scheme was already very 
progressive. Barnes contended that the Peace Conference might refuse it unless 
Governments had a significant stake in it, lest the ‘the principles of State sovereignty’ 
be clearly infringed.
84
  His practicality arose from his experience of dealing with the 
likes of the Imperial War Cabinet, and knowing how the Labour Convention might 
appear to men like Lloyd George and Clemenceau. Barnes remained adamant that 
improved working standards would result through coordination with the State, while 
Gompers proclaimed he would never change his stand, regardless of what his own 
Government might think. He proclaimed he would rather send the Peace Conference a 
‘bold scheme’ to be rejected outright, instead of a ‘moderate proposal’ which it might 
accept yet water down further.
85 
   
 In the end, the Europeans (save France’s Colliard) were virtually united behind 
2:1:1. Zoltowski, the Polish delegate,
86
 felt it supported agricultural interests, especially 
in countries where their organisation was weak; Broz, of the Czech delegation,
87
 felt it 
was better for low-skilled workers, an opinion based on the British voting memo. 
                                                 
83
 Ibid  
84




 Count M. Jean Zoltowski (N/A) Polish labour commission delegate; member of the Polish National 
Committee. 
87 Rudolph Broz (N/A) Czech (alternate) labour commission delegate; replaced Dr Benes.  





 favoured it saying two government votes was ‘fair and balanced’, and 
that his Government was actually more concerned with progressive labour legislation 
than the workers themselves.
89
 The ‘no’ camp included Chile’s de Bustamante
90
 who 
envisioned the potential for a state/employer anti-worker bloc.
91
 Ultimately 1:1:1 was 
rejected by ten to four, with 2:1:1 passing by the same margin.
92
 Articles III and IV 
were thereby adopted for the tumultuous second reading.
93
  A pervasive sense of 
frustration emanates from both the British and American sets of records, despite their 
differences in emphasis. The British perspective won the day, which determined that 
despite any philosophical arguments, the plenipotentiaries would not accept a minority 
State representation at the Labour Conference.  
A labour ‘Super Parliament’: Article XVIII 
 Most of the Commission delegations were amenable toward finding consensus 
as the individual Articles were revised, but once the scheme’s overall constitutionality 
came up for debate, obstruction came particularly from the American delegation despite 
their being in the minority.  The Article XVIII debates reportedly ‘gave rise to the most 
prolonged discussion and the most acute controversy’ the Commission faced.
94
  Its 
provisions were supremely contentious because they held national legislatures to 
account for enacting Conference decisions within a set timeframe.  Angry 
disagreements greatly threatened the scheme’s survival more than once.  As drafted, 
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Article XVIII determined that a Conference decision became an international 
Convention, and if it had passed by a two-thirds majority it would be automatically 
ratified by the national High Contracting Parties (HCPs) within a period of one year, 
unless their national legislature rejected it. 
 This proved intensely problematic. Japan, for one, argued most strongly that 
their economy was not developed enough to withstand such rapid standardisation.
95
 
Other Commission delegations, the Italians in particular, argued contrarily that the 
Article was not radical enough to make Conference decisions effective; subsequently 
they moved to bestow it with statutory powers. The majority of the Commission 
objected to the Italian proposal. Gompers and his American partner, the banker Henry 
Robinson
96
 argued with increasing insistence that the American Constitution rendered 
the Article unconstitutional and unacceptable in any way.  Robinson loathed ‘European’ 
socialism and governmental interference in labour matters as much as Gompers did, and 
he took up Gompers’ battle with relish.   
 The compromise solution to satisfy such opposing views proved exceedingly 
difficult to arrange. The technical aspects and implications of the delegations’ various 
proposals were well interpreted in Edward Phelan’s chapter in volume one of 
Shotwell’s Origins.
97
 Phelan, as discussed, had been involved in the scheme’s drafting 
in Britain before arriving in Paris.  He recalled candidly the intransigence of an 
American delegation that ‘never succeeded in convincing the Commission that a 
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constitutional obstacle really existed’ since the provision always clearly stated that 
national legislatures held the final power of veto.
98
  Barnes exerted a great deal of 
tactical and diplomatic energy to keep the Labour Convention in progress at this stage,  
recalling the ‘baffling problems’ presented by several differing national constitutions. 
He remarked that the United States’ Federal Government structure was particularly 
problematic since it held ‘little power in regard to labour legislation’, compared to 
Britain where its Parliament was ‘supreme.’ He also recalled that differing world 
climactic and industrial circumstances meant that their ultimate settlement would have 
to ‘frame elastic conditions… yet be sufficiently rigid to achieve results.’
99
  
 The Italian delegation, as discussed, had only given provisional support for 2:1:1 
with the caveat when Article XVIII was discussed that their desire to give the Labour 
Conference mandatory authority would be considered.
100
  On February 17, Italy’s 
Mayor des Planches’ presented a proposal for virtual statutory powers that still allowed 
for a final veto in the State legislature. The Italian proposal also suggested that a League 
Tribunal could refer nationally defeated Conventions back to the Labour Conference 
‘for fresh consideration.’
101
  A further, more binding proposal came two days later from 
Mayor des Planches which determined that a State could not appeal against any 
Convention that had passed the Conference a second time.
102
  
 The Italian proposals proved unpopular. Belgium’s Emile Vandervelde objected 
to the Italian memoranda together they essentially created a ‘Super-Parliament’, which 
he said might be nice as ‘a system of the future’ but it immediately negated the rights of 
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national governments. Barnes again argued that these notions were too controversial for 
the Peace Conference, and could potentially render all  the Commission’s work 
‘nugatory.’ Furthermore, he explained, in ‘backwards’ countries, and in the case of a 
war-torn Belgium, rigid and incontestable legislation could be devastating.  Naturally he 
drew support from Belgium, but also from America’s Robinson, as well as Chile’s 
Bustamante, Japan’s Otchiai and Poland’s Zoltowski. Japan’s delegate clearly expressed 
his objection owing to their ‘very different’ economic and climactic conditions; hence 
preserving their parliament’s power was paramount.
103
  Robinson explained that 
America’s Constitution ‘prevented any delegation of power’ as the Italians suggested, 
and Chile’s Bustamante supported him, citing a similar constitutional conflict in his 
land.
 104
 A number of further objections saw the Italian proposal withdrawn on February 
19
 
and the Article XVIII vote was held over. 
 The toxic Article XVIII debate was suddenly and frustratingly revived the very 
next day. France’s Colliard moved for an amendment granting rigid conference powers, 
akin to what the Italians had proposed to create a ‘deliberative international assembly’ 
as soon as possible. Barnes retorted that while he was sympathetic to notions of a future 
labour ‘super-parliament’, it was neither Article XVIII’s purpose, nor was it the 
Commission’s job, to create one. This important expression of hope was officially 
recorded for posterity, as Barnes and Vandervelde both determined it was worthy of 
further consideration.
105
 Robinson went on the attack, insisting the US Senate was 
‘quite loathe to part with any of its sovereignty’, that it would never accept any labour 
super-parliament, and that the mere proposal would give the Senate a negative 
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impression of the Peace Conference’s work.
106
  Gompers also reacted angrily when 
France resurrected the Italian proposals, exclaiming that ‘resolutions to the hopes of 
people are a waste of time here’ since his own hopes were being ignored (probably 
referencing tepid receptions to the AFL’s 1918 Charter). To calm the Americans, 
France’s Fontaine suggested the first of several watered-down Article XVIII 
amendments, replacing the phrase ‘endowed with powers’, with ‘under certain 
conditions to take resolutions having the force of international law.’
  
Barnes explained 
that this would still result in the US Senate’s rejection, and proposed the even weaker 
phrasing ‘… there may someday be such an agreement of the High Contracting Parties 
as to insure legislative effects to its agreements without unnecessary delay.’
107
   
 Leon Jouhaux attacked the bulk of the Commission, asserting that such meek 
verbiage missed the point, and insisted that granting the immediate wish of French 
labour was the goal: allusions to future aspirations and expressions of hope were not 
enough.  He again cited ‘seething ferment’ across labour, attributing the failure of the 
International Association for Labour Legislation (IALL) to similar ‘nebulous’ 
resolutions. Jouhaux also accused governments of ‘always’ being anti-labour, and stated 
that ‘in spite of what Mr Barnes thinks the labour world does wish and will believe in a 
new world.’ The American minutes of this sitting recorded Jouhaux’s foreboding that 
the hypothetical Labour Conference had ‘no right to reject these principles… and it may 
tomorrow be compelled by display of force’ to satisfy labour’s demands.
108
  
 Such philosophical questions were rendered moot once the scheme’s legality 
and constitutionality was questioned. Robinson asserted that the US legal expert, James 
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  had confirmed Article XVIII made the Labour Convention impossible 
to accept under a federal system of government. The President’s assent to the Labour 
Convention, as a component of the Peace Treaty, was something the Senate would 
normally approve.
 110
 The granting of legislative power through the elected House of 
Representatives was enshrined in the first paragraph of the US Constitution.
111
 The 
Supreme Court, Robinson claimed, would therefore disregard the ‘labour chapter’ as 
unconstitutional and other federal nations (such as Chile) could follow suit.
112
 
Robinson’s proposed an addendum to the Article, one which absolved the United States 
from any obligation toward Conference decisions: -    
…and except where this undertaking is inconsistent with the constitution or 
organic law of any of the High Contracting Parties, and in such case it shall 
be obligatory on such High Contracting Party to use its utmost efforts to 





Gompers insisted the American delegation wanted to ‘cooperate to obtain the best 
results’, but that the Senate would simply refuse the Convention owing to Chapter 
XVIII, since the US Constitution was not about to be amended.
114
     
 Sir Malcolm argued that this was largely a matter of political will, since any 
constitutional democracy could already refuse the scheme as it stood since the national 
legislature ultimately held the final power of veto. He also gave the example of the 
British House of Commons which could ‘postpone discussion of any subject 
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  Robinson’s proposal would institutionalise and enshrine a reduced 
obligation on all of the High Contracting Parties to the point of negating any power the 
Labour Conference held. Sir Malcolm advised the American delegation to confer again 
with their constitutional lawyers and governmental experts and adjourn the matter until 
further advice was in.
116
  Barnes moved that Article XVIII’s wording would be the last 
thing finalised after the rest of the Labour Convention was completed, instructing the 
entire Commission to ‘avail themselves of the interval to find a satisfactory formula’ in 
concert with their national governments.
117
 The interval only served to deepen the 
Commission’s dilemma during the third reading, as discussed below. 
The British scheme and the Dominions: Article XXXIV 
 Barnes’ transition from domestic politician to international figure was hastened 
when the British Dominions’ leaders reacted angrily to the draft Labour Convention 
after the Scheme’s second reading concluded. The draft Article XXXIV aimed to 
establish the rights of self-governing colonies and dominions in relation to the other 
High Contracting Parties (HCPs) to the Peace Treaty that would eventually join the 
League of Nations and ILO.  However, as the League’s composition was still 
undetermined when the scheme was penned, the language had been left intentionally 
vague.
118
  Several Dominion heads threatened to reject the entire scheme owing largely 
to how Article XXXIV ‘limited’ their rights. It read: -  
 The British Dominions and India shall have the same rights and obligations 
 under this Convention as if they were separate High Contracting Parties.  
  The same shall apply to any colony or possession of any of the High 
 Contracting Parties which on the application of such High Contracting Party  
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 is recognised as fully self-governing by the Executive Council of the League  
 of Nations. 
  The High Contracting Parties engage to apply conventions which they  
 have ratified in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention to 
 their colonies, protectorates and possessions, which are not fully self-governing: 
 1. Except when owing to the local conditions the convention is inapplicable,  
 or 
 2. Subject to such modifications as may be necessary to adapt the convention to  
 local conditions. 
  And each of the High Contracting Parties shall notify to the International 
 Labour Office the action taken in respect of each of its colonies, protectorates  
 and possessions which are not fully self-governing.
119
 
Although the arguments were largely economic, they represented deeper matters of 
national identity in the new post-war world order. Furthermore, the particular 
difficulties for Barnes in simultaneously serving on the Labour Commission and the 
British Empire Delegation came to light in the records. The matters underpinning the 
Article XXXIV debates resonated throughout Barnes’ complex post-Labour 
Commission work in Paris, indicating a critical juncture in his post-war career.  
 As the second reading concluded, the British and Belgian delegations attempted 
to refine Article XXXIV via amendments granting the dominions and India identical 
rights with all the HCPs to the Treaty, leaving the HCPs of controlling possessions, 
colonies and protectorates outside the ILO to determine their obligations to Conference 
decisions on a case-by-case basis.
120
  America’s Robinson also found fault with the 
verbiage and suggested special terms (similar to proportional representation) for self-
governing possessions and federated nations so that ‘the difficulties of the United States 
in accepting the convention’
121
 could be averted..
 
His proposals essentially aimed to 
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devolve the power of labour legislation to each of the 48 American States, equating 
conditions in the USA to those in some British Colonies. Barnes and Vandervelde 
objected, arguing this would defeat the entire ILO project:  It would make the Labour 
Conference unwieldy, create ‘overwhelming’ majorities, fracture the unity of powerful 
economic nations, and ultimately make enacting ratified Conventions in large entities 
like the United States, Canada, and Australia very difficult.
122  
 
Article XXXIV’s second reading debates also unfortunately re-opened 
discussion of Articles XVIII and IV. Article XVIII (as discussed) was on hold owing to 
the ‘American problems’, while Article IV (conference representation constitution) had 
already been decided via majority voting as discussed. Robinson persisted but his 
motion was eventually defeated, nine to three, with France’s Colliard abstaining.
 123
 
Japan’s Otchiai and Chile’s Bustamante were not present. Given their earlier arguments, 
they probably would have supported Robinson but his motion still would have been 
lost. However Barnes’ Article XXXIV woes were not over by March 1919 when the 
Labour Commission officially disbanded and Barnes became its acting Secretary.  
 When drafted in January, the original opening clause to Article XXXIV’s read: 
‘the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire and India may become parties to 
this Convention, and have the same rights and obligations thereunder as if they were 
independent States’. Barnes said this was done to ‘safeguard’ their uncertain position in 
relation to the other HCPs to the Treaty.
124
  Canada’s President Robert Borden
 
made a 
strong declaration of Dominion independence before the Peace Conference on March 12
 
1919 and the lingering repercussions for Barnes are discussed in the concluding chapter.  
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It was subsequently determined that Article XXXV (as it became during the third 
reading) would be amended prior to reaching the Peace Treaty’s Drafting Committee to 
ensure that the British Dominions and India were accorded the same rights as all 
signatories to the Peace Treaty and the future League Covenant. The third clause 
determining obligation to observe a conference convention based on a colony’s self-
governing status, local conditions or the ruling HCP’s determination (when not self-
governing) was preserved.
125
  Somewhat ironically, the Americans had condemned this 
settlement for giving unfair preference to the Empire which perpetuated an imperialistic 
regime of sub-standard conditions in its colonies.  
 The day before the Labour Commission broke for recess on February 28, Barnes 
made some last-ditch yet fruitless attempts to move past the Article XVIII impasse with 
the American delegation. First, he suggested replacing the line ‘unless such Convention 
is disapproved by its Legislature’ with ‘unless such Convention fails to obtain the 
support of the national authorities concerned’
126
 - leaving each nation to determine for 
itself which branch of their legislature would deal with ratified conventions within the 
set time limit. Robinson was adamant that this was pointless and he disregarded Barnes’ 
suggestion, saying it did not smooth ‘the American snag’ at all.
127
  Barnes’ next attempt 
at concession was the addition of a new paragraph that would allow the federated 
United States to remain a unitary force while still respecting the legislative sovereignty 
of its components, using language consistent with the adopted Article IV. It read: -  
In the case of a Federal State, if the power of legislation on any matter dealt  
 with in any Convention rests with the Legislatures of the Constituent States, the  
 High Contracting Parties shall communicate the Convention to the Constituent  
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 States and each State may adhere separately to the Convention. Notification of 
 the adhesion of any such State through the Federal Government to the Director 




The Americans were not at all satisifed. Gompers gave the floor to Robinson, who had 
earlier accused Barnes of trying to limit his speaking, having also just discovered that 
the Commission delegations’ secretaries were abridging the minutes. Robinson 
demanded he be recorded verbatim, particularly when he argued points that he claimed 
prevented things ‘operating as Great Britain expects.’
129  
The verbose addendum he 
proposed released any country from their obligations, and from any sanctions, if they 
could argue that their internal composition prevented compliance.
130
 Robinson asserted 
the discussion was over, threatening that the US’ lawyers were prepared to file briefs to 
the League of Nations commission, or the Peace Conference Secretariat, if the Labour 
Convention contradicted their written Constitution.
131
  Gompers interjected, grandly 
proclaiming that the US Constitution was a binding legal document as well as ‘a true 
declaration of the rights of man. Its object was to guarantee the life, liberty and property 
of every citizen.’
132
 The American people would directly challenge Article XVIII if 
forced upon them as it stood, he concluded.  
 France’s Leon Jouhaux was reportedly ‘astonished’ that the AFL leader did not 
realise his attitude ‘would ruin every effort which might be made to level up working 
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conditions.’ The Belgian jurist Ernest Mahaim also challenged Robinson’s legal advice, 
adding that any hopes he had held about the United States’ desire for progressive labour 
legislation were dashed.  He further expressed his resentment that America sought to 
escape binding international agreements while his own war-ravaged country would risk 
their own recovery in the name of labour’s advance.
133
   
The Commission’s stark option was to vote for the British text and leave the 
United States’ participation in the ILO in doubt - or accept Robinson’s amendment 
which radically reduced America’s obligations.
134
 Despite such considerable drama, the 
second reading closed with Robinson’s amendment defeated with a number of 
abstentions and the only ‘ayes’ being the Americans. Barnes’ amendment granting 
responsibility for Conference decisions to national authorities passed, preserving Article 
XVIII for the time being.
135
 The Italian-French joint resolution hoping for ‘the force of 
international law’ to stand behind international labour legislation also passed; the 
Americans and Japanese voted against, as did Sir Malcolm, with Barnes abstaining.
136
 
Technically the outcome was paradoxical, as any ILO participant’s obligation relied 
upon such vicissitudes of public pressure for social progress as the Peace Treaty might 
enshrine, juxtaposed with a potential lack of political will and/or realist economic 
arguments that could be made against Conference decisions.  
Barnes moved finally that the first Labour Conference would occur in October 
1919, allowing time for participation by ‘the neutrals.’
137
  The Commission adjourned 
to allow delegates to confer with ‘their Governments and organisations of employers 
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and workpeople’ regarding the Labour Convention’s second reading adoptions.
138
 It was 
envisioned that the mid-March third reading would entail only minor final amendments 
and that the Labour Commission Report would reach the entire Peace Conference 
shortly before the next plenary. Barnes immediately showed Lloyd George the adopted 
Convention, then travelled home with Harold Butler to meet British Labour 
representatives. Samuel Gompers, ‘instead of consulting the American experts, had used 
the interval for an extended tour of Italy, where he was royally received.’
139
  
Conclusions   
 Disagreements over the power of the Labour Conference stemmed from political 
differences shaped by historical experience, despite being rooted in similar soil. 
Gompers’ intransigence as President at times had the potential to wreck the entire 
scheme as he passionately opposed the idea of any governmental interference in labour 
matters. This was intensely problematic since the ILO’s founding premise was that 
minimum standards for labour were arrived at through national legislation via 
international agreements.  The mere suggestion of an international ‘parliament for 
labour’ contravened the AFL’s core tenet of non-political labour, while Barnes 
contended that a beneficial labour-State relationship was proven: he held that it was 
already the direction things were moving in the West, and industrialising Eastern 
nations held the same aspirations. The British scheme was a positive break from the 
past, Barnes argued, because it recognised the value of labour working with and in 
government.  The tensions between the European strain of state-centric, collectivist 
socialism, and American voluntarism and independence were apparent throughout this 
analysis, personified by the various arguments of the Commission delegations. 
                                                 
138
 TNA FO 608/239/350 (18) 28.2.19 
139
 Shotwell diary, p.194  
Chapter three: The Labour Commission 
164 
 
 The philosophical tensions exacerbated during the Labour Commission sittings 
also capture how nationalism and internationalism in 1919 were to some extent still 
‘inextricably entangled’ concepts,
140
 but the very existence and make-up of the 
Commission showed, perhaps better than any other Peace Conference commission, a 
desire for institutions and political settlements to catch up with the zeitgeist for world 
peace through the satisfaction of labour’s demands. Some might see as evidence of great 
societal evolution, though these aspirations were tempered by the constraints of the 
Peace Conference environment (as Barnes repeatedly reminded delegates). The 
Commission minutes set out in detail how far nation s were willing to go after the war 
to sacrifice their national sovereignty in relation to the power of the annual International 
Labour Conference, making for immensely powerful reading.   
 International relations and the state-labour relationship become more inter-
dependent than ever as the post-war world took shape in Paris. The minutes of the first 
and second readings of the draft Labour Convention captured how Barnes adapted his 
inherent logic and natural ability as mediator and conciliator to navigate it through 
several near-crises. At the same time, a picture of a 19th century British trade unionist 
morphing into a 20th century world diplomat emerges.  During this period, the 
challenges Barnes faced also provided increasing opportunities for him to expand his 
horizons beyond the realm of the British labour movement he so loved yet had perennial 
struggles with from the time that his politicisation began.  
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4  The Third Reading of the Labour Convention      
The March Intermission 
 A flurry of key behind-the scenes activity between February 28 and March 11 
1919 unofficially marked the beginning of the British scheme’s third reading 
somewhat ahead of schedule.  James Shotwell remained in Paris and worked with 
Edward Phelan, investigating the doubtful constitutional scenarios that Samuel 
Gompers and Henry Robinson had portrayed. Although a member of the American 
delegation to the Peace Conference, Shotwell became an indispensable asset to the 
entire Commission as the recess commenced, and he remained so for the duration. 
Phelan, the only British delegate to remain in Paris, was motivated by the supposed 
impossibility of Article XVIII to seek advice from the American law experts there 
autonomously. It was evident that all of the American Peace Conference delegations 
held misunderstandings about the draft Labour Convention that posed a threat to the 
Labour Commission’s credibility, and it was feared that Gompers’ negative 
comments might have given the American President Woodrow Wilson serious 
misgivings about their work.  Shotwell recalled of the time: -  
…In the weeks and months that followed, Mr. Phelan and I were destined 
to work together intimately and at high pressure in the negotiations which 
led to the creation of the International Labor Organization, and I found 
him a loyal colleague, fertile and creative of suggestion, one who was 
never lacking in the understanding of the difficulties confronting the 
American Delegation, perhaps aided in this by his Irish sense of humour. 
The International Labor Organization owes more to him than will 
probably ever be widely known, for both as planner and negotiator he 





The British delegation was indeed fortunate to have such a dedicated, energetic pair 
of intellectuals working away in Paris. No official records or minutes exist for this 
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crucial yet secretive early phase of the ILO’s inception, so the testimony of 
participants is relied upon to reveal a number of interesting, key developments that 
have not been widely discussed. Shotwell endeavoured to find a way forward despite 
his own initial doubts about certain aspects of the draft Convention, writing ‘Indeed, 
I had criticized the British scheme from the start for the extent to which it tried to 
circumvent government action by proposing to create law in an international body in 
which the governments formed only a fraction of the membership.’
2
 
 Shotwell was very busy with ‘the Inquiry’, the American groups of 
academics tasked primarily with working on territorial and economic questions, and 
was unaware of the specific problems the British labour delegation faced throughout 
the second reading. He had heard rumours that the Commission was invoking ‘an 
international parliament of labour with power to make international laws in the form 
of treaties.’
3
 Barnes briefed him on developments during a five-minute hallway 
meeting on the day the Commission broke up, informing him that they were ‘up 
against the American Constitution.’
4
 Shotwell was surprised that the British 
Government was supporting proposals so out of keeping with his understanding of 
the British way. The long list of punishments for States which failed to comply with 
their League obligations, for example, gave him sympathy for Gompers’ belief that 
legislation was beyond the remit of organised labour.
5
 Shotwell’s diary recorded that 
Woodrow Wilson’s adviser, David Hunter Miller
6
, had called the draft Convention ‘a 
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joke’ and disregarded it entirely.
7
 Nevertheless, Shotwell saw the necessity of getting 
a formal labour convention in place soon, for ‘European labour was in a very restive 
and critical state of mind, with Bolshevism threatening in the East and revolution 
flaming up in Central Europe… A downright failure of the Labour Commission was 
therefore no trivial matter.’
8
   
 Phelan’s concern over the Article XVIII stand-off drew him to Shotwell on 
March 4 as he reviewed the most recent Labour Commission minutes. He had also 
‘discovered with consternation’ that while Gompers was touring Italy, Robinson had 
also left Paris. Phelan became adamant that Wilson should know of ‘the pretended 
constitutional difficulty’ being perpetuated, sensing there was little hope the impasse 
could be overcome unless urgent action was taken.
9
  He found that Shotwell was 
similarly preoccupied and complaining that, since his introduction to the scheme in 
January, the Inquiry’s only knowledge about the Commission’s work was through 
occasional, random contact with the British.
10
 At Phelan’s insistence, Shotwell 
agreed to discuss the situation with Royal Meeker
11
 of the American Department of 
Labour. Phelan also learned of the arrival in Paris of Professor Felix Frankfurter, the 




 Frankfurter was ill with la grippe
13
, yet took great interest in the case, 
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immediately judging that the Americans’ arguments were specious.  After reviewing 
Robinson’s supposedly ‘expert’ advice with two more lawyers, his opinion was 
firmly entrenched. Phelan asked Frankfurter to go to the US President, stressing 
‘what a tragedy it would be if the project of establishing an international organisation 
that could be of inestimable benefit to mankind were to come to naught’ owing to the 
Americans’ ‘misunderstanding.’
14
 Shotwell also recorded Frankfurter’s alarm at the 
situation, noting his remark that ‘it would be nothing short of an international scandal 
if, after having promised labour legislation with such a magnificent gesture at the 
first meeting of the Peace Conference, there should be a complete breakdown on a 
technical question.’
15
 Frankfurter insisted that Shotwell solve this problem by any 
means necessary, through co-operation with the British ‘or any others who could 
help prevent so disastrous a fiasco.’
16
    
 As the alarm call shot up the chain, Shotwell managed a March 9 interview 
with Colonel House,
17
 ‘probably the most hard-pressed man in Paris’.
18
  Brevity was 
essential, so Phelan and Shotwell prepared by carefully underlining the specific 
phrase in question.
19
  House did not want to be bothered with Labour Commission 
matters at all, since Gompers had already fully briefed him, and his reception was 
‘the reverse of cordial.’
20
   He felt that an international body designed to impose 
labour legislation on his country was ‘utterly preposterous… (inferring that) it could 
                                                                                                                                          
also a Paris victim. 
14
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not be entertained for a moment.’
21
 Shotwell argued rather bravely that the United 
States ought to express a strong point of view and not merely criticise European 
plans.
22
 After re-reading the text, House allegedly remarked ‘This is not at all what I 
understood from Gompers. I don’t say we could necessarily accept it as it stands, but 
it is something we would not be justified in refusing to discuss.’
23
 Shotwell’s diary 
alleges he personally convinced House that the American peace delegation might be 




 For his good deed, Shotwell was informally appointed by Colonel House as 
the Labour Commission’s technical advisor, a position which ‘remained irregular and 
at times embarrassing.’
25
  Despite his unease, Shotwell held great respect for the 
thoroughness of the British and he found Barnes to be ‘a straight forward, intelligent 
man…a substantial, wholesome type, whose strength is rather moral than 
intellectual.’ At the age of sixty, Shotwell noted with respect that Barnes had ‘none of 
the fire of (Keir) Hardie, but he has been fighting labour battles for almost half a 
century.’
26
 Shotwell endeavoured to make the British scheme sound more like a 
labour parliament, and less like the super-state ‘making labour laws for all the world’ 
as American perceptions went. Barnes returned to Paris with the British labour 
delegates on March 10, and with Shotwell, Frankfurter, and James Brown Scott they 
worked on the Convention all day before reaching an amendment ‘which seemed to 
satisfy’
27
   




 Shotwell diary, p.204 
23
 Phelan memoir, p.161 
24
 Shotwell diary, p.204 
25
 Ibid, pp.204-5 
26
 Shotwell diary, p.143 
27
 Shotwell diary, p.206  
    Chapter four: The Third Reading of the Labour Convention    
170 
 
 While in London, Barnes conferred with British Government and TUC 
representatives including Margaret Bondfield on the scheme’s second reading 
outcomes. The Parliamentary Committee of the TUC assured Barnes of their 
sustained support for 2:1:1. He had also been granted near free rein by the Cabinet to 
use his own judgement regarding any subsequent amendments, but with the explicit 
instruction that under no circumstances should Governmental delegates wind up 
casting less than fifty per-cent of the Conference vote.
28  
Edward Phelan’s midnight mission 
 With the American issue momentarily on hold, the priority for the British 
delegation was maintaining European support for Article III and its 2:1:1 conference 
vote constitution lest the entire scheme fail. Phelan was struck by Barnes’ and Sir 
Malcolm’s confidence that 2:1:1 would easily survive the third reading. In his 
memoir he recalled a colourful argument wherein he reminded them of 2:1:1’s 
narrow margin of passage, informing them how the European proletariat had 
reportedly found the 1:1:1 formula highly appealing during the break. In reply, Sir 
Malcolm invited him to borrow Barnes’ car and drive around Paris on the ‘fool’s 
errand’ of waking up the Polish and Czechoslovakian representatives in the middle 
of the night to ensure their votes.
29
  Phelan claimed that he secured the Polish vote 
upon waking their oft-absent delegate Zoltowski, getting a written guarantee which 
the Polish substitute Patek
30 
could use in his place.  
                                                 
28
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 Phelan’s subsequent rousing of the Czech delegate Dr. Benes was less 
encouraging. There he discovered that the Czech workers and the Czech Labour 
Ministry both favoured 1:1:1 and that Benes felt obliged to vote accordingly. 
Phelan’s vibrant memoir depicted how he strong-armed Benes to decide otherwise, 
warning him that the British Government might not ‘feel cordial to the smaller 
powers’ if the Labour Convention failed as a result, and that Czech support at such ‘a 
critical moment’ would surely be rewarded.
31
 ‘Had either the Poles or the Czechs 
voted the other way the British text would have been defeated. Each of (these 
particular) countries was often to claim in the future that without its vote there would 
never have been an ILO’, he concluded.
32
  
 The Labour Commission members agreed unanimously that their goal was to 
achieve consensus rapidly and finalise the Labour Convention quickly. During their 
first reunion sitting, Barnes happily reported how the London TUC Parliamentary 
group was largely behind the second reading draft, presenting the two amendments 
that the TUC Council’s Bondfield had proposed on behalf of the National Federation 
of Women Workers (NFWW). These important proposals passed the Commission 
easily and ultimately determined that Conference questions relative to women’s 
needs required a female national adviser,
33
 and also specified that the ILO Director’s 
office employed a number of female staff.
34,35 
 The British minutes recorded that the 
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bulk of the minor concerns raised at that point by the European and Japanese 
delegations could be easily resolved over the coming days.
36
  
 Barnes’ initial optimism was quickly dampened, however, as a frank and 
hastily-penned note to Lloyd George two days later disclosed: - 
I enclose a summary of our Labour scheme. I had fondly hoped it had 
been agreed to and had reported so last week. Instead of which the 
Americans and French have come back to assail it from opposite sides. 
The first want to make the Conference into a mere talking shop, the 
French to make it a super parliament. I should like to feel that we have 
your support for our scheme as it stands.
 37
   
 
 
The Henry Cabot Lodge campaign 
 Recent political developments In the United States did not bode well for the 
Labour Convention’s fate. Owing to the success of the Henry Cabot Lodge
38
 
campaign against the League of Nations, Gompers reported on March 11
 
that for the 
first time in his life he was compelled to put his government’s view ahead of the 
American worker’s.
39
  Lodge, the Republican Senate leader, had swayed thirty-seven 
Senators to reject the Peace Treaty if it contained a League Covenant committing 
Congress to aid European nations without its expressed authority.
40
 Gompers 
described how the Labour Convention, as an adjunct of the League of Nations, could 
risk ‘compromising the whole work of the Peace Conference’ in presenting such a 
challenge to the American Constitution. It was just too risky despite ‘remarkable’ 
national support recent by-elections had shown for Wilson’s liberal diplomatic 
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policy. Gompers concluded that it was unlikely that the Labour Convention would 
pass the Senate, therefore they were better off focusing on getting the ‘fundamental 
principles’ of the AFL labour declaration (passim, previous chapter) into the Peace 
Treaty somehow.
 
On that note he announced that the Preliminary Peace Conference 
had formally requested all Commissions to submit their final Reports, conventions 
and recommendations soon.
41
   
The American plan for Article XIX     
 James Shotwell called the March 12 sitting ‘a trying one’
42
 as the American 
delegate Robinson embarked upon an audacious and redundant trajectory upon 
mention of Article III’s, insisting his speech be recorded fully.
43
  He proposed a five-
day suspension of discussion on Articles III, IV and XVIII (now XIX) to allow the 
Americans to draft their amendment to make the scheme constitutionally viable.
44
 
Robinson forcefully reiterated his previous arguments, adding that dissatisfaction 
from America’s workers plus advice from his constitutional law experts necessitated 
significant amendments to the British plan if not ‘a substitute’ scheme that every 
country could accept.  It seemed that the American delegation had not spent any of 
the recess working out the difficulties the second reading presented to them, and they 
were now demanding a one-size fits all solution for the world’s labour problems.  
 Barnes’ extraordinary reply was also captured verbatim. Shotwell credited 
Barnes for his restraint while underscoring ‘the fundamental position of the whole 
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matter: whether (the) convention is to have any binding force’
45
 at all.  Addressing 
Gompers, Barnes explained that his American colleague had put the Peace 
Conference and the Labour Commission in a very unfortunate, if not impossible, 
position.
 46
 Despite a month of debate and many revisions, Robinson was still 
misinterpreting the Convention as an assault on national sovereignty, he said. He also 
reminded him that they had presented a similar amendment two weeks earlier, which 
was voted down.
47
  As a compromise, the Commission agreed that national 
‘competent authorities’ would ultimately rule on Conference decisions: nevertheless 
Robinson proposed further language to lessen any state’s responsibility, repeating 
specious constitutional arguments. Despite the concessions already made, Barnes 
declared, Robinson was putting forward not an amendment, but ‘a proposition which 
alters the whole character and structure of the scheme…’
48
   
Our people will not only be impatient but will say that we are not 
competent to do the business… We do not need a Debating Society and 
therefore we are up against a fundamental difference of opinion. We want 
an organisation of Labour with certain machinery by which Conventions 
will be given effect… we want an organisation with a prospect of some 
practical results following immediately thereon and it is for us to say 





Such a transformation would require re-submission of the draft scheme to all national 
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 European delegation members expressed further outcry, amounting to how 
the Americans were wasting valuable time and seeking the dilute the Conference’s 
powers over their own national legislative issue. Leon Jouhaux defended the Labour 
Convention as the League of Nations’ best chance for support and the best thing the 
Peace Conference could hope to produce. France, he said, whole-heartedly embraced 
its spirit, and he ‘deplored the prospect that the United States, whose president had 
been the most active advocate and builder of the idea, might be the one stumbling 
block in the way of realization’, again warning that restive labour might ‘rise to wipe 
out governments and itself reconstruct the world’ if the League was sunk in this 
way.
51
 Belgium’s Vandervelde ‘deplored the fact that at the eleventh hour’ the 
United States sought to cobble together a brand new proposal.
52
 Arthur Fontaine was 
also angry, yet emphasised how vitally necessary the United States’ participation 
was. Robinson was thereby granted a week to concoct his text, postponing the final 
vote for the third reading to March 17.
53
   
Shotwell and the ‘dual method’ 
 The American proposals dominated the remainder of the Labour Convention 
drafting sessions; until then the Commission’s work had been preoccupied with 
amendments to the British draft.  Ultimately the scheme’s Conference procedure was 
fundamentally transformed, and its potential scope for enacting progressive labour 
reform was weakened owing to the vital need for the United States’ acquiescence. 
Getting around the ‘American snag’ involved the help of the American historian 
Shotwell, albeit somewhat against his will. Sensing the inevitable, he recalled his 
attempt to remain obscure in the corner of the room before Gompers introduced him 
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to the Commission as Robinson’s substitute Commission member. ‘This was against 
my wish, as I did not want to be involved in votes for which I had no responsibility, 
but there was no way out’, he wrote.
54
  He became a Labour Commission official on 
March 13.  
 Immediately Shotwell had to mitigate competing American and French 
tensions with Barnes struggling to maintain the Commission’s momentum. Fontaine 
provocatively revived Article III on the morning of March 13, claiming the French 
Advisory Committee of Employers and Workpeople had shown renewed preference 
for 1:1:1 during the break. Barnes reminded him that 2:1:1 had been adopted and 
would stand until the American proposal was in.
55
 That afternoon Barnes was 
decisive, telling Robinson that his untimely deferral was only granted with the full 
understanding that Article XIX would be decided on March 17 ‘without further 
postponement.’
56
  By Shotwell’s testimony, March 17 was possibly the busiest day 
of his life.
57
 By nine o’clock that morning he had already seen James Brown Scott to 
discuss legal implications and within the hour he and Robinson were reviewing their 
options.   
 At that point the far less-binding Conference ‘recommendation’ was 
introduced. Shotwell explained how Article XIX’s revision determined that all 
Conference proposals now automatically became recommendations, in contrast to 
Conventions, which had passed the Conference with a two-thirds majority and came 
with potential sanctions attached. Each participating country was then merely 
responsible for presenting the recommendation to its competent authority for 
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consideration, which could then be denied without any penalty. Shotwell realised the 
conundrum this presented, recalling that ‘the problem was to make the 
recommendation more than the “pious wish” which Mr. Barnes and M. Fontaine 
regarded as utterly ineffective.’
58
 It is important to recall that the bulk of the 
Europeans had sought a Labour Conference with quasi-statutory powers for affecting 
national legislation. 
 The ‘dual method’ was made flesh through a new American article proposal, 
Article XX, which essentially eradicated the ‘ingenious innovation’ at the heart of 
the British scheme.
59
 Article XX lessened the obligation to implement Conference 
outcomes further by asserting that any ILO member could claim its constitutional or 
legislative structure left it with ‘limited means’ for introducing a Convention, 
removing the threat of any penalty. The dual method meant that the Americans, or 
any federated nation, could arbitrarily exempt themselves from any Conference 
decision it chose.
60
 As Phelan described it, the idea of the recommendation in itself 
was benign, but going the extra step to make Conference decisions so vulnerable left 
labour decisions to ‘ordinary diplomatic procedure’,
61
 in other words: business as 
usual. 
 Finally, the Americans proposed an addition which eliminated a key feature 
of the British scheme which threatened to scupper it completely. Their Article XXI 
proposal granted the League of Nations primary responsibility for appeals and 
sanctions concerning Conference decisions, bestowing them with power over labour 
decisions. The British scheme had proposed that labour experts of each state, and the 
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Governing Body of the ILO, had this responsibility, leaving the LON Tribunal as the 
court of last resort only. It is difficult to comprehend why Robinson would suggest 
this when the League of Nations was already under siege in America, lest he wanted 
the Scheme to fail altogether (a point revisited in the following chapter). 
Nevertheless, he argued that using the existing LON machinery to impose sanctions 
under its Covenant would reduce ‘friction between various States’ and fit better with 
‘the American national sentiment, which is specifically in favour of strengthening the 
power of the League of Nations and its existing organs.’
62
 This cannily implied a 
buttressing of Wilson’s vision, offsetting the Lodge campaign to improve the ILO 
scheme’s chances through popular support.  
 Barnes saw through Robinson’s assertions, rejecting Article XXI as anathema 
to a scheme founded upon the relationship between a semi-independent ILO and a 
merely reinforcing League, a principle established during the earliest discussions 
with the British trade unions.
63
  Barnes was stunned by this suggestion of ‘something 
entirely new ….it will be necessary to begin again, after five or six weeks of 
discussion, to deliberate on the principles adopted from the beginning. I admit that I 
am overwhelmed at the thought.’
64
  
 Flawed as it was, discussion over the dual method and its underpinning ethos 
highlighted some interesting insights and the nature of the zeitgeist for a true 
‘International Labour Conference’ for labour right after the war, revealing further 
where these ideas sprang from, and where they might be headed. In its defense, 
Professor Shotwell contended that the recommendation could in fact make the 
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Conference stronger and potentially more productive. It promoted labour reforms 
that did not require the majority vote to pass, thereby giving the national competent 
authorities a greater body of legislation to consider.
65
 He gave his personal assurance 
that its acceptance would ‘secure the unreserved support of the US in the whole work 
of the new organisation’,
66
 reflecting the voluntarist attitude historically 
underpinning American organised labour ideology. France’s Fontaine in turn gave 
the US delegation a brief lecture on the contrasting history of European labour 
legislation, pointing out that no Americans had attended any world labour 
conferences until 1917. Maybe in America, Fontaine contended, mere labour opinion 
could force change, but European parliaments had historically refused to legislate 
until economic competition forced them to.
67
  Gompers nevertheless characterised 
the Europeans’ attitude as ‘impudent’, giving assurance that if America were granted 
the liberty they sought they would comply. He also warned that if the United States 
was forced to remain outside the ILO ‘the separation might become accentuated with 
time’,
68
 inferring American isolationism as well as a threat to the post-war Anglo-
American relationship. The Italian representatives questioned his logic, however, as 
Gompers had earlier pointed out the US Senate’s hostility toward the League of 
Nations, yet here were proposals to make the ILO virtually dependent upon it for 
enforcement: this put the ILO and the LON Covenant equally at risk of rejection.
69
      
 Barnes initiated a sub-committee to find a workable compromise in a virtual 
last-ditch effort after so much late-breaking conjecture.
70
  Personally, he was willing 
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to accept the recommendation as long as the Convention protocols remained intact.  
The Article XIX sub-committee met for two days, comprising the Belgian delegate 
Mahaim, America’s Robinson and Britain’s Sir Malcolm, with Shotwell as technical 
advisor. The ILO project had initially excited Shotwell, but the committee’s second 
day nearly broke him. Writing on March 17, he had said ‘What I wanted to do most 
of all at the Peace Conference has now come true - to negotiate that part of the 
general treaty which has to do with improving the conditions of the working people 
of the world.’
71
  However when the jurist Mahaim was absent the next day, Shotwell 
refereed a hot debate between Robinson and Sir Malcolm that nearly drove him to 
quit, recording that the session was ‘extremely lively, with frank exchanges of 
opinion on more than the subject matter.’
72
 Robinson eventually backed down. 
Shotwell recorded in his diary that he had picked up his coat, ready to storm out until 
‘the obstructing member gave way.’
73
 Presumably Robinson gave way on Article 
XXI, the plan to make the League of Nations responsible for challenged Conference 
decisions, as Sir Malcolm’s Subcommittee Report did not recommend its adoption.
74
   
 The Subcommittee Report put into words what everyone already knew:  in 
the end, it was vitally more important to include the United States in a ‘weakened’ 
scheme than to have a more powerful one without it.  Article XIX’s system of 
recommendations was adopted which, as Shotwell contended, could allow different 
states to apply reforms in ways that best suited their local and national industrial 
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 Article XX was also accepted, but amended to allow only truly 
Federated States ‘in respect of their treaty-making powers’ to treat conventions 
voluntarily, narrowing the field for exemption somewhat while still leaving the US 
with a get-out clause.
76
 Sir Malcolm admitted these amendments placed some nations 
‘on a different footing’ but it was best to ‘recognise that these differences exist.’ 
Deference to the United States was explicit, but their obligation was strongly 
implied: -  
…I think we may have confidence that the progressive spirit displayed by 
the United States people and Governments in regard to all industrial 
matters, the pressure which will be exerted by the powerful body of 
which our President is the head in the direction of any improvement of 
labour conditions which may be recommended by the Conference, the 
force of public opinion, and I may add the great influence which will be 
exerted by the International Labour Organisation itself will secure in the 
United States – even with the weaker provisions of the new clause – a 
real and effective effort to realise in legislation and reforms which may 




The vote came back with ten in favour of the abridged Robinson proposals, with four 
abstentions from the Italian and Japanese delegations.
78
  The European delegations’ 
closing remarks all reinforced how none of their reservations outweighed the 
importance of American participation. More crucially, however, all Labour 
Commission delegates sought to convey that a general consensus had been 
responsible for passing the entire scheme. The ultimate third reading vote on Article 
III saw the American motion for 1:1:1 lost however, eight votes to six, leaving the 
second reading’s decision on 2:1:1 to stand by a slim majority as Phelan prophesied. 
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 After seven weeks of passionate discourse the Labour Convention for the 
Peace Conference was unanimously accepted.
80
 The Japanese abstained, owing to 
their consistent position that their nation’s special circumstances put them at a 
considerable disadvantage.
  
France’s Loucher was (again) absent.
81
 The Peace 
Conference secretariat received the final Labour Commission Report on March 24, 
and Gompers left Paris for good two days later on the 26.  Articles XIX and XX 
would dilute Conference powers considerably, but Article III at least kept 
Governments invested in recognising labour’s demands, if not giving effect to them.  
 During his address to the Preliminary Peace Conference on April 11, 1919, 
Barnes was candid about how difficult it was to reach agreement until the right 
formula for compromise, especially regarding Article XIX, was found: -  
… I want to be perfectly candid with the Conference – the net result of all 
of this is that a less degree of obligation falls upon a Federal State than 
upon other States signatory to our document. That is bad; it is regrettable 
but, as we found, unavoidable. The difficulty was there. We did not make 




 Compromise was necessary and unavoidable on all fronts to finalise the 
Labour Commission Report and ILO Convention for the Peace Conference.  A 
subsequent section discusses some of the lingering challenges facing Barnes once it 
reached the Council of Ten (soon to be Five). And, despite several animated 
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exchanges between Barnes and Gompers, the AFL leader reflected late in life that 
‘The British saw our real difficulty more appreciatively than other groups and Mr 
Barnes of the British Delegation helped in the development of proposals to which we 
could agree.
’83 
  Shotwell pragmatically assessed that ‘A detailed study of this whole 
incident shows how an apparently impossible situation can ultimately be solved if 
there is sufficient good will and patience on both sides, combined with a real desire 
to see the result attained.’
84
  Unpicking the competing tensions underlying the third 
reading debates helps to better understand what the international zeitgeist was at the 
time, on the part of the Allies at least, and how national ideologies affected a 
changing (yet arguably still rigid) international complexion.   
Women and the Labour Commission 
 The Commission finally dealt specifically with women’s employment 
questions on the penultimate day of the Labour Convention’s drafting, March 18
 
1919, when they received a delegation from the Inter-Allied Women’s Conference 
(IAWC).  Women’s groups, particularly in relation to labour, did not appear to be 
adequately recognised during the Allied Peace Conference, and there is indeed scope 
for further research in a less constrained context than what this thesis can provide. 
Barnes was involved in dealing with their concerns to some extent as this section 
discusses. When he presented Margaret Bondfield’s two successful amendments to 
the Commission on March 11, he respectfully described her as ‘one of the leading 
personalities in the women’s Trade Union Movement.’
85
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 During the Berne Labour and Socialist Conference of February 1919, 
Bondfield represented the British TUC and was among other trade unionists 
including Leon Jouhaux with responsibility for drawing up a world charter for labour 
based on economic and social questions.
86
   Bondfield’s Allied Labour Commission 
proposals (previous section) ensured that women had at least some representation 
within the bureaucracies of the ILO Governing Body’s bureaucracy and at the 
Labour Conference as technical advisers.
 
Women’s direct influence on Conference 
decisions was discounted, however, because as mere advisers they could not vote 
according to paragraph five of Article III.
87
  The Peace Conference Directory 
reaffirms much that is already known about the status of women (from an 
institutional perspective) in the early twentieth century; one of the very few women 
listed among hundreds of international conference delegates is a secretary.
88
 
 The IAWC held their own mid-February Paris Conference, running parallel 
with the Allied Peace and Berne conferences. The delegation which met the Labour 
Commission in March included members of the French Union for Women's Suffrage 
(USFS) including their secretary-general Cécile Brunschvicg,
89
 and the Allied 
Women’s Suffrage Association (AWS), among others.
90
 The IAWC presented their 
resolutions in relation to labour matters affecting women to President Wilson, 
including the formation of an Allied women’s commission to ‘enquire and report’ on 
                                                 
86
  Origins, vol I, p.75   
87
 1919 TUC Conference Report, pp.179-181; ‘The Conference may add to any committee which it 
appoints technical experts who shall be assessors without power to vote.’ 
88
 Miss A.M. Saunders, sec. to NZ’s Sir Joseph Ward; Gertrude Bell arrived in Paris on March 7 and 
played a key yet unofficial role in promoting Arab independence; see G. Bell (Paul Rich, ed.)The Arab 
of Mesopotamia (UK: 2016 Westphalia Press) 
89
Cecile Brunschvicg (1877–1946) was a co-founder of the French Union for Women's Suffrage 
(Union française pour le suffrage des femmes) secretary-general, the USFS was founded in Paris, 
1908. 
90
 The AWS was founded in America, c.1869 
    Chapter four: The Third Reading of the Labour Convention    
185 
 
‘conditions and legislation concerning women and children throughout the world.’
91
 
The IAWC campaign was successful in gaining admission of women to the League 
of Nations
92




 The British Government had been lobbied for women’s representation on the 
Labour Commission as soon as the Peace Conference announced its formation in 
January 1919, and Barnes was given responsibility to inform them of the official 
position. Margaret Llewellyn Davis of the Women’s Co-operative Guild
94
 wrote to 
Lloyd George of her ‘grave concern’ that no women had been summoned to the late 
January TUC and Empire Delegation labour meetings (previous chapter).
95
 Barnes 
quickly apologised for any discourtesy, qualifying their omission by explaining that 
the TUC represented ‘a large number of women’ through their organisational 
affiliation. Bowerman’s chosen delegation, he wrote, ‘was presumably thought to be 
in a position to state the women’s case’, and although he supposed Bondfield could 
have joined them, it was not the Government’s decision to make.
96
  He advised Davis 
that the Labour Commission had no responsibility concerning specific proposals and 
that it was going to establish a world labour conference, consisting of delegates 
chosen by organised, writing ‘it will be no part of our business then to differentiate 
as between men and women.’ Barnes gave Davis assurance that the Government was 
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‘fully alive to the question of women’s interests being safeguarded.’
97
 Arguably these 
phrases were cold comfort to long-campaigning suffragists and advocates for better 
standards for women workers and their families.  
 Mary Macarthur,
98
 trade unionist, ILP member and anti-sweating campaigner 
had also wired Barnes from England during the TUC-BED joint meetings, concisely 
stating that ‘organised women’s opinions on international labour treaties should be 
heard. Much dissatisfaction here among women’s organisations generally.’
99
 Barnes 
replied somewhat limply that only tentative arrangements had yet been made, and 
that there would be ‘ample time for any representation you might care to make being 
duly, and I can assure you sympathetically, considered’ before the Peace Conference 
saw any proposals.
100
 As stated, the women’s delegation was not received until the 
race to complete the Labour Commission’s final Report was underway. 
Responsibility was again laid upon Bowerman for his male-exclusive choices, with 
Barnes asserting that those who participated ‘did put the women’s point of view so 
far as they knew, and I can assure you that it has always been kept in mind.’
101
  
Examination of the brief minutes of the January 27-29 meetings, however, did not 
reveal any women-specific concerns being raised.
102
 The reply to Macarthur was 
very similar to that which Davis had received: specific proposals pertaining to either 
gender were not being considered, as they were ‘making provision for labour getting 
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its due place… obviously we have no right to determine whether organised labour 
will select men or women for such purpose.’
103
  
The Proposals of the Inter-Allied Women’s Delegation  
 The Labour Commission met with a diverse configuration on March 18 
combining  representatives from more established and newer women’s groups.
104
  
Among them were the American journalists Constance Drexell
105
 and Alice Riggs 
Hunt
106
, and several unnamed French correspondents - the ‘lady journalists’ initially 
denied entry by Gompers upon arrival. It was Italy’s Mayor des Planches who gained 
their entry by challenging the standing press protocol which banned any reporting on 
the Labour Commission save official press releases, suggesting they attend as 
members of their national delegations.
107
  Gompers then expressed the Commission’s 
‘entire sympathy’ for their cause and their earnest wish to satisfy their claims: claims 
which supported women, children and even men.’
108
  It is interesting to note the 
awkwardness of some of these exchanges as they are preserved in the historical 
records.  
 The French suffragist Julie Siegfried
109
  noted how it was ‘a red letter day in 
the history of the feminist movement,’ and that she and her colleagues ‘wished to aid 
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the Commission in preparing for humanity and especially for women workers’ 
happier and fairer conditions of life.’
110
 The delegations took turns presenting their 
declarations, comprising many lengthy but understandable statements of principles 
and aims, with a good deal of repetition, along with suggestions for the first labour 
conference agenda. Many of the IAWC’s resolutions strongly resembled the wider 
social and economic aims contained within the draft Labour Convention Preamble,
111
  
indicating once again the international zeitgeist for a more transcendent 
internationalism that was long in development as Sluga aptly depicted in her 
research.
112
 Shotwell observed that ‘while their program was mainly concerned with 
the condition of women in industry, it covered as well most of the points in the 
Labour programme and even extended beyond it.’
 113
  Their fulsome presentations 
caused some confusion, however, which may have affected their reception by a 
pressurised Commission: - 
Mr. Barnes pointed out after the delegation had gone, the proposals 
would have been much more effective if they had been better organized 
so that the Commission could readily see which of them were intended to 
be inscribed in the Treaty of Peace and which were to be discussed in the 




Gompers congratulated the deputation ‘on the ability with which they had presented 
their case.’
115
 He referenced Bondfield’s earlier proposals, assuring them the 
Commission ‘had already considered a number of reforms of interest to women’, and 
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expressed his regret that they had not heard their ‘very interesting’ representations 
sooner.
116
   
 A sub-committee was tasked with narrowing down and refining the women’s 
proposals for a circulation document, and only those specifically moved by a 
member were discussed during two busy Labour Commission sittings as their final 
Report was drafted.
117
  Among those passed was the Preamble provision specifying 
the protection of juveniles in industry, largely at Arthur Fontaine’s behest. The 
Commission also approved their recommendation for ‘payment of maternity benefit 
to be made during the period for which work might be prohibited on account of 
childbirth.’
118
  Subsequently, item three on the October 1919 Washington 
Conference agenda dealt with “women’s employment (a) before and after child-birth, 
including the question of maternity benefit; (b) during the night, and (c) in unhealthy 
processes”.
119
 The replacement of the words ‘unhealthy industries’ with ‘unhealthy 
processes’, which, in part, extended protection to home workers, was another 
successful adoption.
120
  More importantly a number of the women’s proposals had 
recommended that ‘a commission of competent women’ should determine what these 
unhealthy processes were, as women were being excluded from some relatively well-
paid types of work that was less dangerous than others, based merely on their 
gender.
121
  This reflected the February IAWC resolution that  ‘women’s labour 
commissions should be set up in every country consisting of representatives of 
Governments, Trade Unions, scientific women, and to whom should be submitted all 
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 However, the desire for the establishment of 
what were essentially national women’s consultative committees was a radical 
departure from what the original British draft scheme envisioned. The final outcome 
for women in the Labour Convention was mixed and muted: while language 
regarding healthy processes was adopted on March 19, any proposals for establishing 
national women’s consultative committees were lost at the last minute on the 22
nd
. 
The British records noted such a thing was ‘of too exclusive a character’ and ‘there 
was no reason why a similar commission should not be set up as regards men.’ It was 
deemed to be a matter of national legislation and inappropriate for inclusion in the 
Peace Treaty.
123
   
 Other proposals owing to a ‘sufficiently heavy’ Conference agenda were the 
principle of equal pay for equal work; half-time work on request for married women; 
equal technical education opportunities for boys and girls; and equal opportunity for 
women to enter all industries and professions. The Labour Commission had 
unanimously agreed ‘not to commit itself to the implications’ of equal opportunity 
for women. Gompers asked it be ‘expressly noted’ that he was ‘opposed to the 
admission of women into all professions or industries without exception’ and that he 
‘would vote against any proposal to this effect.’
124
 Fontaine, Vandervelde ‘and 
various other members’ were in agreement with this sentiment. Finally the 
Commission adopted recommendations for female labour inspectors, by  nine votes 
to three. This became the last of the Labour Charter’s nine points for the Peace 
Treaty, adopted in June 1919.
125
 The reduction in weekly hours of work from forty-
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eight to forty-four was rejected. The final agenda item adopted for the October 
Labour Conference extended the application of the 1906 Berne Convention on ‘the 
prohibition of night work for women employed in industry and the prohibition of 
white phosphorous in the manufacture of matches.’
126
    
 Some limited benefit for women did result, either through integration into the 
permanent ILO machinery, the first Conference agenda or the Labour Clauses, but 
the meeting minutes captured the pervasive ethos that prevented progress at the pace 
they demanded. It has been effectively argued that women did not gain from the 
initial ILO settlement, especially from the deliberations of the international 
Conference.
127
  Bondfield’s amendments at least gained women a place within the 
ILO machinery, indicating her understanding of the vital importance of having 
women at the centre of administrative structures. Barnes’ January correspondence 
with women’s groups indicated that their concerns were an afterthought, but his 
replies also denoted naïve optimism, inferring that universally improved labour 
standards could trickle down to benefit working women and their families as well as 
men. It was not widely considered that women had special needs as mothers, or 
wives tasked with caring for elderly family members. 
Conclusions 
 This chapter demonstrated how much of the activity during the intermission 
suggests how often international diplomacy is shaped in hotels, dining rooms and the 
hallways and corridors of great buildings of state, much of which official records 
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ignore.  Surviving anecdotal accounts also give a sense of atmosphere that formal 
and often incomplete records often neglect. Phelan’s accounts of racing around in 
Paris under cover of darkness and Shotwell’s diary entries also denote how essential 
maintaining the smaller powers’ support for the scheme was when American support 
was in doubt.  Phelan and Shotwell’s intermission work, and the intricate concession 
debates that followed, indicated that American recalcitrance owed more to political 
vicissitudes and will than to real legal boundaries. Although Gompers and Robinson 
were not experts on the US legal system’s technicalities, they at least had a pragmatic 
understanding of the American legislature’s limitations, much as Barnes understood 
the Peace Conference’s attitude towards ‘too progressive’ labour reform. The 
extended Article XIX debates reflected the ideological gap between American 
individualism and European collectivism that guided most Commission arguments. 
Articles XIX and XX diluted the Labour Conference’s powers considerably, but 
Article III at least kept Governments invested in recognising and potentially giving 
effect to labour’s demands. Shotwell, officially an American delegate, provided an 
invaluable service to the whole Commission and reconstructed the United States’ 
demands in a way that enabled the passage of the Labour Convention, albeit 
compromised. The fact that the ‘British scheme’ might have failed without him can 
not be ignored.    
 Gompers resented that the British created the scheme and took charge of the 
draft Convention’s direction, and he went on the defensive early in the process.  
Barnes’ in-depth familiarity with the scheme’s technical aspects as they came up, 
soft-spoken as he was, may have been intimidating given Gompers’ lack of 
experience in policy-making (chapter two depicted how he used his power to 
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organise American labour factions and broker deals through various means of 
persuasion). Unfortunately, Gompers’ outsider mentality threw a shadow over the 
proceedings, and he almost resembled a Don Quixote figure tilting at windmills, 
exhibiting conflicting priorities that were ultimately thrown into turmoil by the 
Lodge campaign. He did, however, see the opportunity the Lodge campaign 
presented to defend his fundamental belief that the AFL declaration for a labour 
‘charter’ was the Commission’s top priority.  Barnes and the British (and the 
Europeans) had the benefit of their Government backing them relatively 
unanimously while the American legislature was deeply divided over the League 
Covenant. Gompers’ allegiance to two masters appeared to confound him so late in 
life.  By contrast, Barnes expanded his role, advancing age notwithstanding, as the 
following chapters depict.   
 The inclusion of women earlier in the Labour Convention process might have 
resulted in more meaningful contributions to the ILO Covenant, but pervading 
attitudes kept many women in an economic sub-group comparable with agricultural 
labourers. Barnes exhibited both a conservative and inconsistent attitude towards 
women’s labour, arguing on the one hand that all of organised labour would benefit 
through cooperation with ‘benevolent’ governments, while telling the women 
arguing for inclusion on the Labour Commission that such a decision was beyond his 
Government’s remit. Barnes was adjusting to changing circumstances, yet his 
attitude towards women in the labour movement represented another paradoxical 
aspect of his political ideology: he did not seem to fully recognise that their desires 
were part of a wider international dialogue. To some extent the minutes of the 
women’s delegation to the Labour Commission indicated the prevailing emphasis on 
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presenting the Peace Conference with a scheme not overly radical, yet at the same 
time the men’s candour reflected contemporary negative attitudes regarding the 
female voice as a yet-transitioning type of internationalism emerged. 
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Chapter five: The Road to the Peace Conference 
 Although the Labour Convention for the ILO was finished and the Labour 
Commission concluded, Barnes’ work was far from over. The immediate priority was to 
achieve adoption of the Labour Commission’s Report (‘Labour Report’ or ‘Report’) by 
the Peace Conference so that the Organising Committee for October’s International 
Labour Conference could begin working in earnest. Growing rumours that the 
American Senate would not ratify the League of Nations Covenant provoked great 
anxiety for residual Commission members still in Paris who were nevertheless 
determined that whatever happened ‘labour would still have its parliament.’
1
 As the 
Commission’s acting General Secretary, Barnes worked diligently to avoid the 
Conference’s postponement or cancellation by keeping the Labour Report high on the 
Peace Conference agenda as dozens of international delegations and sub-committees 
also jostled for attention. He attended numerous, disconnected meetings to publicise the 
Commission’s work, while the complicated matter of the Labour Charter attached to the 
Report as an Annex, was yet unresolved.  
 Complications arose when the British Empire Delegation’s Dominion leaders 
saw the March 24 Report and vowed to boycott the entire scheme, perceiving threats to 
their economies and their self-governing status. The significant changes they demanded 
were impossible for Barnes to undertake without the Peace Conference plenary’s 
official authority. At the same juncture, Barnes faced great hostility from the Council of 
Five’s foreign secretaries (save the British Foreign Secretary, Balfour) who disregarded 
his plea for a special plenary session to consider any late-breaking amendments or 
sanction the Commission’s reassembly in order to satisfy the hostile Dominion heads.   
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The Labour Charter 
 Shotwell assessed that the controversial, hastily-assembled Labour Charter was 
the main hurdle to overcome, as its clauses had been denied the ‘fire of debate’ received 
by the Labour Convention’s individual articles; nor were the British Empire and 
Dominion heads involved in its drafting.
2
  Barnes nevertheless defended the 
controversial points (also referred to as ‘the clauses’) despite his own scepticism about 
their necessity since a number of Labour Commission delegations were so passionate 
about their codification. He was blunt in his memoir: - 
For my part I attached little importance to the declarations. They were for 
the most part merely decorative phrases and declarations which had been 




In retrospect Barnes was blasé about what came to comprise Article 427 of the Peace 
Treaty of June 1919, but at the time their debate set off a chain of events that challenged 
the ILO Convention’s progression to the Peace Conference. As an earlier chapter 
discussed, nineteen points of general agreement were compiled in February (largely at 
the behest of the Italian and American delegations), and refined between March 15 and 
24 into a final ‘nine guiding points’ of general labour principles.
4
 The Charter was 
important for those who felt establishing mere Conference machinery was inadequate, 
and although Barnes believed in its statements of economic and social justice he 
deemed them inappropriate for an international treaty. Backed by Belgium’s 
Vandervelde, he made practical arguments against burdening the other plenipotentiaries 
with deep, fundamental labour questions, or proposals either too vague or too specific. 
In-depth consideration of the points commenced in mid-March just as the constitutional 
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aspects of the scheme came under intense scrutiny and the Commission raced to 
conclude its main business, the establishment of the annual International Labour 
Conference. It was composed and redrafted amid such confusion that it threw the whole 
of the Commission’s work into doubt.
5
  
 An impatient unofficial sub-committee formed to draft its own seven-point 
expression of labour principles for the Treaty on Mach 15, presented by Italy’s Mayor 
des Planches. In the light of this break-away committee, Barnes determined that nothing 
be sent to the Peace Conference without approval by a two-thirds majority, also moving 
that names be recorded against the votes for the proposed clauses.
6
  Delegation 
members argued to preserve their original wording and to present the full nineteen, 
unabridged clauses to the Peace Conference for insertion in the Treaty. While Barnes 
appreciated this sentiment, he consistently maintained that doing so would only lead to 
their rejection.
7,8
   
 The February 1919 Berne conference
 
had inspired already-impatient critics of 
the British scheme and the Allied labour plan to demand immediate satisfaction of their 
own programme via specific Peace Treaty affirmations. Barnes recalled the strident 
Leon Jouhaux, fresh from Berne with the CGT
9
 declaration in hand, ‘breaking in upon 
us when we had nearly completed our work and denouncing that work in unmeasured 
terms.’
10
 Jouhaux insisted through fiery rhetoric that the Labour Charter had to 
compensate for an unaccountable ILO convention which, but for the Preamble’s brief 
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statements, was devoid of any real intent. He proclaimed ‘There has been much talk 
about a new world… (and) there must be great social transformation.’ He warned of the 
danger in publishing a document ‘in which there was not even a reference to the right of 
a child, to education, or the position of women.’ The CGT declaration proclaimed how 
the Labour Conference would be just another inert advisory body, and that its Covenant 
intentionally employed vague language to prevent actual legislation.
11
 His impassioned 
discourse did not alter the Labour Charter’s content, but it may have impressed upon 
Barnes the necessity for avoiding a cavalier attitude. 
 Barnes felt a flawed Labour Charter could defeat the entire concept of peace 
through labour. His primary assertion was that a ‘theoretical programme’ exceeded the 
Commission’s remit, and what it could reasonably produce. He argued that universal 
declarations were impossible since not every nation was represented at Paris, nor could 
a single screed accommodate all their stages of industrial development.
12
 Ultimately no 
part of the Peace Treaty could comprise anything permanent which might conflict with 
future Conference decisions.
13
  Politically, Barnes was concerned that such a 
prescriptive text would conflict with Article XII of the League Covenant
14
 and create 
such a dangerous ‘diplomatic misunderstanding’ as to incite another war. Ultimately 
Barnes felt that a number of definitive ‘points’ could never permanently solve all of 
labour’s multitudinous woes: the Labour Charter was an impossible ‘compromise 
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between ideals and reality’ in his opinion.
15
  On the other hand a Charter comprising a 
few, easily agreed labour principles would be valuable propaganda for swaying public 
opinion to create the right moral atmosphere for meaningful reform to take root.
16
 It 
should only imbue the Peace Treaty with the ethics that the annual labour conference 
would put into ‘practical application.’
17
 In this way it may have represented to Barnes a 
vehicle for institutionalising some of his deeply-held Christian and communitarian 
socialist beliefs.  
 The earlier Labour Convention debates had exposed conflicting ideas about 
democracy and sovereignty that were clumsily met through the late addition of the 
Article XIX special protocols.  The Labour Charter controversy deepened the dilemma, 
touching upon issues of national importance that seemed to confuse some Commission 
members as to their end goal. Barnes was bluntly described as ‘leading the opposition to 
the charter’,
18
 yet the minutes from this period showed the opposite to be true: he was 
deeply concerned that it be handled delicately. Much of the difficulty stemmed from 
misunderstandings and miscommunications about the Commission’s remit in a 
pressurised and multi-lingual setting.
19
    
Point fifteen: America and Freedom of the Seas 
 Samuel Gompers’ ceaseless campaign to embed the AFL’s 1918 declaration in 
the Peace Treaty took an interesting turn during the Labour Charter debates. The 
original draft point fifteen had read in part that ‘seamen of the Mercantile Marine should 
                                                 
15
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have the right of leaving their ships while they are in port.’
20
 In America, this ‘freedom 
of the seas’ was codified in the Seamen’s Act, 1915
21
 and held the same symbolic and 
practical relevance that the eight-hour day held in Europe. Gompers’ fundamental 
argument was that point fifteen extended to sailors rights which workers on the land 
already enjoyed.
22
  Gompers was still stinging over the earlier defeat of point thirteen 
regarding the abolition of involuntary servitude, something which closely resembled 
America’s constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.
23
  His allegiance to an ideal the 
European delegations did not fully understand only complicated his mission.  Barnes, 
once again backed by Vandervelde, maintained that point fifteen was ‘too special’ for 
the Charter. 
24
 His practical experience of Council of Ten meetings again led him to 
warn the delegates to limit their Peace Conference presentation ‘to the inclusion of a 
few declarations of principle of a general character’ since ‘only a very limited 
programme’ stood a chance of acceptance.
25
  
 Gompers entered into an alliance with Andrew Furuseth, the outspoken head of 
the powerful International Seamen’s Union (ISU),
26
 to ensure that that point fifteen 
became enshrined within the Treaty. Furuseth was an early and hostile critic of the 
League of Nations. Within days of the November 1918 armistice he began defending 
the Seaman’s Act that he felt it imperilled, and by December he was making his case to 
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 Neither British officials from the Department of Shipping
28
 nor 
the Secretary of the War Cabinet, Maurice Hankey, sympathised with his position. In 
January Furuseth wrote ‘I could find no indication that they were even considering the 
Seamen's Act. The silence was so thunderous that it made me afraid.’
29
  The refusal in 
February 1919 by both the Executive Board of the British Seaman’s Union and the 
International Seafarers’ Federation Conference to endorse similar protections for their 
sailors only reinforced his fears.
30,31
  Nobody embodied suspicion and distrust about the 
British scheme better than Furuseth. 
 In order to convince his skeptical AFL delegation that things were going well on 
the Labour Commission, and to prove he was not being ‘carried away by the novel 
situation in which he found himself’, Gompers often brought wary colleagues like 
Furuseth to the sessions.
32
 Furuseth became convinced that the European delegations 
were under the sway of a British-led, anti-American conspiracy with the Seaman’s Act 
in the crosshairs. By March, Furuseth’s angry Memorandum on the Constitution of the 
Conference on Labour Legislation in Relation to the Seaman’s Act of America 
(‘Seaman’s memo’) was circulating the Peace Conference. It accused the British 
Delegation of seeking to damage America’s economic position by weakening seamen’s 
protections, and it castigated the Commission for rejecting the point about involuntary 
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 Furuseth also took full advantage of hallway diplomacy during his 
campaign against the Labour Commission, surprising Shotwell (who referred to 
Furuseth as a ‘psychological curiosity’
34
) in corridors more than once - requesting full 
accounts of their work, and engaging him in heated debate over how international 
labour legislation might harm sailors.
35
 Shotwell felt Furuseth was unfair to the British, 
particularly Barnes, but those impromptu encounters gave him insight into how to 
change Furuseth’s mind long enough to allow the Commission to meet its pressing 
deadline.  In the end, the Gompers-Furuseth alliance provoked another key American 
concession with Shotwell’s help.  
 Shotwell recalled Gompers’ near-obsequious deference to Furuseth,
36
 and Max 
Lazard of the French delegation
37
 remarked in 1931 that ‘Gompers watched him 
continuously and seemed to be terrified of him.’
38
 When Gompers introduced the 
seamen’s clause for debate on March 15, Furuseth was not even present.  Meanwhile, 
the American delegation had given its provisional support to the Article XIX sub-
committee report (passim, previous chapter) with the reservation the Commission would 
once again vote on Article III and 2:1:1 (despite the matter being closed).
39
 On March 
19, Gompers seized his moment: linking point fifteen to 2:1:1 by claiming that it created 
an anti-labour bloc which could ultimately deny American sailors their right to leave 
ship, something tantamount to involuntary servitude.
40 
 He claimed that the Labour 
Conference could deny the aspirations of ‘the sailors of the whole world (who) hoped to 
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secure similar rights’ as those the US Seaman’s Act enshrined. He then proposed new 
wording for point fifteen, with Furuseth’s Seaman’s memo attached, in advance of the 
final Article III vote. 
41
 Barnes argued that point fifteen was superfluous since the 
London International Seamen’s Conference had recently rejected a very similar 
provision,
42
 contending further that the contract between a sailor and a ship’s Captain 
was unassailable, a mutual civil responsibility that Conference decisions could not 
nullify. The Seamen’s memo ‘did not appear to contain any serious arguments’ to 
support the necessity for point fifteen, and Barnes, defended by Fontaine, asserted that 
no recommendation or convention could ever lessen ‘the advantages already acquired 
by anybody of the working classes anywhere.’
43
  The Commission was again at a 
standoff, Europeans versus Americans, with just two days to go and much to resolve. 
 Shotwell convinced Furuseth to consider a solution during a frustrating March 
21
st
 session. Commission members ‘did not understand the situation and were anxious 
to get on with the drafting of the clauses’ as Gompers repeated the previous days’ 
oration solely for Furuseth’s benefit.
44
 Shotwell’s personal notes mention that Barnes 
was not alone in showing annoyance, nevertheless Furuseth remarked sharply that ‘the 
British are going to use the machine you set up’ to betray the 1915 Act.
45
 The matter 
seemed insurmountable until Shotwell convinced Furuseth to consider a clause 
stipulating that ‘In no case shall any of the high contracting powers be asked or 
required, as a result of the adoption by the conference of any recommendation or draft 
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convention, to diminish the protection afforded by its existing legislation to the workers 
concerned.’
46
 Furuseth finally relented. Shotwell’s clause became another Special 
Protocol to Article XIX, the ‘safeguard clause’, passing an exhausted Commission 
without objection on March 22
nd
 to become part of Article 405 in the Peace Treaty.  
 Initially Furuseth was so pleased with Shotwell that he made him an honorary 
member of the Seaman’s union.
47
 Within days, however, the mercurial Furuseth 
revolted against the Labour Charter, and had even asked President Wilson to amend it 
behind an unwitting Gompers’ back.
48,49 
The trajectory of the ‘safeguard clause’ is 
contested. Gompers claimed that he, Furuseth and Robinson drafted it themselves after 
the point fifteen debate had been intentionally postponed, without Shotwell’s help.
50
 
Shotwell observed that this ‘somewhat contradictory account’ served ‘as a caution to 
the historian in dealing with records of this kind.’
51
  It is unfortunate that the American 
minutes (previous chapter) end before this episode. The safeguard clause was another 
crucial American concession to the ILO Convention, but it did allow the Commission to 
finalise the nine points and attach the Charter  to the Labour Convention.
52
  
 A satisfied Gompers closed the Commission on March 24 apologising for the 
‘warmth’ he displayed over ‘ideas which were particularly dear’ to him.
53
 Admitting 
that his initial ambivalence had passed, he saw ‘the possibility of leading a campaign in 
the United States in favour of the Convention’, despite having ‘wondered if it would not 
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be his duty to fight against it’ until the last minute.
54
  France’s Colliard (responsible for 
nominating Gompers as Commission President) concluded that ‘The Draft Convention 
might be said to be the child of Mr. Barnes… the Commission had done its best to 
endow this child with a strong constitution... (and that) the child was well equipped for 
a robust future.
’55  
Barnes’ experience was far from over, yet he looked back wistfully:- 
It is a singular thing that people will oft fight harder over affirmation of 
abstract principles than concrete practical proposals for immediate 
application… And looked at in that light, some of them were at once found 
to be impossible…  In a practical working of the International Labour Office 
they will, of course, play little part, excepting by way of reference, and the 
most that can be said for them is that, in the words of the Indian medicine 




The Borden declaration 
 The politics of national identity suddenly impacted upon the Labour 
Convention’s progress and further complicated Barnes’ role when the British 
Dominions demanded recognition as ‘autonomous nations of an Imperial 
Commonwealth’ from the Peace Conference just as the Commission’s American 
problems neared their zenith on March 12. On that date the Canadian Prime Minister 
Robert Borden declared to the League of Nations council that Canada and the other 
Dominions had rights as individual signatories to the Treaty with the same ‘power of 
review’ as all High Contracting Parties (‘HCPs’). Borden was deeply invested in the 
subsequent revision of the LON Convention to reflect his declaration since he held 
primary responsibility for drafting Part IX of the 1917 Imperial War Conference 
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resolution, formally recognising the Dominions’ voice in foreign affairs and securing 
their place at the Peace Conference.
57,58
    
 Borden had been warned by Canadian Justice Minister C J Doherty
59
 that the 
ILO Convention’s Article XXXV did not match the recently revised language of the 
draft League of Nations covenant they had fought for. It still read ‘The British 
Dominions and India shall have the same rights and obligations under this Convention 
as if they were separate High Contracting Parties’, insinuating a lesser degree of 
independence with regard to labour decisions.
60
  Doherty also insisted that the ILO 
Convention’s Article VII effectively eliminated any Dominion presence from the ILO 
Governing Body, since the single representative for the British Empire in its entirety 
would no doubt be Britain, owing to its industrial prominence.
61
 The Convention’s 
British authors, he wrote, deprived the Dominions of any ‘real or effective national 
status.’
62
 Borden thereby advised Sir Malcolm that he was in complete agreement with 
Doherty on the very day he issued his independence declaration.
63
 The Canadians 
hadn’t considered that Article XXXV had been drafted in January when the League’s 
composition was still uncertain (as discussed above). Sir Malcolm explained that this 
wording was intended to safeguard the position of the Dominions without denying their 
rights, giving them equal status with any HCPs eventually joining the League.  He also 
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deferred to the Americans for instigating the limitations Article VII placed on the 
Governing Body as they had ‘objected strongly’ to having the same representation as 
smaller nations. Sir Malcolm tried to reassure Doherty that the real power and authority 
of the ILO scheme lay within its annual Labour Conference.
64
  
 President Borden remained unconvinced that the Dominions were on equal 
footing, and he was angered that Article XXXV had not been amended in the March 24 
Labour Commission Report.  He complained to Lloyd George and Barnes that the ILO 
Convention came from a British perspective that ignored Canadian conditions, being 
drafted free of any consultation with the Dominions as far as he knew.
65
 Evidence 
showed that the Dominion leaders remained quiet on labour questions since the January 
TUC-BED joint meetings as discussed earlier, despite Phelan’s regular distribution of 
Labour Commission updates.
66
  There are no records of any British Empire Delegations 
(‘BED’) meetings discussing the scheme after January’s joint drafting sessions, and as 
Barnes recalled, they seemed generally uninterested.   
Hostility from the British Empire Delegation  
 Barnes led a series of meetings with BED members and Dominion leaders that 
commenced March 29 to deal with their eleventh-hour complaints. The British records 
held at The National Archive, formal in their tone as they are, capture a pervading sense 
of frustration on Barnes’ part that was only mitigated once his consistent backer, David 
Lloyd George, defended several of the arguments he had been putting forward for 
several months. 
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 Barnes had wrongly believed that ‘thrashing out any difficulties’ with the BED 
was just a procedural matter by then, and he was confident he could bring the scheme 
quickly before the Council of Ten, and the Peace Conference, soon after.
67
  The draft 
Labour Charter’s point eight, however, which read ‘in all matters concerning their status 
as workers and social insurance (sic) foreign workers lawfully admitted to any country 
and their families should be ensured the same treatment as the nationals of that 
country’,
68
 proved problematic. On March 27 Borden warned Lloyd George that point 
eight would force British Columbia to rescind legislation reserving ‘certain industries 
for white labour’, something which could arouse ‘the fiercest resentment (which) might 
lead to the most serious consequences.’
69
  Point eight roused the rest of the Dominion 
heads to scrutinise the text, and a frustrating ‘detailed examination of the whole scheme’ 
ensued.
70
 Sir Malcolm, Barnes and Shotwell made amendments ahead of the first March 
29 BED session in response to Canada’s concerns, rewording the point in question to 
make clear it applied to a foreigner’s rights in labour matters only, but this did little to 
pre-empt further controversy. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa then avowed 
their total rejection of parallel membership between the ILO and the League of Nations, 
the key fundament of the ILO vision.  Barnes was surprised by the hostility he 
encountered.
71
 The Dominion leaders’ demands to alter that essential relationship 
exceeded his authority as either acting Secretary to the Labour Commission or as a BED 
plenipotentiary. 
                                                 
67
 TNA FO 608/238/419  
68
 ILO B.07.B02, 27.3.19 
69
 Ibid; ‘in all matters concerning their status as workers and social insurance (sic) foreign workers 
lawfully admitted to any country and their families should be ensured the same treatment as the nationals 
of that country’ at March 24.  
70
 Origins, vol 1 p 200 
71
 Phelan memoir, p.200 
Chapter five: The Road to the Peace Conference 
209 
 
 The varying arguments from the BED against dual ILO-LON membership that 
delineated national priorities were presented as economic concerns, yet they 
exacerbated enduring racial prejudice.  Japan, for example, had made its membership in 
the LON dependent on the recognition of racial equality in its Covenant.  The ILO 
Convention, meanwhile, gave special consideration to such developing economies 
which the Dominion leaders already felt gave them an unfair advantage.  Australia’s 
slight but intrepid Prime Minister, William ‘Billy’ Hughes, abhorred the dual 
membership, since a nation outside the League also remained outside the labour 
restrictions imposed by the ILO.  Hughes feared Japan posed an economic threat as 
great as Germany’s.
72
 Hughes angrily resolved to reject the labour scheme until dual 
membership was removed, supported by Borden, New Zealand’s Massey and South 
Africa’s General Smuts.
73
  Barnes’ insistence that he lacked the authority to make such 
a significant amendment at that stage fell on deaf ears.
74
 Shotwell’s diary recorded 
amusingly that although the BED feared the firebrand Hughes, treating him as ‘an 
enfant terrible who might have broken loose’, in actuality his ‘worst disturbance was 
insisting that all his neighbours round the table sign his autograph book.’
75
  
 India’s Lord Sinha
76
 also declared at that late stage that the ILO Convention 
simply ‘would not suit Indian conditions’ the way it stood.
77
  The Maharajah of 
Bikaner, Ganga Singh, concurred, stating that while British India and the Indian States 
wanted to raise labour’s standards, the scheme’s proposals only suited European 
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  Universal imposition was ‘prejudicial’ to Indian industries, her people and 
her labour forces, he declared - ‘Indeed it would be no exaggeration to say that they 
would otherwise result in serious industrial and labour unrest.’
79
 Barnes, as a progenitor 
of the Labour Convention, consistently argued that to ignore differing phases of social 
and industrial development could thwart the Labour Convention’s unanimous 
acceptance.  National Archive records indicated that Barnes, at Borden’s insistence, 
personally chaired at least one sub-group at the end of March 1919 to specifically 
address the Dominions’ particular complaints, with India’s participation. Ultimately 
developing nations, i.e., Japan and India, were allowed extra time to consider how to 
enact Labour Conference decisions domestically.
80
   
 Matters of national identity continually vexed Barnes. On March 31
st
, A.L. 
Sifton of the Canadian Customs Ministry
81
  challenged the ILO-League membership 
parallel, protesting Article XIX’s special protocol that gave preference to the 
Americans.
82
 He contended that ‘no Canadian Government could stand if it accepted the 
scheme as drafted.’
83
  Notes of the next day’s session recorded Barnes’ clear irritation at 
such an objection being raised so late in the day.
84
 He recalled that the Dominion group 
was ‘unwilling to abate any of its claims or implications even of a theoretical nature’ as 
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they had recently ‘come in to full National stature’ as Peace Conference delegates 
themselves.
85
 After the April 1
st
 session, Barnes advised the BED secretary Captain 
(Clement) Jones
86
 to abandon any hopes for a change in attitude, complaining: ‘the 
Minute I sent you the other day might well be torn up. I now realise that the BED will 
make no progress whatsoever unless they have a meeting with the PM in the chair.’
87
   
 Barnes sent an urgent meeting request to Lloyd George that underscored his 
impatience. He reiterated to the Prime Minister how the Labour Commission had toiled 
away for many weeks, secure in the belief that the Dominion leaders were ‘quite 
cognisant’ of the features they now railed against.
88
 The Dominion leaders, as it turned 
out, should have regretted harrying the Prime Minister: during the resulting April 3
rd
 
BED (discussed below) he fully backed Barnes, adamant that the Labour Convention 
would get to the Peace Conference with or without the Dominion heads’ agreement.
 89
   
Resistance from the Council of Five  
 At precisely the same juncture on April 1
st
, Barnes encountered an impasse upon 
approaching the Council of Five’s Foreign Secretaries with the Labour Report. Their 
sanction was required for its presentation to the Peace Conference plenary ahead of the 
Treaty’s final drafting. Only the plenary conference could authorise the reassembly of 
the Commission to deal with any significant changes such as the BED group sought. 
Additionally, as Barnes argued, the plenary would give much-needed positive 
international publicity to the all-important Labour Convention and the nine points of the 
Labour Charter.   
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 Barnes was immediately rebuffed by US Secretary of State Robert Lansing.
90
 
Lansing had recently been lobbied by none other Henry Robinson, Gompers’ Labour 
Commission ally, to bury the Labour Report.  Gompers recalled that Robinson 
‘protested most vigorously’ at the thought of the Commission re-forming without the 
presence of American labour representatives who had left France by then. Robinson 
personally sent Lansing a memorandum to that effect, also complaining to President 
Wilson that ‘there had been no intimation’ that the Commission’s work was incomplete 
when they disbanded: its re-formation, he wrote, would be ‘irregular, unfair and of 
harmful consequence.’
91
 There is evident discrepancy in the records about how the 
Labour Commission left things. The British minutes recorded that Gompers had said his 
late March departure ‘would not prevent the Commission from continuing its work if 
that proved necessary.’
92
 It is extraordinary to consider that, despite the Article XIX 
concessions Robinson had successfully instigated during the third reading, he would 
soon attempt to derail the ILO Convention’s passage this way.  
 On the morning of April 1
st
 James Shotwell again proved his belief in the British 
scheme’s end goal, struggling personally to promote the Labour Report to several 
uninterested American delegations and ‘worn out’ Commissioners.93  Coincidentally, 
The Times had also prematurely published most of the details of the Report that 
morning, greatly angering Lindsay.
94
 The newspaper positively assessed the new world 
labour bureau as ‘the most valuable of all the by-products of the League of Nations 
(forming) a permanent bond of attachment between it and the democracies of all 
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  Nevertheless, Lansing castigated Barnes during a sharp exchange for 
‘constant leakage’ to the press by the British delegation (Barnes, as discussed, held 
responsibility for official press releases; how The Times received a copy is uncertain). 
Barnes argued back that the Times’ report only strengthened the case for a plenary 
hearing, as ‘Workmen did not read the Times.’ He warned the Council that the recent 
Hungarian revolutions were one example of the ‘lamentable effect’ the Peace 
Conference’s refusal to take labour problems seriously could have.
96
 Arthur Balfour, the 
British Foreign Secretary, came to his defence, asserting that ‘nothing affected the 
working man so immediately as the report of this Commission’, insisting upon its 
prominence as ‘there was a real danger of the labour side of the Conference appearing 
to be neglected.’
97
 Balfour sagely suggested Barnes appeal to the ‘Big Four’ leadership, 
something Barnes at first lamented.
98
   
 After a considerable amount of to and fro, the Council of Five agreed to let 
Barnes distribute the Report to the Paris delegations and the international press, a few 
days before the all-important April 11 conference plenary. Lansing’s begrudging 
attitude was interpreted by Shotwell as indicative of a general resistance to changing 
traditional diplomatic practice, forcing recalcitrant, ages-old foreign offices to 
reconsider their roles in a rapidly changing, post-war world.
99
 Shotwell noted this 
setback in his diary, sharing his British colleagues’ frustration and ‘uncertainty as to 
whether our work was really going to be given its place or snowed under by the interest 
in political and territorial settlement… the rigid mind of the foreign office official is 
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 After this seeming defeat, the British took a much-needed tea break in 
Shotwell’s room. Barnes, Shotwell wrote, ‘was about as hot a Briton as I have seen in 
Paris’,
 101
 and Sir Malcolm further mentioned that Barnes ‘would have gone up to his 
room to have an old-fashioned cry, as he used to have in boyhood days’ if not for the 
reinvigorating tea.  The next morning, Barnes penned ‘an exceedingly strong letter’
102
 to 
Lloyd George, reporting that the Foreign Secretaries had ‘shunted the whole thing’ onto 
the Prime Ministers. He stressed that he was ‘getting very uneasy’ about the Labour 
Convention’s future: - 
No one appeared to regard the Labour settlement as of any importance. One 
of the secretaries said that, in his judgement, it was not Labour but territory 
which was agitating the mind of peoples. I combatted this idea as well as I 
could…  
 
…if it gets abroad that the Peace plenipotentiaries are only taking a languid 
interest in Labour adjustment, then Labour will be very wroth and will have 
reason to be so… I am here to advise you on Labour feeling when necessary. 
That is my justification in writing you this long letter…  
 
I know that Labour cares nothing about territory except to see such 
adjustment made as to leave no rankling sore for the future, and I know 
further that Labour does care about getting on with those things that concern 
the daily life of working folk. It is because of that I want our scheme 
through and our Committee at work.
103
 
A sympathetic Shotwell observed that at that juncture, Lloyd George could not 
‘let Labour down completely after having left to Barnes the task of meeting the 
activities of Henderson and his friends by action at the Peace Conference 
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 Despite the attitudes of Lansing, Robinson, Furuseth and Gompers, the Labour 
Convention did have supporters within the American delegation. E. Stagg Whitin
105
 of 
The Inquiry (the academic advisory group for the American Peace Conference 
delegation)  told Phelan that he would personally ‘undertake a share in the propaganda 
in favour of the scheme’, suggesting grand reception committees ahead of the 
Washington Conference, along with railway tours and other entertainments that required 
the delegates’ arrival several weeks in advance. Phelan mused on the potential for 
numerous free train trips and dinners, while also suspecting that the AFL wanted to 
‘unload’ the elderly Gompers into an ILO desk job ‘which he could assume with honour 
and which would take him out of America.’
106
  
Lloyd George rebukes the Dominion heads  
 Balfour’s suggestion that Barnes take his request up to the ‘Big Four’
107
 was a 
fortuitous move since Lloyd George and Clemenceau both saw the immense value in 
acknowledging labour’s demands as a bulwark to revolution. Lloyd George 
subsequently took a hard line during the April 3
rd
 BED session, admonishing the 
Dominions for a raft of ‘second reading objections.’
108
 Barnes decried the resurrection 
of the Labour Commission when the Labour Convention was ready for the Peace 
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 His circulation of a detailed justification for the ILO-LON dual 
membership had no effect on the scheme’s most belligerent detractors, Hughes and 
Massey who extolled numerous economic arguments, including the dangers of cheap 
export dumping and increased ‘sweated’ labour from Labour Conference-excluded 
countries potentially.
110
  They even suggested amending the first Article of the Labour 
Convention, or that of the League of Nations Covenant itself, to suit them: this meant 
‘wrecking the whole scheme’ as Barnes was concerned.
111   
 
Robert Cecil (League of Nations’ Council, and League of Nations Union, et al) 
supported Barnes, expressing the ‘immense moral value’ of parallel ILO-LON 
membership, and the importance this held for the British Labour Party: otherwise ‘they 
will feel they have been betrayed, and will attack the League.’
112
 Cecil argued further 
that the Allied ILO Conference would contain the revolutionary mindset, displacing 
ideas emanating from independent Socialist conferences which were ‘inconsistent with 
the authority of the State’, finally warning that the League of Nations would fail if its 
only role was to prevent war.
113
 Lloyd George reminded the Dominions leaders that 
they were not ‘menaced with the dangers of Bolshevism’ as the European continentals 
were, and were economically protected and favoured within the Empire with their own 
national legislatures.
114
 He warned the BED group that they risked provoking ‘great 
disappointment in labour circles throughout the world’, not to mention looking foolish 
by contesting their nation’s own Report. Clemenceau, he added, was particularly 
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anxious for an ‘earnest attempt to better the conditions of the working classes.’
115
 
Phelan suspected that Leon Jouhaux’s numerous, public fulminations on the Allies’ 
great deception of the working classes were behind some of the Prime Minister’s 
assertions.
116
    
 The BED’s recalcitrance notwithstanding, the April 5 ‘Big Four’ meeting 
secured the audience with the Peace Conference Barnes had strived for.
117
 Balfour 
chaired two preparatory BED sessions ahead of the April 11 plenary wherein he stressed 
the importance of presenting a united front. Hughes, Botha and Massey nevertheless 
remained ‘impervious to arguments’ about joint membership.
118
 To specifically appease 
Canada, Barnes worked with Shotwell and Sir Malcolm on the language of Article 
XXXV with support from French, Belgian, Italian and American representatives. 
Wording agreed between Sifton, India’s Lord Sinha, and Barnes brought the Labour 
Convention’s language in line with that of the League Covenant, finally removing the 
distinction between the British Dominions and India from the other League members.
119
  
Further consultations between Barnes, the Indian and Japanese labour delegates resulted 
in the second special protocol to Article XIX, as discussed above, which 
institutionalised special consideration of climactic conditions and ‘industrial 
peculiarities’ in developing economies.
120
 Shotwell felt the consistent cooperation from 
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the Japanese, and new-found agreement with India signalled that ‘unanimous consent’ 
was on the horizon.
121
    
 Skepticism over the novelty of the Labour Conference endured, however, as 
expressed by Massey through his belief that industrial matters would remain best served 
under the existing Empire system.
122
 Nevertheless the fate of the ILO Convention was 
up to the Peace Conference to decide. 
The strategic dismissal of the Labour Charter  
 To ease the ILO Convention’s passage, the BED resolved not to discuss the 
contentious nine points of the Labour Charter during the April 11 plenary. Its proposal 
for the Treaty would not be raised, and, if mentioned, the points only referred back for 
reconsideration and/or redrafting. Balfour was perhaps their most vocal opponent, 
calling them ‘a mixture of platitude and paradox.’ Hughes claimed he would ‘veto the 
whole scheme’ if the revised Labour Report even included its annexed Charter.
123
 
Harold Butler and Barnes both believed the nine points were ‘valuable propaganda’ if 
nothing else; a concept Butler felt neither the BED nor Lloyd George fully grasped.
124
 
The unfortunate Charter was still attached to the Report, however, so Balfour instructed 
the BED Secretary Maurice Hankey to prevent their adoption any way he could.
125
  
Barnes’ own plan was to submit a two-part motion to approve the Labour Commission 
Report and its Labour Convention in order to authorise the Washington Conference 
Organising Committee, giving the plenary enough to consider without discussion of the 
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 Phelan advised Butler of Barnes’ ‘delicate and difficult’ situation regarding 
the points: -   
Nobody wants them at all events in their present form, and nobody wants to 
undertake the job of suggesting that they be referred back or of suggesting 
any action that would look like shelving them. Barnes is suggesting to 
Balfour that when they have suffered a good deal of criticism, as no doubt 
they will, that he might come in as a sort of conciliator and produce a 
suggestion to refer them back… 
 
The difficulty of course is that while it is not our particular business to burn 
our fingers pulling other people’s chestnuts out of the fire, at the same time 
if we do nothing the 9 points will be simply talked out or adjourned and so 




The plan ultimately worked. The Labour Convention, unanimously adopted on April 11, 
gave the Organising Committee the authority to initiate the massive task at hand, as 
Barnes had hoped.  On the day, he presented the Labour Commission Report free of 
notes in an effective speech, as the Manchester Guardian reported: ‘his voice was 
excellent, and his speech - solid, quiet, dignified, sincere - seemed to typify the 
character of his contribution to the cause of progress’
128
 Phelan recalled Barnes’ plain-
speaking ‘natural eloquence… (that was the) characteristic expression of the philosophy 
that had guided him throughout his public career.’
129
 Barnes had determined that his 
consistent backer, the Belgian Socialist Emile Vandervelde, would also address the 
plenary session.
130
 His improvised yet grand eloquence emphasised the strong bond 
between Britain and Belgium: -  
I am convinced that Mr Lloyd George at any rate, who has just so 
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successfully solved one of the gravest conflicts between Capital and Labour 
that has ever arisen in the world, will not dream of contradicting me on that 
point…  
 
…there are two methods of making the revolution which we feel is 
happening throughout the world, the Russian and the British method. It is 
the British method which has triumphed in the Labour Commission; it is the 
one which I greatly prefer, and it is for that reason that with all my heart I 
support the conclusion of my friend, Mr Barnes, in expressing the hope that 
they may be accepted by the conference, and that the events of today will 
show that the working classes, having been one of the decisive factors in 
winning the war, shall receive their due recompense at the moment in which 




Barnes mentioned the Labour Charter only briefly, and after a number of somewhat 
‘desultory’ speeches lauding the day’s significance, its discussion was thankfully 
averted.
132
 Philosophically, Barnes’ speech was underpinned by his fundamental 
communitarian, socialist and moral beliefs. He again recalled the class divisions and 
community harm that labour’s miserable, demoralising pre-war condition created, 
laying upon the world the great danger which yet menaced peace. It was the ‘long arm 
of circumstance which has cast the devil’s chain around the workmen’
 
that was 
responsible, he declared, and not the ‘conscious cruelty’ of any particular class: -   
We are seeking now, for the first time in history, so far as I know, to get the 
willing co-operation of all concerned – States, employers and workmen – 





 Barnes was frank about the sacrifices made to raise the bar for all: - 
I want to be perfectly candid with the Conference, the net result of all of this 
is, that a less degree of obligation falls upon a Federal State than upon other 
States signatory to our document. That is bad; it is regrettable, but, as we 




…We believe our scheme will give life and strength to the League of 
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Nations by bringing it in contact with the daily life of the people. We believe 
that our scheme gives hope and will bring help to those whose lives are 
seared and scarred by toil and sorrow.
135
 
The Times of April 12 published Barnes’ entire speech, declaring that the Peace 
Conference had adopted ‘British Methods’ for world labour.
136
 The Manchester 
Guardian commented ‘it was essentially Britain’s day’, and that the Commission, ‘not 
too happy in its chairman, owed a great deal to the tact and skill of Mr Barnes.’
137
    
 President Wilson praised Barnes’ words and the ‘admirable document’ before 
him, expressing his pleasure at hosting the first international Labour Conference, giving 
assurance that invitations would follow.
138
 Shotwell allegedly advised Wilson that an 
announcement of invitations was prudent, and suggested that the nine points should be 
accepted at least in principle since the final amendments to Article XIX wer still being 
drafted.
139
 Wilson never mentioned the nine points, and only spoke again to regret that 
Samuel Gompers could not express American labour’s sentiments.
140
  
The Borden amendment and a hasty conclusion 
 A peculiar turn of events precipitated Robert Borden’s verbal amendment to 
Article XXXV which may have given his March independence declaration greater 
publicity on the world stage. Through ‘some mistake’ Article XXXV’s April 9 revision 
to suit Canada (previous section) was absent from the Labour Report the Peace 
Conference had received.
141
 Borden noticed the omission immediately, and conferred 
with Lloyd George, Balfour, Clemenceau and President Wilson about introducing the 
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amendment verbally, recalling ‘it was at once agreed that, under the circumstances, such 
an amendment was not only appropriate but necessary.’
142
 Borden’s insistence on the 
equality of Dominions with all HCPs to the Peace Treaty and League Covenant was 
further reflected in changes to Articles I, VII and XVIII of the Labour Convention by 
the time it became Chapter XIII of the treaty signed on June 28 1919.
143   
 
Clemenceau finally determined the Labour Report’s unanimous adoption in an 
instant. Barnes noted the French Prime Minister was ‘scenting long discussion’ about 
the Labour Charter. 
144
 Shotwell also observed Clemenceau’s impatience, recording that 
the Charter’s dismissal owed as much to this as to Balfour’s sheer loathe of it. Balfour 
was busily striking the nine points from the Labour Report in such a way that his 
neighbours Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson, would surely notice.
145
  Shotwell 
recalled how Clemenceau made his stance characteristically clear before adopting the 
freshly-abridged Report: -   
…When he came along to where Barnes, Sir Malcolm and I were discussing 
the situation, Barnes asked him where the Nine Points were. Clemenceau 
was coughing as he paused to talk to us. He had an irritation from his 
wound, and the bullet still lodged in the back of the lung, but he was in 
excellent spirits and laughing through his coughing fit, tapped his chest with 





 It is interesting to consider Balfour’s exaggerated behavior, as Shotwell reported 
it, since the British had already made a firm decision to avoid the Charter’s discussion. 
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It may be reasonable to argue that Balfour was trying to impress upon to the recently-
wounded Clemenceau that this would only extend an already long-winded plenary.  It is 
also noteworthy that Samuel Gompers, one of the Charter’s strongest advocates, 
remained overseas, nor did any representative of American labour speak on April 11 
1919. America did not officially participate in the 1919 Washington Conference despite 
hosting it: Gompers observed the conference for a single day as the AFL’s delegate, nor 
did the US Chamber of Commerce send any representatives.
147
 Ultimately, the Peace 
Treaty containing Chapter XIII, the ‘Labour Chapter’, was never ratified by the US 
Senate owing to Article X of the League of Nations Covenant, and Woodrow Wilson 




Barnes’ declaration of faith: The Perils to the Workers from Materialism 
 This section concludes with examination of an address Barnes delivered in 
September 1919, shortly before traveling to the Washington Conference as a 
representative of the British Government, because it virtually encapsulates his political 
ideology and personal beliefs in a single keynote speech. The Perils to the Workers from 
Materialism
149
 (‘Perils’) was delivered during the International Conference on Labour 
and Religion at London’s Browning Hall Settlement.
150
  The ‘The Religion in the 
Labour Movement’ conference was also fulfilling something of a propaganda mission in 
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reaction to recent activity by the Anti-Socialist and Anti-Communist Union (‘ASU’).
151
 
The Conservative-led ASU had long contended that religion and socialism were 
incompatible, warning that the Non-conformist movement had become infiltrated and 
politicised.
152,153
 In his speech Barnes used biblical references to make some points 
while harnessing the  nascent language of the Wilsonian ‘new internationalism’ to make 
others.  A brief analysis of this key address closes the thesis’ main research section 
because it bridges the ideological gap between nineteenth-century communitarian 
socialism and the labour ideals of the twentieth, epitomising Barnes’ non-dogmatic 
ideology and his political trajectory. Barnes also, rather cleverly, championed the 
underlying ethos of the ILO and League of Nations without mentioning either 
organisation by name, further demonstrating his adept manipulation of positive 
propaganda.      
 Barnes argued that the war had proven beyond all doubt that the workers’ life 
had become dominated by the ethos of quantity over quality.  Describing how malign 
forces had exploited working class conditions, he traced a path between the self-interest 
of economic materialism and the greed of the Central European Powers which had led 
to total war’s devastation. He denigrated the lust for territorial expansion responsible for 
‘the world being ‘bathed in blood… (and) brought almost to the verge of 
                                                 
151
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 He also accused the traditions of laissez-faire capitalism and classic 
Liberalism of playing a role in this ‘cult of selfishness’: –  
…this latest exploit of militarism is only the flower and culmination of a 
hard and acrid philosophy of life, which had taught that everyone was to 





 War profiteering was another aspect of materialism’s evils, Barnes said, taking 
the opportunity to uphold his 1917 Government’s food policies as evidence of 
benevolent State action toward addressing want and social ills.
156
 In reaction to recent 
acceleration of Syndicalism and hard-left permeation into the labour rank-and-file, 
Barnes referred to ‘unseen forces’, ‘lop-sided organisations’ and ‘academic agitators’ 
who yet threatened the world’s new-found peace, without directly naming Bolshevists 
or militants: -    
…Some organisations seem to be getting under the control of those who 
have little idea of reciprocal service. Some of them I am afraid, on the 
Labour side, are getting under the control of those who want to pull down 
the pillars of the State on the off-chance that something more to their liking 





He alluded to the alternative of beneficent organisations, i.e., the ILO Conference, the 
State solution to the evils of materialism: -   
If organisation is going to be used rightly, it ought to contribute to the 
common good and equalise the chances of life… The workmen in the mass 
want to take their proper place in the community on equal terms with other 
people. There is an ardent desire on the part of the working class as a whole 
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In a nod to the Christian communitarian church movement, he professed the great ‘need 
for friendliness’, a universal, basic human requirement that transcended capitalism and 
whatever economic system that might follow.
160
   
  Barnes channelled the practical and ethical aims of the ILO and the Labour 
Conference, the collective security ethos underpinning the League of Nations, the 
communitarian socialist ethics of the previous century and the divisive nature of 
Bolshevism in his Perils address. The word ‘socialism’ was never uttered nor did he 
employ any associated slogans or jargon.  Numerous allusions to historical materialism 
and evolutionary socialism bore the influence of a man educated in the previous 
century, yet one who embraced modernity by capturing the emergent language of the 
Wilsonian world view, the ‘new’ Internationalism. The war, he said, had been a uniting 
experience despite its horror; an object lesson proving that there is ‘something in 
mankind that cannot be bludgeoned. There is something that guns cannot kill...’
161
  
Man’s natural desire for peace and co-operation, and the desire for a greater 
internationalism in the post-war world, was framed quite simply by Barnes as faith.   
 Conclusions 
 During the Labour Convention’s third and final reading, Barnes continued 
defending the British scheme’s tenets and its core features against an increasingly 
obstructionist American delegation, a process complicated by criticism and conjecture 
over the nine points’ purpose and principles. The draft of the ILO scheme, although 
British in name and by design, was largely the product of consultation with European 
(and British) organised labour, and the continuation of long-held belief about achieving 
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social justice through workers’ welfare. It was difficult for Barnes to balance majority 
opinion against the tactical necessity of United States’ backing, but with the help of 
Shotwell and others he succeeded. America was not affected by the war as Europe was, 
and Gompers’ attitude particularly annoyed the British and Belgian delegations:  despite 
their relentless and sometimes bitter opposition it was shown that the bulk of the US 
arguments were fallacious. The Americans appeared to be grandstanding on the 
international stage to make a statement about their position at the Peace Conference and 
show their allegiance to the AFL back home. Barnes gave as good as he got during 
heated Commission arguments, nevertheless he was always very fond of ‘Sam’, even 
keeping him abreast of the Labour Charter’s progress in May 1919.
162
  Barnes refrained 
from maligning the American delegation in his memoir, although his private letter to 
Gompers does refer to American obstinacy during the last-minute redrafting of point 
eight. 
 Barnes’ pivotal role as British Empire Delegation plenipotentiary and Labour 
Commission spokesperson appeared as though it would be a boon, especially during the 
earlier phases and readings of the scheme. Because it had always been imagined that the 
first international Labour Conference would probably take place before the League of 
Nations’ constitution was settled, as a matter of urgency and because of war-time 
promises some of the language was left intentionally vague to afford flexibility. While 
the Labour Commission beavered away, the League of Nations Council also advanced 
its programme, and as it did sensitive issues of national identity and territorial 
sovereignty in the new world settlement made Barnes’ dual role awkward. When the 
Dominion leaders backed him into a corner as a labour commissioner, Barnes played his 
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political card, calling in Lloyd George to staunch hyperbolic claims that threatened the 
ILO scheme’s survival. The nationalistic, racial overtone of Borden’s concerns over 
‘white labour’ being jeopardized by the Charter’s point eight was the antithesis of the 
Peace Conference and League of Nations philosophy; however these sentiments also 
represent a truthful picture of where ‘national’ race relations stood in the industrial 
sphere of 1919: despite pre-war liberal ideals and an intellectual desire for a world 
‘supranationality’ and an international mindset, the economics of labour were still 
drawn along 19th century lines of race and national identity (much like Barnes’ 
lingering naivety around women’s place in the labour realm).   
  Similarly, when the Council of Five’s foreign secretaries jeopardised the Labour 
Report’s chances before the Peace Conference, the Prime Minister helped Barnes secure 
the crucial special plenary session with the Big Four’s sanction.  Barnes’ loyalty to 
Lloyd George paid off, as did his practical, pragmatic understanding of contemporary 
political and diplomatic procedures. While the Peace Conference symbolically 
represented a ‘new internationalism’, put into practice through the adoption of 
seemingly open covenants and a full embrace of the conference system, Barnes also 
recognised that politics was still largely a matter of who your friends were. By sticking 
close to the ‘establishment’ and potentially sacrificing friendships he had culminated 
over two decades, he was able to present what was essentially a moderate socialist tract 
to the Peace Conference. But Barnes did not do it alone; he utilised a national and 
international network of support to achieve the Allied Powers’ sanction for a world 
labour conference as an integral part of a permanent institution tasked with maintaining 
industrial and world peace. The Labour Convention for the ILO ultimately represented 
the way in which national identity shaped such a vast concept as an international vision 
Chapter five: The Road to the Peace Conference 
229 
 
for world labour, not to mention a (more or less) binding treaty for world peace.  Barnes 
was interestingly placed at the centre of numerous, shifting ideas and practices that 
bracketed the world’s nascent experience of total war.  
 In this manner another phase of Barnes’ transformation from ‘British labour 
representative’ to international diplomat and labour spokesperson can be detected. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, Barnes sacrificed some of the desires of his own labour peers 
(the British TUC delegation) to suit the BED and Dominion group’s priorities. The 
BED’s subsequent ignorance of the Labour Commission’s progress signaled to Barnes 
that this gesture was unappreciated. Meanwhile, Lloyd George’s consistent sanction in 
Paris undoubtedly raised his international profile. The dual effect gave Barnes 
something of a springboard for his post-Cabinet and Peace Conference work as a world 
speaker, writer and educator on the history of organised labour and the International 
Labour Organisation’s creation, after a long and oft-challenging career as a British 
politician and Trade Unionist.  
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6 After the Labour Convention 
 The International Labour Office, officially established in Geneva in the summer 
of 1920, survived initial intense criticism from the left of being ineffectual, and from the 
right of being too expensive and a product of socialist bias,
1
 yet it has carried on 
oversight of the annual Labour Conference. The ILO website is a valuable resource for 
studying its post-1919 trajectory and details of the international labour and humanitarian 
legislation it has produced.
2
 
 It is an understatement to say that the story of Barnes and the founding of the 
International Labour Organisation did not end in April 1919.  He remained 
fundamentally involved in a number of ways, and the continuing diversity of his role is 
noteworthy. He endeavoured to get the Labour Charter adopted, keep the Washington 
Conference on track, and hold the British Government to its Paris commitment in a 
continuing effort to raise international standards for labour. Barnes continued to lecture 
on the work of the ILO and write about his Paris experience until he was too unwell to 
carry on. Space does not allow for a full survey of his multi-faceted work from 1919-
1938 examined during this research, but it is hoped that a subsequent publication about 
George N. Barnes’s personal life, and his dedication to organised labour’s social and 
political concerns will follow.  This epilogue chapter discusses some of it briefly, with 
mention of some of the resources and archives that hold this material, further 
demonstrating that George N. Barnes was integral to the ILO process and remains an 
                                                 
1
 Ramsay MacDonald’s ‘The Attack on the I.L.O.’ in The Labour Magazine (Joint Publications 
Department of the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party: 1923) defended the ILO as the only 
virtuous Peace Conference outcome, using financial data, in a sharp rebuttal to Lord Rothermere’s Daily 
Mail criticisms. TUC HD 4797 1924; reprinted in the booklet Labour and the League of Nations 
(London: 1924 League of Nations Union) 
2
 http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/lang--en/index.htm  
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important figure for further study concerning the history of the British Labour Party, the 
organised labour movement, and of International Relations.    
The Balfour-Borden revisions to the Labour Charter   
 The Labour Charter underwent a number of revisions and passed through many 
hands before its acceptance by a Peace Conference plenary on April 28. Barnes knew 
that its adoption was essential for maintaining the credibility of the Commission and the 
League in the public eye. At the same time it was also feared that major amendments 
would greatly upset the proletariat, as the European press had erroneously reported the 
Charter was adopted by the Allied Powers on April 11. The nine points first underwent 
minor revision over several days by Shotwell, Barnes, Sir Malcolm, Robinson, and 
David Hunter Miller among others, point eight receiving special attention due to the 
Japanese delegation’s concerns.
3,4
  As predicted the British Foreign Secretary Balfour 
stepped in to recast them, and his April 16 draft combined the pithy nine points into six 
more complex ones which implied a lessened obligation on the Conference to uphold 
them.
5  
An April 17 letter from Henry Robinson to Samuel Gompers noted that ‘our 
friends the British, combining with Buzfuzz Shotwell, have been rolling around’ trying 
to find a solution that suited all concerned parties. It also reiterated Robinson’s deep 
upset that Barnes had approached the Council of Five for a special plenary session, or 
the right to reform the Labour Commission without Gompers in it.
6
  Barnes reported to 
Balfour that the Dominions and Indian delegations approved of his redraft, but that the 
Belgians and Italians had rejected it, the latter firmly believing that the nine-point 
                                                 
3
 Shotwell diary, p.262 
4
 Ibid, p.263 
5
 ILO 3.17.D01; see appendices. 
6
 ILO 3.17.D02, HR to SG; apparently ‘Buzfuzz’ was their nickname for the moustachioed Professor 
Shotwell. In the letter Robinson also let Gompers know he had written to Wilson to complain about 
Barnes’ reforming an incomplete Commission. 
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Charter had been adopted during the earlier plenary.
7
 The Americans also resented 
Balfour’s draft, so Barnes was very anxious about presenting it. He felt obliged to 
remain loyal to the original nine labour clauses for the treaty, and he confided to Sir 
Malcolm that ‘we are left for the moment in the soup… 
…if we go forward with things are they are of course I have no option but to 
adhere to the resolutions as they came from our Commission. It is true that I 
am a member of the BED but I am here as Vice-Chairman of the Labour 




Further complicating things, Italy had threatened to leave Paris following President 
Wilson’s retraction of the Treaty of London, and his declaration that Italy would have to 
be satisfied with retaining control of the primarily Italian areas of Trentino and the 
Tyrol.
9
 Following that development, Balfour passed the Charter to Vandervelde and 
Borden for revision, suggesting the Canadian Prime Minister move it as an amendment 
at the plenary.
10
 Borden’s resultant April 26 Labour Charter was approved in his hotel 
room by Vandervelde, Robinson, and Japan’s Otchiai,
11
 with the BED accepting it just 
hours before the April 28 plenary session. Barnes, as Chairman of the Labour 
Commission, moved for the original nine points ‘as a matter of duty’ during the sitting, 
and Borden’s amendment was seconded by Vandervelde receiving unanimous 
adoption.
12
  Barnes experienced a considerable amount of trouble during the protracted 
Labour Charter affair, but ultimately the nine points survived through a combination of 
international efforts and shared interest. Although the Charter was used as a tool of 
                                                 
7
 ILO 3.21.B01, GNB to AJB 23.4.19   
8
 ILO 3.08.B06, GNB to MD, 24.4.19; abbreviation of BED was Barnes’. 
9
 Dissatisfaction over this aspect of the Versailles settlement is seen as a precursor to the rise of Fascism 
in Italy;  see Rene Albrecht-Carrie ‘The Present Significance of the Treaty of London of 1915’, 
(Henceforth Carrie) Political Science Quarterly, (54), 3, Sept. 1939, pp.364-390 
10
 ILO 3.08.B06, GNB to MD, 24.4.19  
11
 Kentaro Otchiai (1873-1926) Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary of His Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan at The Hague. 
12
 Origins, vol 1 p.217; see Appendices for comparison of the Charter versions. 
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diplomacy regarding the Italians, they left the Peace Conference but returned on May 5 
after accepting some compromises.
13
 
 At the same juncture, Barnes was involved some Article VII controversy while 
the Drafting Committee amended the adopted Labour Convention to suit still-dubious 
Dominion members.
14
 Canada’s Customs Minister Sifton was agitating for Canadian 
membership on the ILO Governing Body, and Barnes quickly assessed that he was 
doing Borden’s bidding.  He revealed his suspicions in a letter to Sir Malcolm, 
referencing the Old Testament by likening Sifton to Esau and Borden to Jacob.
15
 
Borden seemed happy to let Sifton appear as the instigator, judging by Barnes’ remark: 
‘I do not think Sir Robert cares a twopence about it.’
16
  Over the following days, Barnes 
reported to Sir Malcolm that Sifton was still ‘bleating into the ear of anybody he can 
attract to listen to him about Article VII… needless to say I am keeping off the grass.’
 17
 
The Canadians’ success in changing the Article as discussed
18
 held little implication for 
the British labour delegation, but the related correspondence revealed another aspect of 
the Dominion dimension that Barnes faced. This correspondence preserved in the 
Geneva ILO archives’ ‘Shotwell papers’ indicate further research to completed, and 
may comprise more ‘lost’ original Barnes papers.
19
    
 
                                                 
13
 Carrie, op cit. pp.373-4; 378-9 
14
 Article 7 of the draft Convention became Article 393 in the Peace Treaty, see appendices. 
15
 Esau was unattractive and wicked because he took the Lord’s gift for granted and sold his birth right to 
his brother Jacob for a meal as a child. Jacob later used deception to claim his brother’s rightful fortune 
from God, yet he was nevertheless ‘the chosen one’ to settle Israel.  
16
 ILO 3.08.B06, GNB to MD, 24.4.19 (67/7054); Sir Malcolm replied this was ‘a little unfair on Esau!’ 
ILO 3.19.B10, SM to GNB 26.4.19 (67/7099) 
17
 ILO 3.08.B07, GNB to SM 30.4.19 
18
 Treaty Article 393 determined the Conference would determine annually a 12-member GB, 8 chosen by 
nations of ‘industrial importance’, the League would determine this if there was uncertainty; see 
appendices.  
19
 Box 114 in COL but marked as ‘3.17.001-5’, resembling the ILO filing system but there not accounted 
for in the Geneva indexes.     
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The ‘German notes’ and the International Labour Conference 
 Barnes was also deeply involved in the debates over German admission to the 
ILO and the Labour Conference, and Germany’s inclusion on the ILO Governing 
Body.
20
 The Parliamentary Archive’s Lloyd George papers hold much correspondence 
attesting to Barnes’ concerns over the welfare of the German working people. He was 
unwilling to have the Labour Convention placed in the same document as the war 
reparation terms. Barnes frankly and repeatedly expressed that the terms were 
unreasonably punitive and potentially destructive, and that the occupation period should 
be ‘divided by about ten.’
21
 His remarks to Lloyd George invited the Prime Minister’s 
request for alternative financial and diplomatic solutions which Barnes was keen to 
provide. He argued that ‘in view of the growing tendency towards international 
solidarity of democratic forces’ it was important make Germany’s repayment period 
brief as possible.
22
 To back his assertions that the financial reparations could be 
devastating, Barnes went on an information-gathering visit with Shotwell to the 
formerly occupied German zones. His detailed report of June 22
nd
 concluded that people 
in rural areas, children, the poor and the elderly had suffered most during the war and 
stood to bear the brunt.
23
  
 On May 7 the German delegation was presented with the Allied peace terms. 
Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau immediately presented the British Empire Delegation 
with counter-proposals that included an alternative League of Nations plan, and a 
                                                 
20
 Treaty Article 312 of the League Covenant (Part X, Section VIII) granted Germany a provisional seat 
on the ILO Governing Body; see appendices. 
21
 TPA LG 4/3/17, 2.6.19; DLG’s reply showed surprise and dismay at Barnes’ seeming change of heart; 
LG 4/3/18. 
22
 TPA LG F/4/3/21, 3.6.19 
23
 TPA LG F/4/3/22, 22.6.19 
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Charter for International Labour Law proposals.
24,25
 Philip Noel-Baker (Robert Cecil’s 
legal counsel), deemed the section on labour law ‘distinctly tendentious’ from the 
outset, setting the tone for the decisions following. The German suggestions were never 
going to be seriously considered.
26,27
 The residual Labour Commission, headed by 
Barnes, believed the Allied plans were much more practical than Germany’s, an opinion 
shared by the TUC.
28
 The volley of notes between the Allied and Associated Powers 
and Germany, and many relevant documents now in the National Archive, gave support 
to Barnes’ counsel, and both the New York and Geneva Shotwell collections reference 
copies of missing original ‘Barnes letters’ in this area. Barnes again played a pivotal 
role, corresponding with the Big Four and the Foreign Office regarding the tone and 
content of the Allied responses, not just concerning Germany’s labour proposals.
29
   
 Barnes naturally discussed Germany’s labour scheme with the British TUC. 
Henderson advised Barnes that British labour felt the German plan simply did not 
improve upon the Allied Labour Commission’s plan in any meaningful way, and that 
trying to arrange an international Trade Union conference before adoption of the Peace 
Treaty as Germany suggested, could delay its signing indefinitely.
30
  In regard to the 
planned Washington Labour Conference for October, Barnes’ opinion also matched that 
of the TUC: the reform of labour could not be universal unless Germany was admitted 
                                                 
24
 TNA FO 608/167/75 (translation) 
25
 TNA FO 608/167/78; the German proposals were submitted to the League of Nations Council and 
Peace Conference Secretariat 
26
 TNA FO 608/167/84 (Article VII of the ‘German note’) 
27
 TNA FO 608/167/36 
28
 TPA LG 4/3/16, 16.5.19, AH to GNB 
29
 TNA FO 608/167/1-419, and FO 608/239/19-33; ILO 97-113, and scattered across COL files 110-113, 
which are poorly organised.  
30
 TNA LAB 2 771/25 16.5.19 AH to GNB; the LAB 2 771, 774 and 775 files contain much 
documentation about the WC Organising Committee, the TUC and German conference admission, etc., 
also poorly organised 
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to the Labour Conference ‘early’ (before her League status was confirmed), and to the 
League of Nations immediately upon the signing of the Treaty. 
 The German note(s) did not alter the Labour Convention or its Charter before 
they went into the Peace Treaty. Ultimately the Supreme Council determined on May 
31
st
 that Germany could attend the Washington Conference as delegates, and that the 
Conference would decide upon its permanent ILO membership and position on the 
Governing Body.  Foreign Office files in The National Archive contain a great deal of 
material regarding the Government’s assessment of the situation and Barnes’ 
involvement, including notes on Brockdorff-Rantzau and speculation that he was a 
figurehead placed by the Russians and/or minority German socialists.
31
 These records 
indicate further that the reorganisation of labour at the time transcended industrial 
considerations to include matters of high diplomacy and international relations, all 
involving Barnes’ multi-functional contributions. 
The IFTU and the Washington Conference Organising Committee  
 Travel complications prevented the German delegation from attending the 
Washington Conference of October-November 1919.
32
  Nevertheless, Barnes expended 
a considerable amount of energy over German admission during the summer and 
autumn of 1919, a troubling matter that threatened to indefinitely postpone the planned 
Conference. His efforts there are another unexamined area of his ILO-related work that 
was beyond the scope of this study.  For example in August 1919, Barnes acted as 
counsel and intermediary to the Foreign Office when the newly-formed International 
Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) issued its declaration condemning the Washington 
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 TNA FO 608/126 and 608/135  
32
 TNA CAB 24/95/79, Report on First International Labour Conference, GNB/SM 30.12.19 
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Conference to failure if former enemies or the central powers were barred from 
participation.
33
  The Amsterdam IFTU conference of July 1919 resolved to boycott the 
ILO unless Germany was fully reintroduced into labour’s international circle, a position 
supported by French and British organised labour.
34
 It had been observed that the IFTU 
overlooked the fact that Germany’s Washington Conference attendance was already 
assured, regardless of her pending League status, yet the IFTU stated it would only 
cooperate with the Washington Conference if ‘the representatives of the trade union 
movement of all countries’ were invited without exception.
35
 The IFTU also resolved 
that the ILO Convention and its Charter disregarded the Berne programme of February 
1919.
36
 There is a great deal of correspondence between Barnes and the IFTU 
Presidents William Appleton
37
 and Edo Fimmen
38
 in both Shotwell collections (original 
and copy) wherein Barnes argued that the Amsterdam conference had not based its 
decisions on sound information, and he spent a great deal of time refuting Appleton’s 
misunderstandings and misapprehensions. 
 Sir Malcolm was deeply concerned about the high politics underpinning the 
Amsterdam declaration. Private correspondence captured his nervousness about a 
‘truculent’ Germany taking advantage of the situation the IFTU had created, and Barnes 
trying to calm him down.  He wrote to Barnes on August 6, suspicious that ‘German 
intrigue’ was behind it all, worried that they would try to force the Berne manifesto on 
                                                 
33
 The IFTU Congress ran 25 July – August 3, comprised delegations from the United States, Germany, 
Great Britain, France, Holland, Austria, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Holland, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Czecho-Slovakia and Luxemburg, thereby playing an important part in getting the former 
enemy countries admitted to the Washington Conference.  Leon Jouhaux was IFTU Vice-President. 
34
 The resolution is reproduced in Origins,  vol. II, p.447 (doc 59) 
35
 Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. COL files 110, 114– 121 contain numerous copies 
and some original Appleton-Barnes and related correspondence. 
36
 Origins, vol. II, p.447 (doc 59) 
37
 W A Appleton (1859-1940) IFTU founder; founded the International Lacemakers' Federation, 1900, 
General Federation of Trade Unions, 1903, et al; see appendices   
38
 Edo (Eduard Carl) Fimmen (1881-1942) Dutch multi-linguist trade unionist and editor; General 
Secretary of the International Transport Workers' Federation, 1919-42, et al; see appendices. 
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the Washington Conference and re-open the entire ‘labour super parliament’ debate.  
‘They will do their utmost to destroy the scheme of Labour Organisation as laid down in 
the Peace Treaty and substitute something else’, conceding to the IFTU could ‘throw 
the Conference into confusion and absolutely destroy any chances of its producing 
useful resolutions’, he wrote.
39
  In early September 1919, Italy and France were still 
publicly questioning German admission to the ILO. Barnes advised Sir Malcolm that 
America ‘really holds the trump card’ since their Conference invitations had implied 
that Germany and Austria would not be attending. Britain could not invite them, Barnes 
wrote, lest they be accused of overstepping. He said he would make some investigation 
into the Americans’ attitude personally.
40
  
 Several months of the Organising Committee for the Washington Conference’s 
time were occupied with the all-important issue of former enemies of the Allies 
attending the ILO’s first conference. Barnes nevertheless glossed over the entire affair 
in his memoir, neatly stating that the Washington Conference easily ‘settled down to 
business’ once America invited Germany and Austria to send delegates, just as the ‘Big 
Four’ had earlier agreed in Paris.
41
  Barnes’ sanguine recollection, along with Harold 
Butler’s and Sir Malcolm’s contributions to Volume one of Origins, negate the 
tremendous anxiety the German notes and IFTU declarations evoked in a 
quintessentially Whiggish narrative.  Barnes was not a member of the Organising 
Committee, but a Government official deeply invested in the Allied Labour Scheme.  
The Organising Committee authorised by the Peace Conference was restricted to a 
purely administrative role (essentially that of international civil servants) and could not 
                                                 
39
 ILO 5.14.B02, MD to GNB 6.8.19  
40
 ILO 5.16.B08, GNB to SM 9.1.19; ILO files 114-127 contain numerous WC/Appleton/Germany-
related documents. 
41
 Barnes, FWWC, p.270 
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base its decisions on political imperatives. Not being an official member, Barnes was 
able to offer Sir Malcolm and his colleagues his informed opinions confidentially, 
probably helping them to prioritise their numerous complex tasks under the constraints 
of time.  
The Washington Conference   
 This thesis does not intend to analyse the history or numerous implications of 
the 1919 Washington Conference, or its Conventions. It offers instead a digest of 
Barnes’ Conference role that concludes with a summary of his efforts to see the 
Washington Conventions ratified in Great Britain. For Barnes, getting the Labour 
Convention into the Treaty was the fulfilment of his 1918 electoral mandate to secure 
peace through internationally raised welfare standards for labour. He used this 
achievement as justification for resigning from the Lloyd George cabinet in 1920. 
Barnes then retired from public life completely in 1922 after leading the fight in the 
House of Commons for the ratification of the Washington Conventions, with a great 
deal of cross-party support.  
 The Washington Conference
42
 determined that the ILO would be established at 
Geneva with M. Albert Thomas as its Director, and a provisional Governing Body was 
selected. Barnes believed that the ‘chief value of Washington’ was that ‘it launched the 
organisation for world regulation of labour as a going concern. Some critics said that it 
would not work. Washington proved that it could and did work: -  
…the Labour Organisation has taken root and is now available for men and 
                                                 
42
 29 October to 29 November 1919. The daily minutes of the Washington Conference at the TUC 
Archive (HD 4791) revealed attending members of the British delegation for each sitting, and the 
National Archive’s CAB 24/89/22 27.9.19, and 23/12/13 7.10.19 record the suggested Government, 
labour and employers’ delegates. 
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women of Governments and both sides of industry to hammer out their 
International Labour difficulties on the anvil of common sense, and in doing 
so, lift Labour – especially in the poorer paid countries – from the category 
of merchandise to the higher ground of the humanities.
43
   
Barnes was a Conference Vice President and chaired several of its sessions. His blunt, 
direct and sometimes amusing manner of holding court is preserved in its daily 
reports.
44
 Barnes also chaired the 48-Hour Week Convention to Special Countries 
Committee, overseeing its ten sessions.
45
 Barnes presented the full Report he and Sir 
Malcolm wrote to the British Government on December 30 following his brief cable on 
the Conference’s final day which reported general success.
46
 He advised among other 
things that ‘Opportunity was afforded the women advisers of putting their case on the 
floor of the Conference, as well as in Committee, when matters specially affecting 
women were under discussion.’
47
  The sections of the Report that Barnes wrote himself 
were apparent, and he referenced Gompers’ one-day appearance: - 
 …we have no hesitation in saying that the Conference, in spite of the 
abstention of the United States of America, was a great success. It kept its 
feet on mother earth. Its findings are on the whole practical, and such as can 
be adopted by Governments in the near future… there appeared to be a 
change in American public opinion in regard to it, and a desire in 
Governmental circles to pay it some attention – a desire, however, which 
came too late to eventuate any practical shape.
48
   
 
When Barnes wrote his 1923 memoir he was apparently still stinging from his recent 
experience of holding the British Government to account over its obligation to ratify the 
Conventions, as discussed below. He remarked sharply that the threat to the ILO came 
                                                 
43
 Barnes, FWWC,  pp.272-3 
44
 TUC HD 4791: the complete record ‘International Labour Conference. First Annual Meeting’ is 
available at the TUC Archive in London. 
45
 Ibid, pp.322-6  
46
 TPA LG F/4/3/30 
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not from ‘that which was predicted at Paris by the minority who opposed the plan’ but 
from the precise opposite: Governments who defaulted on their pledges to labour: -  
Government delegates have voted for conventions and recommendations… 
as for instance the British delegation at Washington – by express injunction 
of their Governments - and then these Governments have failed to honour 
their bond. That is the danger confronting the Labour Organisation and it is 




Barnes said that world governments could not expect working class cooperation in 
maintaining industrial peace if they ‘persist on disregarding conventions and 
recommendations of Labour Conferences, then they must not expect Labour to take it 
lying down.  Labour accepted the Labour Chapter of the Peace Treaty in a spirit of 
goodwill.’
50
 If Labour withdrew as a consequence of the State’s default, the ILO would 
be ‘doomed to futility… it would become a mere bureaucratic machine, a body without 
a soul, for it would lack that stimulation that only Labour can give’, he wrote.
51
 Barnes 
was disappointed by the Government he had supported during and after the war, which 
he had consistently argued to his Commission challengers was a friend to labour, not its 
foe.   
 Barnes’ involvement with the Organising Committee showed his unwavering 
resolve that Washington Conference would proceed despite any difficulties arising over 
Germany and Austria’s admission. The National Archives’ LAB 2 series contains 
numerous files recording his involvement in the technical and financial aspects of its 
arrangement, including arranging proper secretarial support and in delegating enough 
labour and technical advisers to adequately represent mining, women workers and 
‘other interests’. His efforts, made in coordination with the TUC Parliamentary 
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 Barnes, FWWC, p.273; Barnes consistently capitalised Labour when referring to the movement.  
50
 Ibid, p.274 
51
 Ibid, p.275 
 Chapter six: After the Labour Convention 
242 
 
Committee, were in part to avoid the impression that the Conference was merely an 
extension of British Empire’s industrial primacy.
52
  Given the difficulty the League of 
Nations faced in the United States, it has been argued that without Barnes’ able steering 
of the Organising Committee and coordination of numerous points of view as well as 
resources, the Washington Conference might not have happened when it did, if it 
happened at all.
53
    
Barnes and the Washington Conventions before the House of Commons   
 Barnes retired from the back benches in 1922 when the Labour Party announced 
it would field a candidate against him for his Glasgow Gorbals seat. He greatly regretted 
leaving the ILO without a spokesperson in the House of Commons. Barnes also 
expressed grave disappointment over the British Government’s attitude towards the first 
International Labour Conference by not presenting the Conference Report and White 
Papers pertaining to the Washington Conventions to the House for ratification, 
seventeen months after their adoption in May 1921 (the time limit was one year for 
‘nations of industrial importance’ like Great Britain). His anger was yet apparent two 
years later: - 
The Labour Office under the Peace Treaty was good enough to be used as a 
tag at political meetings by Government spokesmen, but the obligations 
under it were forgotten as soon as the cheers subsided... The Government, 
by signing the Peace Treaty, were pledged to submit to Parliament the 
recommendations and conventions adopted at International Labour 
Conferences, but Mr Lloyd George was, in this respect, badly served by the 
Labour Ministry. That Ministry, indeed, as regarded the Labour Office, 
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He refused to implicate his friend Lloyd George, in opposition at the head of the 
doomed National Liberal Party and still reeling from the Chanak Crisis and the Carlton 
Club rebellion that led to his October 1922 resignation.
55
  Barnes had sensed the 
Government was already betraying its obligation to labour by June 1920 when he 
argued for the passage of the Women, Young Persons and Children (Employment) Bill 
during its second reading, in relation to what the Washington Conference sought to 
achieve.
56
 Shortly thereafter, the Ministries of Health and Labour decided together not 
to present the Washington Conventions to MPs for full scrutiny, based on their 
interpretation of Article 405. In October 1920 Oswald Allen of the Ministry of Health 
asked Sir Malcolm Delevingne for an explanation of Article 405, requesting draft copies 
of it dating from the Commission’s time in Paris (when it still comprised Articles XVIII 
and XIX). Allen cited confusion over a line reading ‘or other action’ which concerned 
putting conventions into effect in federated states. This essentially called into question 
who the ‘competent authority’ on labour questions really was. The opinion was forming 
that treaty-making power rested with the Crown, and that the decision to ratify or reject 
conventions could sidestep the House altogether.
57
  Sir Malcolm was baffled. He replied 




 The Health Ministry’s contention, soon adopted by the Ministry of Labour, was 
that Article 405 left it in doubt where ‘competent authority’ lay, and the Law Officers of 
the Crown took up the case. In December 1920 the Cabinet determined, on advice of the 
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 Lloyd George’s trajectory from ‘the man who won the war’ to political obscurity as ‘the goat in the 
wilderness’ is well portrayed in Kenneth Morgan The Age of Lloyd George, pp.77-98 et al. 
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Attorney General, that it was ‘unnecessary to bring before Parliament, by resolutions or 
otherwise, those draft Conventions which the Government decided not to ratify.’
59
 
Given Barnes’ steadfast loyalty to Lloyd George, it is unlikely he knew about this at the 
time, but the Independent Liberal-headed Ministry of Labour of 1921 was resolute that 




   
 Barnes blasted the Ministries of Labour and Health for their non-compliance in 
compelling terms, moving ‘That, in the opinion of this House, the Conventions adopted 
at the International Labour Conference under the League of Nations should be 
submitted to Parliament as the competent authority… In moving this Motion I desire to 
call the attention of the House to the failure of the Government to give effect to the 
Labour Chapter of the Paris Peace Treaty.’
61
  He declared that competent authority for 
labour questions lay with the Ministers of the Crown, not the Crown, as the Independent 
Liberal Minister of Labour Thomas Macnamara
62
 had concluded. Macnamara had also 
argued that labour matters were still best decided by arbitration between Trade Unions, 
employers and workers, revealing his innate scepticism about the ILO conference 
system,
63
 the very argument New Zealand’s Massey made when contesting the British 
scheme’s innovation in 1919.
64
  His personal beliefs reflected a lingering reluctance 
among Government Ministers to surrender sovereignty for labour decisions to the 
International Labour Conference.  
                                                 
59
 Ibid  
60
 By spring of 1921, Lloyd George’s coalition was under threat from Asquith’s resurgence and 





 Thomas Macnamara (1861-1931) Educator and Liberal MP for Camberwell and Camberwell North, 
1900-18; 1918-24; Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, 1908-20; a close Lloyd 
George associate. See appendices. 
63




 TNA FO 608/238/437, 9.4.19  
 Chapter six: After the Labour Convention 
245 
 
 Barnes accused the Government of betraying its own mission in setting up an 
International Labour Commission to agree the purpose and powers of the Labour 
Conference, which all the governments of the world had sanctioned. This egregious 
denial was dangerous, Barnes said, as the Third International had received a strong 
show of support at a recent London worker’s conference, and he declared: -   
If the Government make it a dead letter, and if they show by their action or 
inaction that they are concerned only with labour problems when there is a 
dispute, they will play right into the hands of those who do not want co-




The threat implied was downplayed by Arthur Henderson, who nevertheless delivered a 
very strong defence of Barnes’ motion and further pointed out the Government’s 
exceptional attitude.
66
 There were ‘consequences of an international character, 
consequences of a political character, and consequences of an industrial character...  My 
right hon. Friend (Mr. Barnes) is deserving of the sympathy of all who desire to see the 




 The significant cross-party support Barnes received that day mirrored the public 
appetite for signs of progress toward fulfilment of numerous war-time promises to the 
working classes. Many MPs took up Barnes’ points, arguing that the decision to deny 
House scrutiny contravened the very spirit of the League of Nations. A ‘sinister 
precedent’ was being set by the Lloyd George Government,
68
 foreshadowing his 
ungainly fall from office. The angry debate adjourned on a motion moved by Robert 
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Cecil, avoiding a division. The matter was decided on July 1
st
 when the Government 
had little choice but to present the Conventions or be referred to the League of Nations 
for its dereliction. Macnamara withdrew his Amendment and Barnes’ original Motion 
was passed, Ayes, 164; Noes, 53. Britain ratified five of the six Conventions the 1919 
Labour Conference had passed, omitting the Eight-Hour Day convention, on July 14 
1921.
69
  This episode demonstrates further that Barnes, despite failing health, 
maintained his socialist commitment to defending working class interests, challenging 
the Government he had backed during the war and had even chosen over the Labour 
Party he had helped to create: such were the depths of his beliefs.  
 The relative success of the first international labour conference was belittled by 
the 1921 British Government when, after investing so much in the ILO’s creation in 
1919 (not to mention fully funding the Washington Conference with Treasury Funds), it 
renounced its commitment to the project for world labour by wilfully obstructing the 
Washington Conventions’ scrutiny. In Barnes’ eyes this was an insult to the working 
classes and an embarrassment for the Government he had supported for years. The 
Hansard records of these debates also indicate numerous contemporaries of Barnes’ 
who remain under-researched. They provide evidence of how essential bipartisanship 
was to Parliamentary procedure at the time, also indicating that Barnes’ rejection of 
political ‘tribalism’ was not so unique. 
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Barnes retires  
 Barnes resigned from the Cabinet shortly after returning from Washington in 
January 1920.
70
 His decision was based on ill health, and feeling that he had fulfilled his 
1918 pledge to stay ‘till peace was signed and until Labour was given its place in the 
peace settlement.’
71
 It appeared that the Prime Minister wished him to remain in the 
Cabinet, as three hand-written letters to Lloyd George giving reasons to leave suggest. 
The first, of January 26, made no mention of illness stating that his 1918 promise had 
been met, that peace was ‘secure as it is likely to be’, and that the Labour Organisation 
was launched.
72
 Two days later he restated these points and enclosed the text of his 
November 23
rd
 1918 speech announcing that he had left the Labour Party to remain 
with the coalition. Barnes felt he had already stayed on too long, and truly believed his 
work was at an end: the role of ‘Minister with pay but without portfolio’ as he saw it 
was ‘ceasing to be one which could be justified.’ He announced that he had been, and 
would remain, under medical care for some time, making his continued tenure 
impossible.
73
 His final resignation sent from the Brighton seaside declared ‘the time has 
come for me to resume my place in the ranks.’ With ‘little to do’ and his health 
concerns he would be ‘greatly relieved’ to have his resignation accepted.
74
 Lloyd 
George released him on February 4 1920, one year after the Commission began its work 
in earnest, praising his ‘disinterested patriotism’ in an expression of gratitude for his 
many contributions, and the success of that ‘magnificent piece of work, the ILO’, which 
was ‘more attributable to your initiation and wise guidance than to any other living 
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 There is much to write about the friendship between Lloyd George and Barnes 
that persisted after his retirement. Suffice it to say that the final two letters from Barnes 
to his ‘dear old chief’ dated October and November 1938 in The Parliamentary Archive 
display tremendous warmth as well as signs of advanced illness.
76
 The unfortunate loss 
of Barnes’ personal papers becomes starkly apparent when considering what this later 
correspondence could have revealed.  
 Barnes continued to represent the British Government when he could, attending 
the 1920 Geneva Conference as a British labour representative at Lloyd George’s 
invitation. In preparation, he wrote that he hoped for ‘the release of the Labour Party 
from Bolshevism’ to represent the Party fully once again: the rise of the Third 
International and the formation of the Communist Party of Great Britain weighed 
heavily on both men’s minds. Barnes said he would express unapologetically at Geneva 
world labour’s view that the League of Nations could not ‘function successfully’ if it 
did not contain every country.
77
  He clearly relished his experience of the 1920 
Conference, dedicating eight pages of his memoir to the proceedings.
78
  It appeared that 
he was invited to deliver a House of Commons address following the King’s Speech in 
December 1921 after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, but he may have been 
unwell. There is no record of any remarks in Hansard records.
79
   
 The Harold Butler papers at the ILO Archive in Geneva contain a great deal of 
revealing correspondence. Barnes attended numerous world labour and League-related 
conferences across Europe and Scandinavia, and addressed students of labour and 
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international relations in the nineteen-twenties and mid-nineteen-thirties, health 
permitting. He would only attend events where he felt his presence made a practical 
contribution. For example he declined an invitation from Albert Thomas, Director of the 
ILO in October 1923, to attend the laying of the new ILO building’s cornerstone, a 
highly momentous occasion, despite being urged by Butler to make an appearance. 
Barnes eschewed the pomp of such high ceremony and declined, feeling his time was 
better spent in England attending three ILO meetings and continuing to press for 
ratification of the Washington Hours Convention.
 80
  The ILO Archive’s Butler-Barnes 
correspondence showed that another strong bond had formed; in this case out of a 
mutual interest in reform of labour. The material also offers great insight into how 
Barnes continued his ILO and League-related work for as long he was physically able. 
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7  Summary and conclusions  
  The primary purpose of this thesis was to explore the significance of George N. 
Barnes in the process of creating the ILO during the Paris Peace Conference; identifying 
his contributions and how he resolved the challenges he faced along the way. He guided 
the successful creation of the International Labour Organisation through the Labour 
Commission by maintaining principles and beliefs he had held since the nineteenth 
century and his political awakening into socialism. In practical terms, Barnes’ complex 
War Cabinet role consolidated his work as propagandist, labour conciliator and policy 
coordinator, ably preparing him for the work and his changing role in Paris. His mission 
was nearly thwarted at several turns owing to the complexities of the post-war period; a 
clash of old and new world ideas and priorities that at times seemed irreconcilable, and 
the limitations to what was feasible to achieve in such a short space of time were 
apparent, the pressurised environment of the Peace Conference notwithstanding.  
However, Barnes also used the opportunity the Labour Commission appointment 
presented to justify and move his particular policy ideas about labour and ‘left’ politics 
into the international sphere, laying the groundwork for his post-Cabinet career.  
 What this project has also shown is that Barnes has been unfairly overlooked in 
the historiography as a figure significant for studies of the Labour Party and the 
evolution of its ideas. He represented a convergence of developing concepts about 
organised labour’s place in the pre- and post-war world, and the role of the state in its 
affairs, from a decidedly British perspective.  It is important to realise that, despite his 
officially leaving the Labour Party in 1918, he was nevertheless the government-
appointed representative for British organised labour in Paris with responsibility for 
ensuring that the Labour Convention was enshrined within the Versailles Peace Treaty, 
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a responsibility he took most seriously. Barnes was the only Labour Party member to go 
from being ‘one of the twenty-nine’ that entered Parliament in 1906 to become a Paris 
plenipotentiary in 1919, making him an important labour movement figure during a 
paradigm shift in foreign diplomacy as the working class became an integral component 
of permanent world institutions. His personal trajectory also mirrored the increasingly 
outward-looking character of the British Labour Party he helped launch but left behind 
after so much domestic turmoil. 
 Broadly, the bulk of his Paris struggles emanated from the three-way clash of 
democracy, sovereignty and constitutionality that the Labour Convention’s 
experimental provisions exposed.  This triangulation exposed underlying national 
sensitivities as the Allies redrew territorial and economic boundaries. Barnes was 
wrestling with historical and political ideological divergences and notions about new- 
versus old-world thinking, all within an unprecedented model of international 
diplomacy. As both a labour commissioner and plenipotentiary he continually balanced 
his old world ethics against new world challenges. His transition from nineteenth-
century Christian socialist and radical-reformist activist to twentieth-century trade union 
political labour was part of a natural evolution, as chapter one demonstrated. The ease 
with which he adjusted to the role of high diplomat was partly down to his thoughtful, 
relaxed nature, but his deeply rooted communitarianism and drive for unity was the 
philosophical, guiding ‘glue’ that held his priorities and mission in alignment. Barnes 
was able to channel the tensions that characterised his public life into flexible, reactive 
solutions to the problems he encountered in Paris. Having friends in high places 
undoubtedly helped him through a number of difficulties, helping him carve out a post-
political life for himself in the process. 
Chapter seven: Summary and conclusions 
252 
 
 The research underpinning this thesis has shown that a combination of 
motivations compelled the British, with Barnes in a prominent role, to oversee the 
process of enshrining Chapter XIII in the Treaty of Versailles. The persistent ‘Whig’ 
opinion has mainly argued that the purpose of the ILO being established under the 
League of Nations was to work towards international post-war reconstruction on the 
principle of sustained universal peace through the adoption of uniform industrial 
standards among its member countries. The realist argument has primarily contended 
that it was created largely as a bulwark to Bolshevism and revolutionary influence 
among the working classes, while more recent critical assessments have observed that 
the ILO was a means for the British to assert and maintain economic imperialism.  
David Lloyd George found an invaluable conduit in Barnes, an ally who shared his 
liberal principles that dated to the Belle Époque as well as his loathing of Bolshevism.  
 Barnes’ innate pragmatism helped him to co-manage his British Empire 
Delegation and Labour Commission roles, manoeuvring between academics, 
international diplomats and labour representatives as needed. Balancing the long-held 
desires of the working class and the left with the reality of the Conference setting was 
complicated (and at times, personal), but his political awareness allowed him to manage 
expectations, keeping the Labour Convention from going a step farther than anything 
the Allied powers might accept. Barnes’ ethical brand of moderate socialism helped him 
advance working-class ideals onto the international stage to become more 
institutionalised, and the ‘moralistic’ tone he expressed so clearly with mirrored the 
ethical principles of Wilson’s fourteen points. Yet the concept of collective security as a 
peace-keeping tool was arguably too ‘socialistic’ for some American individualists as 
the Lodge campaign and the Treaty’s fate demonstrated. 
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 Chapter one of the thesis established the early evolution of Barnes from national 
to international figure, denoting that his greatest bête noirs were disunity and discord; in 
the Labour Party, between labourers and employers, and in society at large. The 
biographical review chronicled how Barnes transformed from agitator to establishment 
figure but remained beholden to a particular non-dogmatic strain of socialism firmly 
rooted in Christian communitarianism, universal principles that underpinned his 
transition to world labour figure. Arguably, some of the problems Labour had in the 
decades to come may have stemmed from the formal adoption by the LRC of the 
concept of the Party as a broad church, for which Barnes was partially responsible.  His 
entry into Parliament was a natural transition driven by a sense of duty to his 
community and a utilitarian, scientific yet humanistic moral imperative to help those 
who could least help themselves. At the same time he wanted to keep the worker from 
being reduced into a purely materialistic entity whose existence revolved around his 
economic value. Barnes continually emphasised the importance of keeping warmth and 
humanity at the centre of policy, as his 1909 ILP publications showed. It is interesting 
to note that Barnes’ 1909 interpretation of Karl Marx presaged the Frankfurt School’s 
tenet that the elimination of the human element from the interpretation of Marx and 




 Admittedly, one of the aims of this thesis was to debunk some of the left-
inspired mythology surrounding Barnes’ legacy as ‘hard right Labour’ or a war hawk. 
The war called into question the progressive spirit which animated the transition from 
New Liberal to Labour, and few were spared transformation through its horror. After 
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leaving the ILP in 1914 over its pacifist stance, Barnes was in virtual lock-step with the 
bulk of Labour Party policies and thinking about a thorough prosecution of the war, at 
least until 1917 when the annual Labour Party Conference resolved for a negotiated 
peace (Barnes deeply believed that an absolute termination of the German leadership’s 
hostility was only possible through an irrefutable Allied victory). After replacing 
Henderson in the War Cabinet, he nevertheless supported the Party Conference 
decision, personally intervening to assure Labour Party members’ travel arrangements 
to independent international socialist and worker’s conferences abroad. His belief in 
constitutional processes was explicit, even if he did not always agree with the outcome. 
To that end, he also successfully argued before the Imperial War Cabinet that the Peace 
Conference must pay heed to the decisions of ‘unofficial’ conferences concerning the 
Paris labour decisions. The war did not alter his ideological trajectory, but made him 
(along with the Party and the left) more anxious for practical industrial reforms to 
become embedded into official Government policy, reaffirming his belief that ‘the sport 
of chance conferences’ could never compensate the class who had sacrificed so much 
for so long.    
 It is interesting to note that Henderson’s attempt to ‘serve two masters’, the 
Labour Party and the Government, ultimately led to the revision of the Labour Party 
machine and manifesto under his oversight, while Barnes’ attempt led him toward the 
Peace Conference. Barnes could rightly be accused of a fair amount of political 
opportunism for standing beside Lloyd George, ‘the man who won the war’, in part 
because he wanted so strongly to represent organised labour in Paris. His mantra of 
‘country before party’ angered the Party left, but it was necessary to ensure this vital 
relationship remain intact, not to mention it encapsulated all that he held dear about the 
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wholly inclusive aspect of communitarian socialism. Barnes used Bolshevism as a 
metaphor for disunity and divisiveness in his propaganda, raising its spectre to 
consolidate popular support for his policies. Yet he sympathised with the impetus for 
radicalisation, and took responsibility for communicating the desires of Trade Union 
militants (who he felt posed a threat despite being in the minority) to the Ministry of 
Labour and his superiors in government. Barnes had been committed to labour’s 
Parliamentary representation since the ILP’s formation (when he was still comparatively 
‘radical’ himself), so it was only natural that he stayed with the Coalition Government 
after the 1918 general election to ‘use his status to press for international machinery to 
promote the rights of working people’ as Alastair Reid put it
2
  once Labour was in 
opposition. When Barnes was announced as British labour’s Paris representative (to the 
rank and file’s chagrin), he redoubled the public effort to convince the masses that 
electoral pledges to labour would be carried out. He remained an essential conduit 
between the Labour Party and the Government through official and unofficial channels 
and despite the media spectacle of the November 1918 split, his working relationship 
with Arthur Henderson endured. 
 The risks Barnes took with the Foreign Office in 1917 and the Imperial War 
Cabinet in 1918 to ensure unofficial voices would be represented in the peace process 
were proactive responses to social and political change he had witnessed, at home and 
abroad.  Barnes’ hand in the preliminary drafting of the British scheme was sometimes 
apparent and at other times diffuse. He chose not to take credit for its specific features, 
deferring to it as a group effort at all times. Examination of the evidence and the 
testimonies of some of his contemporaries suggests his direct involvement in drafting 
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some of the Labour Convention’s key features. Harold Butler’s 17-page memo has been 
creditedas the root of the initial draft, but a careful review of Barnes’ activity indicated 
that he may have been coy about his influence during its creation. His public addresses 
since 1917 had pre-announced the technical, practical aspects of the scheme as well as 
its higher aims. Barnes was a strong supporter of the Co-operative movement, and the 
earliest Convention drafts incorporated its tri-partite, quasi-corporatist nature in its 
proposed arrangements for the Labour Conference. The ILO’s first director in 1920, 
Albert Thomas, has been credited for the ILO’s interest in co-operatism because he was 
closely involved with the French co-operative movement.
3
 While these ideas had been 
taking shape for some time, the earlier link to Barnes is compelling. Further similarities 
between Barnes’ ideology and the shaping of the Labour Conference could be seen in 
the machinery it devised to give the worker a sense of control over his fate, just as the 
Workshop Committees and Whitley report encouraged. This was also emphasised in the 
report Barnes wrote summarising the Unrest Commission’s findings. Ideas about co-
operatism were not at all exclusive to Barnes, but he was long representative of that 
school of thought and wove these principles consistently into his policies. 
 This thesis also delineated Barnes’ talent for harmonising seemingly loose ends 
and disjointed ideas into coherence, a skill that ultimately granted him virtual free rein 
from his most powerful ally, David Lloyd George. His handling of the joint TUC-BED 
meetings foreshadowed his ability to manage the full Labour Commission, and the 
presumption that he, and not Gompers, would lead the Commission was perhaps due to 
his adept management of the process to that point. The left criticised Barnes for 
‘hijacking’ Labour representatives en route to Berne in January 1919: however the 
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Labour delegation willingly hustled to arrive virtually overnight in Paris, indicating 
another area of mutual commitment that has been understated in the historiography. 
Bringing Labour Party leaders and the TUC PLP directly into the nascent British draft 
discussions was important to Barnes but, as Bowerman pointed out later, some of the 
Labour Party’s proposals for greater industrial democracy were subjugated to those of 
the Dominion leaders. By contrast, the Dominion heads’ priorities centred on pre-war 
notions of economic primacy and legislative sovereignty underscored by their drive for 
independent recognition. The Labour Convention aimed to embrace modernity by 
embedding the working classes’ rights and role into governmental institutions, but the 
Dominions’ insistence upon the economic ‘return to normalcy’ and their own 
nationalism presented a conflict. In this way, Barnes’ dual role as a Labour Commission 
representative and member of the British Empire Delegation embodied conflicting 
priorities as the new world struggled to transcend the old after the war. 
    A review of Samuel Gompers’ life and political ideology helped to better 
understand why the American labour delegation was such a source of frustration during 
the Labour Convention process. Gompers found himself in Paris at seventy years of age, 
confronted with old ideas he distrusted and new ideas he feared.  Although rooted in 
similar soil, the divergence between Barnes’ and Gompers’ ‘socialistic’ belief systems 
was based upon political and historical realities in their native lands. Gompers had 
recently experienced first-hand the political British Labour Party’s links to the 
international socialist movement in 1918, when renewed efforts to create a political 
working class party in America threatened everything the AFL stood for. By contrast, 
Barnes (and the bulk of the European delegates) had an increasingly benevolent 
experience of working with the State and within government; Labour’s entry into 
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Parliament in 1906 proved to him that a vigilant working class only stood to benefit 
from this relationship.  
 In retrospect, the critical junctures along Barnes’ path are not difficult to trace 
through mass industrialisation and the ‘machine question’, hastened by the effect of the 
wartime Munitions Act on the trade unions and through the radicalisation of the shop 
steward movement. The ILO could not exist until pre-war notions of national 
sovereignty were sacrificed to some degree in the name of industrial and world peace, 
and Barnes’ early insistence on the need for a League of Nations and collective security 
expressed this belief. His conviction that equity of industrial standards was essential to 
keep Britain leading Empire in order to restore healthy international trade flows was 
economically sound, but also representative of contemporary ‘imperialist’ opinion: an 
Imperialism that was also exhibited by Gompers who refused to jeopardise America’s 
high-wage economy and the primacy accorded to production for the sake of the Labour 
Conference. The Labour Commission was in essence a battleground for the nations 
involved to maintain and/or establish a foothold in the hierarchy of the emerging post-
war world economy, and reap the rewards of any soft power that came with it. 
 Barnes ‘Britishness’ was explicit. He championed the fact that the British 
scheme and its 2:1:1 Conference vote composition had been sanctioned by British 
labour, and that as their agent he ensured that this would remain intact. He did not, 
however, reveal that Lloyd George was adamant that the State must maintain its two 
conference votes, and it is important to remember that Barnes’ relative independence on 
the Commission been ordained by the Prime Minister with that caveat. McKillen 
observed that Gompers was not under similar guidance from President Wilson. Wilson 
chose to step back from directly influencing ‘the common people of the world’ out of 
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fear, believing that such matters be left to the international labour conference to 
determine.
4
  Any change-of-heart Gompers displayed regarding the British-led 
Commission was sporadic depending on his immediate requirements. He championed 
the Labour Commission when he needed to show support for Wilson’s League vision, 
but was a foe when it came to the Conference vote and Article XIX. Once he got what 
he wanted regarding the latter, he commended the Commission’s work. Gompers used 
Furuseth as a wedge to attain certain concessions, but Furuseth’s satisfaction was 
temporary and he was soon on the attack again. This put Gompers in the strange 
position of defending the Labour Commission’s work during the June 1920 AFL 
Conference after denigrating it earlier. From 1921 to 1924 Gompers returned to 
chastising the Commission publicly for being unsympathetic to his demands, 
simultaneously upholding the ILO as evidence of his commitment to elevating the 
world’s workers. America’s tradition of isolationism greatly impacted the Labour 
Commission sittings, and Gompers’ eloquences about uplifting the world’s workers 
were undercut once it appeared that he and his colleague Robinson were primarily 
concerned with protecting their high-wage economy, and not making overtures towards 
universal social progress.  It would be short-sighted, however, to ignore the fact that the 
British were equally concerned with protecting their own economic primacy through the 
ILO scheme, as Barnes often admitted. 
 It was apparent that the Labour Convention would never pass the Peace 
Conference without the Americans delegation’s consent, but in the end, Congress never 
ratified the Treaty of Versailles nor did it join the League of Nations. In this way, this 
thesis observes a facet of the unequal US-UK ‘special relationship’ after the first world 
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war, exposing how far Barnes was willing to go to keep America a partner in global 
policy decisions while excusing them from any real responsibility. Despite these and 
other ironies that underpinned the Anglo-American relationship during and after the 
ILO’s inception, Barnes exercised the utmost diplomacy towards Gompers and held him 
in high esteem.    
 The British labour delegation wisely focused on European and Japanese support 
for the Labour Convention in the face of American resistance which helped smooth its 
passage. Labour matters at the war’s end were inextricably tied into matters of high 
diplomacy, as shown through the deal-making between Barnes, Sir Malcolm and the 
Italians, and by Lloyd George’s dependence on Barnes for information on how the 
Italian working classes might respond to settlement decisions. Barnes also asserted that 
making the ILO scheme flexible enough to accommodate developing economies like 
Japan and India was vital for a virtuous economic cycle as well as intrinsic to the 
success and democracy of the Conference. It is speculative to presume that support for 
‘backwards’ nations might have been used as propaganda to minimise criticisms that the 
British labour scheme was just another Imperialist diktat, but given negative 
contemporary press about the Peace Conference one should not entirely rule that out.
5
  
Barnes personally (and presciently) believed it was important to quickly return 
Germany to the world economy by easing its schedule for financial reparations, a view 
popular with contemporary economists among others, but not with the Allied powers.  
 Informal gatherings, chance meetings, and unofficial sub-committees 
constituting ‘hallway diplomacy’ in Paris affected Barnes and the Labour Convention to 
a varying extent. For example, there is no telling what Barnes, Henderson and Lansbury 
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discussed in January 1919 without any records, so the outcome from their meetings is 
speculative. Shotwell’s documentation of random encounters with Furuseth show that 
he was somewhat prepared for the ‘deal’ the two eventually made over point fifteen,  
and the resulting protocol to Article XIX  became one of the most contentious aspects of 
the Convention. Also, Phelan may have testified that his rousing the Czech and Polish 
delegates from slumber prevented 2:1:1’s defeat, but one must also consider how 
gravely they considered the importance of siding with the British when they were at 
their zenith of global power. 
 The Labour Commission did not receive the women’s delegation before the 
Inter-Allied Women’s Conference (IWC) persuaded President Wilson to allow women 
to attend some Peace Conference committees, showing how change in this area was 
indeed slow coming.  This was indicative of the holdover nineteenth-century attitude 
Barnes held regarding women’s suffrage: he believed that women’s matters ‘distracted’ 
Labour MPs from more pressing priorities. The two Bondfield amendments marginally 
influenced the Convention, indicating little more than a gradually changing attitude 
towards women’s participation in permanent institutions. As noted by Eisenberg, the 
ILO Convention was both more and less progressive than the League Covenant towards 
women: it was progressive because Article 389 of the Treaty’s Labour Chapter 
determined that women’s questions required a woman adviser (one of two in total), but 
less so because, unlike Article 7 of the League covenant determining all of its posts 
were equally open to men or women, Article 395 of Chapter XIII stated that only ‘a 
certain number of [the employees in the ILO secretariat] shall be women.’ 
  The British Dominion leaders’ declarations of independence introduced a new 
dimension to Barnes’ post-Commission challenges, but his years of service to Lloyd 
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George were repaid when he needed it most. The Prime Minister pulled no punches 
with the resistant Dominion heads, making it clear that their weak economic arguments 
would not hold up the Labour Convention’s passage. Also, Balfour stepped in to refer 
Barnes and the Labour Report up to the ‘Big Four’ when he encountered friction from 
the Council of Five. While this might have seemed like an act of divine intervention, 
Balfour was undoubtedly concerned with preventing a British humiliation should the 
Peace Conference kill the Labour Convention after it had received so much publicity.  
These interventions demonstrated the importance of protecting Britain’s interests, and 
once again Barnes benefitted from his political affiliations. Any earlier schism between 
Balfour and Barnes (e.g., over his role with The League to Abolish War, or speaking on 
Germany as if he represented Government opinion) was trumped by the importance of 
the ILO’s success for all of the reasons outlined above. 
 The final epilogue chapter reviewed some aspects of Barnes’ post-Labour 
Commission role in an abridged manner, indicating further research and questions to 
answer. Why was Barnes so involved with Canadian delegation problems? Had he been 
tasked by the Prime Minister to intervene as a BED member, or did he personally take 
this on as part of his extended Labour Commission remit?  Did the Prime Minister 
know, or care, that Barnes was aiding the supposedly non-political Organising 
Committee for the Washington Conference its decision-making during the exchange of 
the German notes? Did Barnes step in to help draft the British response to the German 
delegation owing to his personal interest in Germany’s civilian population? Barnes’ 
prolonged triangulation over the matter of Germany’s Washington Conference 
attendance, its position on the ILO Governing Body, and his involvement with the IFTU 
after its August Amsterdam declaration could fill many pages. For example, Barnes was 
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appointed Ambassador to Berlin in July, 1919, reportedly ‘in recognition of the fact that 
he was the chief actor in securing the inclusion of the International Labour Charter in 
the Peace Treaty.’
6
 It is hoped that a fuller review of these records will produce a 
complete survey of Barnes’ role in British-German relations before, during and after the 
war.  As a Washington Conference Chairman, how and to what extent did his influence 
affect the daily proceedings? Records of sub-committee meetings or witness testimonies 
involving Barnes may enrich the Washington Conference story beyond what is already 
known. Research for this thesis has also concluded that details of his post-1920 years, 
after he left the Coalition, have rarely been discussed. For example, correspondence 
with Harold Butler when he was at the ILO (from 1920 as Assistant Director and from 
1932 as Director) reveals a great deal about the continuing relationship between Britain 
and the permanent labour institution Barnes helped establish.     
 Analysis of the Labour Commission sessions indicated how the completed draft 
Labour Convention, finally agreed through virtual consensus (save Japan’s abstention 
and an oft-absent French delegate), represented a patchwork of contemporary national 
and philosophical influences, some complementary and some competitive, each faction 
and delegation striving to make a crucial impact upon the permanent organisation for 
labour under construction that reflected their wider outlooks. The ceaseless struggle for 
women to have their voices heard and requirements acknowledged was overt. The 
Labour Commission records also captured, for example, British primacy after ‘winning’ 
the war, the American tradition of independence (and isolationism), while France’s 
motto of liberté, égalité, fraternité was ably characterised by Leon Jouhaux when 
                                                 
6
 Argus, Melbourne (Australia), 4.7.19, p. 7 
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defending the more ‘democratic’, single conference vote particularly.
7
 Belgium 
essentially tried to balance its need to rebuild with the imperative of advancing 
progressive labour reform, while Japanese and Indian uncertainty about their position in 
the new labour (and world) order was explicit until the last, and the British Dominions 
(including India) seized the opportunity to test the limits of their sovereignty and 
national identity. The Czechs and the Italians both made a point of stressing the 
importance of their proletariat to the world economy, and of their nations when it came 
to re-drawing geopolitical boundaries in the wake of German hostilities and occupation. 
In this way a clearer picture begins to emerge of how national complexions and outlook 
shaped that most vital aspect of the Peace Treaty which endured through the 
establishment of the permanent International Labour Organisation. Peace through labour 
was resilient when compared with the unfortunate longer-term fates of the Treaty of 
Versailles and the League of Nations.  
 Barnes said the Labour Chapter in the Peace Treaty was ‘the work of many 
minds from many countries but in its inception and main outlines it was British… My 
job had been to pilot it through with the greatest possible measure of agreement and 
good will.
8
  He was but one among many voices espousing the need for and the virtues 
of raising industrial standards for the global working class through institutional channels 
in the name of peace,  and was able to use his ‘accidental’ position (as he called it) to 
achieve this. Barnes’ language and approach was symptomatic of the paradigm shift 
towards the ‘new internationalism’ of the immediate post-war era, but it was rooted in 
communitarian socialism’s collectivist ethos and a decidedly British mindset. His mild 
                                                 
7
 Jouhaux declared during the March 20 Commission sessions that 2:1:1 stood ‘in profound opposition to 
the traditions of the policy of the French people’ from the typed English translation of the CGT Statement 
on International Labour Conference, ILO 4.06 LC.15 (undated but c. March 1919) 
8
 Barnes, FWWC,  p.252; attributed to the joint discussions of Sir Malcolm, Butler, Phelan and Barnes per 
Shotwell’s interview(s) with Phelan c. 1931 
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nationalism, high visibility and consistent use of anti-Bolshevist messaging helped 
secure moderate, majority support for the idea that the moderately socialist British 
Labour Party could sit comfortably within the centres of power. By standing alongside 
Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson, Barnes’ presence on the international stage 
formed a link between British labour and responsible government in the eyes of 
Western establishment figures. But he didn’t ‘swing to the right’ so much as stay true to 
what he had believed since his nineteenth century political awakenings about working 
class representation through constitutional structures inside permanent institutions.   
 Competing tensions defined Barnes’ public life, but he amalgamated the 
conflicts that defined his domestic career into a syncretist doctrine that allowed him to 
meet the unprecedented challenges of the Peace Conference and build the bridge that 
carried him into the international labour realm.  His personal policies embodied the 
ethos of emergent post-war internationalism based on shared interests and 
commonalities rather than territorial disputes and power-mongering, yet they 
maintained an intrinsically British emphasis. He was able to overcome some of the 
paradoxes underlying the International Labour Organisation’s creation during some 
crucial junctures through his desire for conciliation and his position at the centre of a 
powerful network. Barnes’ witnessed and in many ways represented a transition of 
ideological and political thoughts and practices, from the domestic to the international, 
at an important time in organised labour’s history. At times he stumbled, but his 
essential and important efforts towards the creation of the International Labour 
Organisation in 1919, and what this represented in terms of geopolitical history, have 
been greatly underestimated. For the reasons outlined, the work of George N. Barnes 
deserves greater attention in British Labour Party historiography, and in histories of the 
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international working class movement, international relations, and the development of 






Appendix 1:  Excerpts from Barnes’ biographical pamphlets 
 
They were noteworthy for denoting Barnes’ particular eloquence, and the tenderness he 
displayed toward his subjects.  
Henry George  
According to Barnes, Henry George: -  
…proposed to tax land values to extinction, or till economic rent was 
swallowed up, excepting only such as amount as would compensate 
landlords for collecting, and he argued that thereby industry would be freed 
from taxes, wages increased, poverty abolished, and a state of society 
brought about from which would emerge a free people, controlling affairs on 




He was characterised as being: - 
…Gifted with wonderful power as a writer, and favoured by circumstances 
in getting the ear of the English-speaking peoples, it is probable that he, of 
modern writers, did more to stimulate thought on social matters than all 
others put together. But his services to the people were not limited by his 
writings. He threw himself with ardour into practical affairs, and as an 





…Whether freedom will come by his methods or by those of others is a 
matter which does not concern me here. But of the man it can with 
confidence be said that he fought bravely for the truth as he saw it, and, 




The portrayal of George’s final hours took on near-holy reverence: - 
…In the night he got up and… was found in an adjoining room, standing 
erect with his eyes wide open... fixed ahead as if he saw something. Perhaps 
he did; who knows? It is never given to the pioneer to enter into the 
Promised Land, but, maybe like Moses, he got a glimpse of it as he crossed 
the bar. He never spoke again, and, in a few minutes, he was dead. What the 
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Robert Burns  
The following is all Barnes’ writing, the indented text are his quotations from Burns.  
He anticipated economic thought by a hundred years, although, like Morris,
5
 
he probably never read a text-book of economics in his life. It was perhaps 
fortunate for the economists that he hadn’t, for if he had turned on them the 
same lash which was directed against the canting religious bigotry of his 
day, they would certainly have cut as sorry a figure as Holy Willie  himself.
6
 
Unlike them, he knew that the object of true political economy was not the 
accumulation of wealth, but rather the rearing of happy-hearted human 
beings; hence he pilloried oppression, and brought social wrong vividly into 
view… 
 
…The dirge in which he pictured the “Poor o’er laboured wight, So abject, 
mean and vile” Is just as applicable to the grime spectre of the unemployed 
man today as it was then, although the poem from which the words are 
culled seems to be somewhat of an unreal production, the outcome, probably 




…If I’m designed yon lordling’s slave, 
By nature’s law designed,  
Why was an independent wish 
E’er planted in my mind?
 8    
 
His message is, of course, tacitly dismissed by the worldly wise as a mere 
dream, but it is the dream which keeps the world young and green and 
hopeful. It is the dream which inspires those who do battle for the right; it 
is the dream which shall possess the best of mankind while injustice lasts, 
and until the dawn of the better day when war shall be no more, and -  
 
Man to man the warld o’er 
Shall brithers be, and a that.
 9 
 
Karl Marx  
Barnes drew comparisons between Marx and Henry George: - 
Like Henry George, Karl Marx was a man of the world, as well as a man of 
books. He was also, like the Prophet of San Francisco, a man of great human 
sympathies, as well as of intellectual attainments…   
  
                                                 
5
 Barnes referred to William Morris, (1834–1896), see bibliographic table. 
6
 ‘Holy Willie’s Prayer’ was another poem by Burns wherein the title character was an elder in the church 
parish of Mauchline, in Ayrshire, names Willie Fisher; Fisher was a hypocritical figure who spied upon 
others in his community and reported to the Minister their ‘sinful’ wrong-doings.   
7
 Barnes, Robert Burns, p.12; Burns was prone to fits of debilitating depression. 
8
 Excerpt from ‘Man Was Made To Mourn: A Dirge’ (1784) 
9




As a profound thinker and a man of erudition probably justice can scarcely 
yet be done him… but it is as a man and a leader of men that Marx is mainly 
of interest to us here. And it may at once be said that, like all truly great 
men, although he led a tempestuous life, he yet remained one of the most 
genial and most general of souls.
 10 
 
Barnes’ interpretation of the Communist Manifesto (1848) read in part:  
Emancipation lay in the property-less classes getting and using political 
power as a lever to transfer the means of life from the owning classes to a 
State representing and acting on behalf of all the people. He pointed out that 
this did not mean subversion of existing principles, but their 
universalization… It meant abolishing, not the State, but only the State as 




Robert Owen  
Per Barnes, Robert Owen: -  
…attached supreme importance to education and co-operation, …(which) 
covered a very wide field… he envisaged co-operation in all the ordinary 
social and secular things of life, and not merely co-operation in selling 
things over a counter. The keynote of his teaching was co-operation of 
educated citizens for the common good. And his supreme credit was that he 
lived in line with his faith. 
 
…New Lanark was with Owen only a beginning, and not an end. He wanted 
to transform the whole world and rid it of its evils. Poverty – mental, moral, 
or material – he regarded as the result of bad surroundings… This really 
summed up his philosophy and his economics. Improve material 




Barnes concluded his speech on Owen’s parting in his reverent style:-  
…he rallied for a day or two. He even discussed with the local vicar some 
proposed alterations in the village school. It was only the last flicker of a 
departing spirit which his feeble body could not sustain. He breathed his last 
ere many more hours, consistent to the last, for he had worked while he had 
any strength left… He never saw the promised land, but he was happy in 
having found the road. Nor was it a new road, for it is found in the 
injunction, now nearly 2,000 years old, ‘he that is greatest among you let 
him be the servant of all’. Robert Owen was the servant of all!
13,14
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 Barnes, Karl Marx, p.1 
11
 Ibid, pp.7-8 
12
 Barnes, Robert Owen, pp.10-11 
13
 Ibid, p.18 
14
 Barnes seemed to have combined elements from the King James Bible: Matthew 23:11 ‘But he that is 
greatest among you shall be your servant’, and Mark 9:35 ‘Anyone who wants to be first must be the very 




Appendix 2:  Draft Convention Crating a Permanent Organisation for the Promotion 
of International Regulation of Labor Conditions, Prepared by the British Delegation, 
January 21, 1919 
 
The earliest ‘treaty’ form of the British draft scheme (sans Preamble).   
 
 1.  The High Contracting Parties agree to accept as the basis of a permanent 
organisation for the promotion of the objects set forth in the preamble, the provisions 
contained in the following articles. 
  or 
 1.  The High Contracting Parties constitute themselves a Union for the 
promotion of the objects set forth in the preamble. For this purpose they agree to accept 
as the basis of a permanent organisation the provisions contained in the following 
articles –  
 2. A general Conference of representatives of the High Contracting Parties shall 
be held within six months of the date when the present Convention comes into force, 
and similar Conferences shall be held from time to time as occasion may require, and in 
any case at intervals of not more than one year. The meetings of the general Conference 
are referred to in the present Convention as the Annual Conference. 
 3.  The Annual Conference shall be composed of three representatives of each of 
the High Contracting Parties, of whom one shall be the delegate of the Government and 
the others shall be delegates representing the employers and the workpeople, of each of 
the High Contracting Parties. 
      The High Contracting Parties undertake to select the non-government 
delegates in agreement, so far as may be possible, with whatever organisation of 
employers and workpeople may exist in their countries. 
      The names of the delegates to meetings of the Annual Conference will be 
communicated to the International Bureau hereafter provided for by the government of 
each of the High Contracting Parties.  
      The credentials of delegates to the Annual Conference shall be subject to 
scrutiny by the Conference which may by the vote of two-thirds of the delegates 
present, refuse to admit any delegate whom it deems not to have been selected in 
accordance with the undertaking contained in this article.  
 4.  The delegates shall vote individually on all matters which are taken into 
consideration by the Annual Conference.  
      The Government delegates shall be entitled to two votes each, and the other 
delegates to one vote. 
      If, however, for any reason any High Contracting Party fails to send to the 
Annual Conference one of its non-government delegates whom it is entitles to send, the 
other of these delegates shall be allowed to sit and speak at the Conference, but not vote.  
      (If any High Contracting Party sends neither of the non-government delegates 
whom it is entitled to send, its government delegate shall have two votes and no more. 
      If, in accordance with Article 3 the Annual Conference refuses admission to a 
delegate of any High Contracting Party, the provisions of the present article shall apply 
just as if the High Contracting Party had sent no such delegate.) 
 5.  The meetings of the Annual Conference shall be held at the capital of the 




 6.  There shall be established at the capital of the League of Nations an 
International Bureau, under the authority and protection of the Chancellor of the 
League. 
      The International Bureau shall be under the immediate direction and control 
of a General Secretary, who shall be the person named in the protocol hereto. 
 7.  The General Secretary shall act as the Secretary of the Annual Conference, 
and shall be responsible to the Annual Conference for the efficient conduct of the 
International Bureau and for other such duties as may be assigned to him.  
 8.  The final constitution and functions of the International Bureau shall e finally 
determined at the first meeting of the Annual Conference.  
      Its functions shall include the preparation of an Agenda for the meetings of 
the Annual Conference, the collection of information on all subjects relating to the 
international adjustment of conditions of employment, the distributions of such 
information to the Governments of the High Contracting Parties, the conduct of special 
investigations ordered by the Annual Conference, the carrying out of the duties required 
of it by the provisions of this Convention in connection with international disputes, the 
editing and publication of a periodical paper in the French and English languages, 
dealing with international problems of industry and employment, and shall be 
responsible for all communications between the International Bureau and the heads of 
the labour departments of the High Contracting Parties. 
 9.  Each of the High Contracting Parties agrees to establish, if it has not already 
established one, a special government department dealing with labour questions and the 
conditions of employment.  
      The head of this department shall act as the sole and responsible channel of 
communication between the government of the High Contracting Parties and the 
General Secretary, and shall be responsible for supplying to the General Secretary the 
statistics and other information he may require.  
 10. There shall be established a Council of the International Bureau which shall 
consist of the heads of the labour departments, or other representatives appointed by the 
Governments of Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy and Japan.  
       The Council shall meet from time to time at the capital of the League of 
Nations, as occasion may require, and shall direct the General Secretary with regard to 
the preparation of Agenda for the Annual Conference, and with regard to the conduct of 
the International Bureau, and with regard to any other matter arising out of the Policy 
adopted by the Annual Conference 
 11. The Council of the International Bureau, together with the General 
Secretary, shall be responsible for the summoning and organisation of the first meeting 
of the Annual Conference. 
 12. The Council of the International Bureau and the General Secretary shall be 
entitles to apply to the Chancellor of the League of Nations for any assistance they may 
require in connection with the organisation of the meetings of the Annual Conference, 
(or in the conduct of special investigations ordered by the Annual Conference), in the 
acquisition of buildings requires for the International Bureau, or in any other matter in 
which the Chancellor may be able to assist them.  
 13. The expenses of the International Bureau shall be borne by the governments 
of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the distribution among the members 
of the Postal Union of the expenses of the International Postal Bureau. The expenses of 




shall be borne in equal parts by the governments sending representatives to these 
meetings.  
 14. The High Contracting Parties recognise the right of the British Empire to 
separate representation in respect of the Dominions of the British Empire, including 
India, at meetings of the Annual Conference, and the right of the Labour Departments of 
these Dominions and of India to communicate directly with the General Secretary. 
 





Appendix 3: Chapter XIII of the Treaty of Versailles (the ‘Labour Chapter’) 
 




ORGANISATION OF LABOUR. 
 
Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace, 
and such a peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice; 
 
And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship, and privation 
to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of 
the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required: 
as, for example, by the regulation of the hours of work, including the establishment of a 
maximum working day and week, the regulation of the labour supply, the prevention of 
unemployment, the provision of an adequate living wage, the protection of the worker 
against sickness, disease and injury arising out of his employment, the protection of 
children, young persons and women, provision for old age and injury, protection of the 
interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own recognition of the 
principle of freedom of association, the organisation of vocational and technical 
education and other measures; 
 
Whereas also the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labour is an 
obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve the conditions in their own 
countries; 
 
The HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, moved by sentiments of justice and humanity 
as well as by the desire to secure the permanent peace of the world, agree to the 
following: 
 




A permanent organisation is hereby established for the promotion of the objects set 
forth in the Preamble. 
 
The original Members of the League of Nations shall be the original Members of this 
organisation, and hereafter membership of the League of Nations shall carry with it 
membership of the said organisation. 
 
ARTICLE 388. 
The permanent organisation shall consist of: 
 
A General Conference of Representatives of the Members and, 







The meetings of the General Conference of Representatives of the Members shall be 
held from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once in every year. It shall 
be composed of four Representatives of each of the Members, of whom two shall be 
Government Delegates and the two others shall be Delegates representing respectively 
the employers and the workpeople of each of the Members. 
 
Each Delegate may be accompanied by advisers, who shall not exceed two in number 
for each item on the agenda of the meeting. When questions specially affecting women 
are to be considered by the Conference, one at least of the advisers should be a woman. 
 
The members undertake to nominate non-Government Delegates and advisers chosen in 
agreement with the industrial organisations, if such organisations exist, which are most 
representative of employers or workpeople, as the case may be, in their respective 
countries. 
 
Advisers shall not speak except on a request made by the Delegate whom they 
accompany and by the special authorisation of the President of the Conference, and may 
not vote. 
 
A Delegate may by notice in writing addressed to the President appoint one of his 
advisers to act as his deputy, and the adviser, while so acting, shall be allowed to speak 
and vote. 
 
The names of the Delegates and their advisers will be communicated to the International 
Labour Office by the Government of each of the Members. 
 
The credentials of Delegates and their advisers shall be subject to scrutiny by the 
Conference, which may, by two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present, refuse 
to admit any Delegate or adviser whom it deems not to have been nominated in 
accordance with this Article. 
 
ARTICLE 390. 
Every Delegate shall be entitled to vote individually on all matters which are taken into 
consideration by the Conference. 
 
If one of the Members fails to nominate one of the non-Government Delegates whom it 
is entitled to nominate, the other non-Government Delegate shall be allowed to sit and 
speak at the Conference, but not to vote. 
 
If in accordance with Article 389 the Conference refuses admission to a Delegate of one 
of the Members, the provisions of the present Article shall apply as if that Delegate had 
not been nominated. 
 
ARTICLE 391. 
The meetings of the Conference shall be held at the seat of the League of Nations, or at 
such other place as may be decided by the Conference at a previous meeting by two-






The International Labour Office shall be established at the seat of the League of Nations 
as part of the organisation of the League. 
 
ARTICLE 393 
The International Labour Office shall be under the control of a Governing Body 
consisting of twenty-four persons, appointed in accordance with the following 
provisions: 
 
The Governing Body of the International Labour Office shall be constituted as follows: 
 
Twelve persons representing the Governments; 
 
Six persons elected by the Delegates to the Conference representing the employers; 
 
Six persons elected by the Delegates to the Conference representing the workers. 
 
Of the twelve persons representing the Governments eight shall be nominated by the 
Members which are of the chief industrial importance, and four shall be nominated by 
the Members selected for the purpose by the Government Delegates to the Conference, 
excluding the Delegates of the eight Members mentioned above. 
 
Any question as to which are the Members of the chief industrial importance shall be 
decided by the Council of the League of Nations. 
 
The period of office of the Members of the Governing Body will be three years. The 
method of filling vacancies and other similar questions may be determined by the 
Governing Body subject to the approval of the Conference. 
 
The Governing Body shall, from time to time, elect one of its members to act as its 
Chairman, shall regulate its own procedure and shall fix its own times of meeting. A 
special meeting shall be held if a written request to that effect is made by at least ten 
members of the Governing Body. 
 
ARTICLE 394. 
There shall be a Director of the International Labour Office, who shall be appointed by 
the Governing Body, and, subject to the instructions of the Governing Body, shall be 
responsible for the efficient conduct of the International Labour Office and for such 
other duties as may be assigned to him. 
 
The Director or his deputy shall attend all meetings of the Governing Body. 
 
ARTICLE 395. 
The staff of the International Labour Office shall be appointed by the Director who 
shall, so far as is possible with due regard to the efficiency of the work of the Office, 








The functions of the International Labour Office shall include the collection and 
distribution of information on all subjects relating to the international adjustment of 
conditions of industrial life and labour, and particularly the examination of subjects 
which it is proposed to bring before the Conference with a view to the conclusion of 
international conventions, and the conduct of such special investigations as may be 
ordered by the Conference. 
 
It will prepare the agenda for the meetings of the Conference. 
 
It will carry out the duties required of it by the provisions of this Part of the present 
Treaty in connection with international disputes. 
 
It will edit and publish in French and English, and in such other languages as the 
Governing Body may think desirable, a periodical paper dealing with problems of 
industry and employment of international interest. 
 
Generally, in addition to the functions set out in this Article, it shall have such other 
powers and duties as may be assigned to it by the Conference. 
 
ARTICLE 397. 
The Government Departments of any of the Members which deal with questions of 
industry and employment may communicate directly with the Director through the 
Representative of their Government on the Governing Body of the International Labour 
Office, or failing any such Representative, through such other qualified official as the 
Government may nominate for the purpose. 
 
ARTICLE 398. 
The International Labour Office shall be entitled to the assistance of the Secretary-
General of the League of Nations in any matter in which it can be given. 
 
ARTICLE 399. 
Each of the Members will pay the travelling and subsistence expenses of its Delegates 
and their advisers and of its Representatives attending the meetings of the Conference or 
Governing Body, as the case may be. 
 
All the other expenses of the International Labour Office and of the meetings of the 
Conference or Governing Body shall be paid to the Director by the Secretary-General of 
the League of Nations out of the general funds of the League. 
 
The Director shall be responsible to the Secretary-General of the League for the proper 






The agenda for all meetings of the Conference will be settled by the Governing Body, 




Government of any of the Members or by any representative organisation recognised for 
the purpose of Article 389. 
 
ARTICLE 401. 
The Director shall act as the Secretary of the Conference, and shall transmit the agenda 
so as to reach the Members four months before the meeting of the Conference, and, 
through them, the non-Government Delegates when appointed. 
 
ARTICLE 402. 
Any of the Governments of the Members may formally object to the inclusion of any 
item or items in the agenda. The grounds for such objection shall be set forth in a 
reasoned statement addressed to the Director, who shall circulate it to all the Members 
of the Permanent Organisation. 
 
Items to which such objection has been made shall not, however, be excluded from the 
agenda, if at the Conference a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates 
present is in favour of considering them. 
 
If the Conference decides (otherwise than under the preceding paragraph) by two-thirds 
of the votes cast by the Delegates present that any subject shall be considered by the 
Conference, that subject shall be included in the agenda for the following meeting. 
 
ARTICLE 403. 
The Conference shall regulate its own procedure, shall elect its own President, and may 
appoint committees to consider and report on any matter. 
 
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Part of the present Treaty, all matters 
shall be decided by a simple majority of the votes cast by the Delegates present. 
 
The voting is void unless the total number of votes cast is equal to half the number of 
the Delegates attending the Conference. 
 
ARTICLE 404. 
The Conference may add to any committees which it appoints technical experts, who 
shall be assessors without power to vote. 
 
ARTICLE 405. 
When the Conference has decided on the adoption of proposals with regard to an item in 
the agenda, it will rest with the Conference to determine whether these proposals should 
take the form: (a) of a recommendation to be submitted to the Members for 
consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise, 
or (b) of a draft international convention for ratification by the Members. 
 
In either case a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present shall be 
necessary on the final vote for the adoption of the recommendation or draft convention, 
as the case may be, by the Conference. 
 
In framing any recommendation or draft convention of general application the 




imperfect development of industrial organisation or other special circumstances make 
the industrial conditions substantially different and shall suggest the modifications, if 
any, which it considers may be required to meet the case of such countries. 
 
A copy of the recommendation or draft convention shall be authenticated by the 
signature of the President of the Conference and of the Director and shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. The Secretary-General will 
communicate a certified copy of the recommendation or draft convention to each of the 
members. 
 
Each of the Members undertakes that it will, within the period of one year at most from 
the closing of the session of the Conference, or if it is impossible owing to exceptional 
circumstances to do so within the period of one year, then at the earliest practicable 
moment and in no case later than eighteen months from the closing of the session of the 
Conference, bring the recommendation or draft convention before the authority or 
authorities within whose competence the matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or 
other action. 
 
In the case of a recommendation, the Members will inform the Secretary-General of the 
action taken. 
 
In the case of a draft convention, the Member will, if it obtains the consent of the 
authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, communicate the 
formal ratification of the convention to the Secretary-General and will take such action 
as may be necessary to make effective the provisions of such convention. 
 
If on a recommendation no legislative or other action is taken to make a 
recommendation effective, or if the draft convention fails to obtain the consent of the 
authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, no further obligation 
shall rest upon the Member. 
 
In the case of a federal State, the power of which to enter into conventions on labour 
matters is subject to limitations, it shall be in the discretion of that Government to treat a 
draft convention to which such limitations apply as a recommendation only, and the 
provisions of this Article with respect to recommendations shall apply in such case. 
 
The above Article shall be interpreted in accordance with the following principle: 
 
In no case shall any Member be asked or required, as a result of the adoption of any 
recommendation or draft convention by the Conference, to lessen the protection 
afforded by its existing legislation to the workers concerned. 
 
ARTICLE 406. 
Any convention so ratified shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the League of 
Nations, but shall only be binding upon the Members which ratify it. 
 
ARTICLE 407. 
If any convention coming before the Conference for final consideration fails to secure 




be within the right of any of the Members of the Permanent Organisation to agree to 
such convention among themselves. 
 
Any convention so agreed to shall be communicated by the Governments concerned to 
the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, who shall register it. 
 
ARTICLE 408. 
Each of the Members agrees to make an annual report to the International Labour Office 
on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of conventions to 
which it is a party. These reports shall be made in such form and shall contain such 
particulars as the Governing Body may request. The Director shall lay a summary of 
these reports before the next meeting of the Conference. 
 
ARTICLE 409. 
In the event of any representation being made to the International Labour Office by an 
industrial association of employers or of workers that any of the members has failed to 
secure in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any con vention 
to which it is a party, the Governing Body may communicate this representation to the 
Government against which it is made and may invite that Government to make such 
statement on the subject as it may think fit. 
 
ARTICLE 410. 
If no statement is received within a reasonable time from the Government in question, 
or if the statement when received is not deemed to be satisfactory by the Governing 
Body, the latter shall have the right to publish the representation and the statement, if 
any, made in reply to it. 
 
ARTICLE 411. 
Any of the Members shall have the right to file a complaint with the International 
Labour Office if it is not satisfied that any other Member is securing the effective 
observance of any convention which both have ratified in accordance with the foregoing 
Articles. 
 
The Governing Body may, if it thinks fit, before referring such a complaint to a 
Commission of Enquiry, as hereinafter provided for, communicate with the Government 
in question in the manner described in Article 409. 
 
If the Governing Body does not think it necessary to communicate the complaint to the 
Government in question, or if, when they have made such communication, no statement 
in reply has been received within a reasonable time which the Governing Body 
considers to be satisfactory, the Governing Body may apply for the appointment of a 
Commission of Enquiry to consider the complaint and to report thereon. 
 
The Governing Body may adopt the same procedure either of its own motion or on 
receipt of a complaint from a Delegate to the Conference. 
 
When any matter arising out of Articles 410 or 411 is being considered by the 
Governing Body, the Government in question shall, if not already represented thereon, 




Body while the matter is under consideration. Adequate notice of the date on which the 
matter will be considered shall be given to the Government in question. 
 
ARTICLE 412. 
The Commission of Enquiry shall be constituted in accordance with the following 
provisions: 
 
Each of the Members agrees to nominate within six months of the date on which the 
present Treaty comes into force three persons of industrial experience, of whom one 
shall be a representative of employers, one a representative of workers, and one a person 
of independent standing, who shall together form a panel from which the Members of 
the Commission of Enquiry shall be drawn. 
 
The qualifications of the persons so nominated shall be subject to scrutiny by the 
Governing Body, which may be two-thirds of the votes cast by the representatives 
present refuse to accept the nomination of any person whose qualifications do not in its 
Opinion comply with the requirements of the present Article. 
 
Upon the application of the Governing Body, the Secretary-General of the League of 
Nations shall nominate three persons one from each section of this panel, to constitute 
the Commission of Enquiry, and shall designate one of them as the President of the 
Commission. None of these three persons shall be a person nominated to the panel by 
any Member directly concerned in the complaint. 
 
ARTICLE: 413. 
The Members agree that, in the event of the reference of a complaint to a Commission 
of Enquiry under Article 411, they will each, whether directly concerned in the 
complaint or not, place at the disposal of the Commission all the information in their 
possession which bears upon the subject-matter of the complaint. 
 
ARTICLE 414. 
When the Commission of Enquiry has fully considered the complaint, it shall prepare a 
report embodying its findings on all questions of fact relevant to determining the issue 
between the parties and containing such recommendations as it may think proper as to 
the steps which should be taken to meet the complaint and the time within which they 
should be taken. 
 
It shall also indicate in this report the measures, if any, of an economic character against 
a defaulting Government which it considers to be appropriate, and which it considers 
other Governments would be justified in adopting. 
 
ARTICLE 415. 
The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall communicate the report of the 
Commission of Enquiry to each of the Governments concerned in the complaint, and 
shall cause it to be published. 
 
Each of these Governments shall within one month inform the Secretary-General of the 




report of the Commission- and if not, whether it proposes to refer the complaint to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations. 
 
ARTICLE 416. 
In the event of any Member failing to take the action required by Article 405, with 
regard to a recommendation or draft Convention, any other Member shall be entitled to 
refer the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
 
ARTICLE 417. 
The decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice in regard to a complaint or 




The Permanent Court of International Justice may affirm, vary or reverse any of the 
findings or recommendations of the Commission of Enquiry, if any, and shall in its 
decision indicate the measures, if any, of an economic character which it considers to be 




In the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time specified the 
recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Enquiry, or in 
the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, as the case may be, any 
other Member may take against that Member the measures of an economic character 
indicated in the report of the Commission or in the decision of the Court as appropriate 
to the case. 
 
ARTICLE 420. 
The defaulting Government may at any time inform the Governing Body that it has 
taken the steps necessary to comply with the recommendations of the Commission of 
Enquiry or with those in the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, as 
the case may be, and may request it to apply to the Secretary-General of the League to 
constitute a Commission of Enquiry to verify its contention. In this case the provisions 
of Articles 412, 413, 414, 415, 417 and 418 shall apply, and if the report of the 
Commission of Enquiry or the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
is in favour of the defaulting Government, the other Governments shall forthwith 







The Members engage to apply conventions which they have ratified in accordance with 
the provisions of this Part of the present Treaty to their colonies, protectorates and 
possessions which are not fully self-governing: 
 




Subject to such modifications as may be necessary to adapt the convention to local 
conditions. 
And each of the Members shall notify to the International Labour Office the action 




Amendments to this Part of the present Treaty which are adopted by the Conference by 
a majority of two-thirds of the votes cast by the Delegates present shall take effect when 
ratified by the States whose representatives compose the Council of the League of 
Nations and by three-fourths of the Members. 
 
ARTICLE 423. 
Any question or dispute relating to the interpretation of this Part of the present Treaty or 
of any subsequent convention concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions 







The first meeting of the Conference shall take place in October, 1919. The place and 
agenda for this meeting shall be as specified in the Annex hereto. 
 
Arrangements for the convening and the organisation of the first meeting of the 
Conference will be made by the Government designated for the purpose in the said 
Annex. That Government shall be assisted in the preparation of the documents for 
submission to the Conference by an International Committee constituted as provided in 
the said Annex. 
 
The expenses of the first meeting and of all subsequent meetings held before the League 
of Nations has been able to establish a general fund, other than the expenses of 
Delegates and their advisers, will be borne by the Members in accordance with the 




Until the League of Nations has been constituted all communications which under the 
provisions of the foregoing Articles should be addressed to the Secretary-General of the 
League will be preserved by the Director of the International Labour Office, who will 
transmit them to the Secretary-General of the League. 
 
ARTICLE 426. 
Pending the creation of a Permanent Court of International Justice disputes which in 
accordance with this Part of the present Treaty would be submitted to it for decision will 






ANNEX.   
FIRST MEETING OF ANNUAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 1919. 
 
The place of meeting will be Washington. 
 
The Government of the United States of America is requested to convene the 
Conference. 
 
The International Organising Committee will consist of seven Members, appointed by 
the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium and 





Application of principle of the 8-hours day or of the 48-hours week. 
Question of preventing or providing against unemployment. 
Women's employment: 
Before and after child-birth, including the question of maternity benefit; 
During the night; 
In unhealthy processes. 
Employment of children: 
Minimum age of employment; 
During the night; 
In unhealthy processes. 
Extension and application of the International Conventions adopted at Berne in 1906 on 
the prohibition of night work for women employed in industry and the prohibition of the 






The High Contracting Parties, recognising that the well-being, physical, moral and 
intellectual, of industrial wage-earners is of supreme international importance, have 
framed, in order to further this great end, the permanent machinery provided for in 
Section l and associated with that of the League of Nations. 
 
They recognise that differences of climate, habits, and customs, of economic 
opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labour 
difficult of immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labour should not be 
regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and 
principles for regulating labour conditions which all industrial communities should 
endeavour to apply, so far as their special circumstances will permit. 
 
Among these methods and principles, the following seem to the High Contracting 





First - The guiding principle above enunciated that labour should not be regarded 
merely as a commodity or article of commerce. 
 
Second - The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by 
the employers. 
 
Third - The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable 
standard of life as this is understood in their time and country. 
 
Fourth - The adoption of an eight hours day or a forty-eight hours week as the standard 
to be aimed at where it has not already been attained. 
 
Fifth - The adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include 
Sunday wherever practicable. 
 
Sixth - The abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour 
of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their 
proper physical development. 
 
Seventh - The principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for 
work of equal value. 
 
Eighth - The standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labour 
should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully 
resident therein. 
 
Ninth - Each State should make provision for a system of inspection in which women 
should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the 
protection of the employed. 
 
Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final, the 
High Contracting Parties are of opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy of 
the League of Nations; and that, if adopted by the industrial communities who are 
members of the League, and safeguarded in practice by an adequate system of such 
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Appendix 4: an abridged evolution of the Labour Charter – the nineteen points 
and the Balfour redraft 
The Labour Charter’s partial evolution is included here because, although the original 
nineteen points were reproduced in volume one of Origins of the International Labor 
Office (pp. 186-8), and documents relating to these were reproduced in its volume two 
(document 43), both volumes of the book are not always easy to find. They are 
interesting for noting how suggestions from the differing delegations in regard to their 
national requirements could not be included in the final nine, as Barnes argued, owing 
their ‘too special’ nature and left for the annual Labour Conference to determine 
instead. Some of the proposals the women’s delegation presented the Labour 
Commission with were treated similarly. It is also interesting to note point thirteen’s 
American spelling of ‘labor’. The Borden redraft discussed in chapter six bore close 
resemblance to the final Labour Charter which comprises Article 427 of Chapter XIII 
(previous appendix). 
A. The original nineteen points, or clauses, of the Labour Charter as they were distilled 
by the March 13 sub-Labour Commission sub-committee from the French, American, 
Belgian and Italian delegations’ submissions:    
 The High Contracting Parties declare their acceptance of the following 
principles and engage to take all necessary steps to secure their realisation in accordance 
with the recommendations to be made by the International Labour Conference 
established under this Treaty as to their practical application: - 
1. The principle of the limitation of the hours of work in industry (or commerce) on the 
basis of eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week, subject to an exception for 
countries in which, owing to climatic conditions, the imperfect development of 
industrial organisation or other special circumstances, the industrial efficiency of the 
workers is substantially different from the efficiency of the workers in other 
countries. 
For such countries a basis shall be adopted which shall be recommended by the 
International Labour Conference as approximately equivalent to the said basis of 
eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week. 
2. The principle that no child should be permitted to be employed below the age of 
fourteen years in order that every child may be ensured a minimum amount of 
education necessary. 
The principle that between the years of fourteen and eighteen young persons of 
either sex may only be employed on condition that their technical or general 
education is continued. 
3. The principle that employers and workers should be allowed the right of association 
and combination for all purposes, subject only to such restrictions as are essential 




4. The principle that every worker has a right to a wage sufficient to maintain a 
reasonable standard of life, having regard to the circumstances of time and place. 
Alternative: The principle that a reasonable wage should be paid for all work 
performed, based on a standard of life corresponding to the degree of civilisation 
attained at the period in question. 
5. The principle of the weekly rest or its equivalent for all workers, which should 
include Sunday wherever possible. 
6. The principle that in all matters concerning the rights of workpeople, working 
conditions and social insurance, foreign workmen and their families should be 
treated on the same footing as the nationals of the country in which they reside, and 
that they may not be subjected as such to any special taxation. 
7. The principle that equal pay should be given to women and to men for equal work. 
8. The principle that maximum weekly hours of work should be fixed by the national 
legislation of each of the High Contracting Parties for wage earners in agriculture. 
9. The principle that the various States should establish a system of inspection of 
working conditions in industry, commerce and agriculture, with which 
representatives of the workers should be associated.  
10. The principle of freedom of migration subject to the consent of the Governments 
and trade unions of the countries directly involved. 
11. The principle that the provisions of the various States concerning health and safety 
as well as those concerning social insurance should be compared, with a view to 
standardising as far as possible the different national regulations on the basis most 
conducive to securing the health and safety of the workers. 
12. The principle that it is incumbent on the Government of every State to take all 
possible measures to prevent unemployment, and to ensure provisions for the 
unemployed worker during any period of involuntary employment. 
13. The principle that in right and in fact the labor of a human being can not be treated 
as merchandise of an article of commerce. 
14. The principle that no condition of involuntary servitude may exist except in 
punishment of a crime of which the person concerned has been duly proved guilty. 
15. The principle that seamen of the mercantile marine should have the right of leaving 
their ships while they are in port.  
16. The principle that no article or commodity may be carried out or delivered in 
international commerce if prison labour contributed to its manufacture.  
17. The principle that the sale or use for commercial purposes of all articles of produced 
by home work should be prohibited. 
18. The principle that any State shall have the right to send special officials to assist in 
any way and to protect its own emigrant workpeople, and that any State to which 
they have migrated shall be obliged to admit such officials and to assist them in the 




19. The principle that reciprocity of action should be established between voluntary 
organisations recognised by their Governments for the purpose of the assistance and 
protection of workpeople.  
 
B. The Balfour re-draft of April 16: One can see why the Japanese delegation may have 
favoured this version. 
The High Contracting Parties, recognising that the physical, moral and intellectual well-
being of industrial wage earners is of supreme international importance, have framed a 
permanent machinery associated with that of the League of Nations to further this great 
end.  
They recognise that difference of climate and race of economic opportunity and 
industrial traditions make strict uniformity in the conditions of labour difficult of 
immediate attainment. But, holding as they do, that labour should not be regarded 
merely as an article of commerce, they think that there ae methods and principles for 
regulating labour conditions which all industrial communities should endeavour ro 
apply so far as their special circumstances will permit.  
Among these methods ad principles, the following seems to the High Contracting 
Parties to be of special importance: -  
 The right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed, as well as by 
the employers:  
 The payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable 
standard of life, as this is understood in their time and country:  
 The adoption, as the standard to be aimed at, of a forty-eight hours week with 
one day holiday: 
  The abolition of child labour, and the imposition of such limitations on the 
labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education, and secure 
their physical development:  
 The adoption in each country of such regulations as will prevent the evils 
consequent on different rates of remuneration being habitually given in the same district 
for the same work, to different categories of the employed; whether those categories 
consist respectively of men and women or of foreigners or native-born. 
Without claiming that these methods and principles are either complete or final, the 
High Contracting Parties are of the opinion that they are well fitted to guide the policy 
of the League of Nations; and that, if adopted by the industrial communities who are 
members of the League, and safeguarded in practise by an adequate staff of (male and 





Appendix 5:  Article 312 of the Treaty of Versailles 
SECTION VIII.  SOCIAL AND STATE INSURANCE IN CEDED TERRITORY 
(ARTICLE 312) 
Without prejudice to the provisions contained in other Articles of the present Treaty, the 
German Government undertakes to transfer to any Power to which German territory in 
Europe is ceded, and to any Power administering former German territory as a 
mandatory under Article 22 of Part I (League of Nations), such portion of the reserves 
accumulated by the Government of the German Empire or of German States, or by 
public or private organisations under their control, as is attributable to the carrying on of 
Social or State Insurance in such territory. 
The Powers to which these funds are transferred must apply them to the performance of 
the obligations arising from such insurances 
The conditions of the transfer will be determined by special conventions to be 
concluded between the German Government and the Governments concerned. 
In case these special conventions are not concluded in accordance with the above 
paragraph within three months after the coming into force of the present Treaty, the 
conditions of transfer shall in each case be referred to a Commission of five members 
one of whom shall be appointed by the German Government, one by the other interested 
Government and three by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office from 
the nationals of other States. This Commission shall by majority vote, within three 
months after appointment adopt recommendations for submission to the Council of the 
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Appendix 6: The evolution of Article XXXV of the Labour Convention   
A. Article XXXIV (as it was known during the second reading) as drafted: - 
The British Dominions and India shall have the same rights and obligations under this 
Convention as if they were separate High Contracting Parties.  
 The same shall apply to any colony or possession of any of the High Contracting 
Parties which on the application of such High Contracting Party is recognised as fully 
self-governing by the Executive Council of the League of Nations. 
 The High Contracting Parties engage to apply conventions which they have 
ratified in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention to their colonies, 
protectorates and possessions, which are not fully self-governing: 
 1. Except when owing to the local conditions the convention is inapplicable, or 
 2. Subject to such modifications as may be necessary to adapt the convention to 
local conditions. 
 And each of the High Contracting Parties shall notify to the International Labour 
Office the action taken in respect of each of its colonies, protectorates and possessions 




 - The text ‘as if they were’ was problematic for the self-governing Dominions.
18
  
B. After the BED meeting of April 9, Article XXXV’s first paragraph was to be deleted, 
and the second amended to read:  
 
‘Any colony or possession of any of the High Contracting Parties which in the 
application of such High Contracting Party is recognised as fully self-governing by the 
Executive Council of the League of Nations shall have the same rights and obligations 
under this Convention as if it were a separate High Contracting Party.’
19
 
C. As discussed, the Labour Report circulated during the April 11 plenary had not made 
the correction. Borden’s amendment followed:  
‘The Conference authorises the Drafting Committee to make such amendments as may 
be necessary to have the Convention conform to the Covenant of the League of Nations 
in the character of its membership and in the method of adherence.’
20
   
D. Second paragraph of Article I of the Covenant of the League of Nations:  
‘Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the Annex may 
become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the 
Assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to 
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 TNA FO 608/238/367, Report of the Commission on International Labour Legislation (p. 29), 24.3.19 
18
 Origins, vol 1, pp.171-2 
19
 TNA FO 608/238/437 (appendix) 9.4.19;   
20




observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be 
prescribed by the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments.’   
E. Article 421 of the Labour Chapter (XXIII) Peace Treaty: 
‘The Members engage to apply conventions which they have ratified in accordance with 
the provisions of this Part of the present Treaty to their colonies, protectorates and 
possessions which are not fully self-governing: 
1. Except where owing to the local conditions the convention is inapplicable, or 
2. Subject to such modifications as may be necessary to adapt the convention to 
local conditions. 
And each of the Members shall notify to the International Labour Office the action 
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Appendix 7: biographical notes 
 
Willie Adamson (1863-1936) 
Labour politician (non-socialist) and trade unionist, Fife and Kinross Miners' 
Association General Secretary from 1908; in December 1910 he become the first 
Scottish miners' Labour MP; chair of the PLP 1917-21, was replaced by Clynes.  
 
W. A. (William) Appleton (1859-1940) 
General secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Operative Lace Makers 1896, served 
Nottingham City Council and its Trades Council through 1907; founded the International 
Lacemakers' Federation in 1900, with corresponding unions in Scotland and France; 
General Federation of Trade Unions management committee from 1903; was made a 
Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1917, and founded the IFTU in 1919. 
 
Edvard Beneš (1884-1948) 
Statesman, Foreign Minister, considered founder of modern Czechoslovakia, formed its 
provisional Government in 1918, served as League of Nations chairman six times, 
negotiated the 1921 treaties with Romania and Yugoslavia (1921) that formed the Little 
Entente, capitulated to Hitler in 1938 to lose the Sudetenland; returned to establish a 
government again in 1945.  
 
William Henry (Baron) Beveridge (1879-1963) 
Social reformer and economist, civil servant served on the Board of Trade, Ministry of 
Munitions, and Ministry of Food; Director of the  London School of Economics  c. 1936; 
advocate for full employment. His 1942 report Social Insurance and Allied Services is 
viewed as the cornerstone of the 1945 Labour Party’s winning progressive policy. 
 
Tony Blair (1953- ) 
Leader of the Labour Party and Prime Minister, 1997-2007, responsible for the 
rebranding of the Party as ‘New’, champion of Giddens’ ‘Third Way’; led Britain into 
the Iraq War in 2001. 
 
Andrew Bonar Law  (1858-1923) 
Conservative Party leader and PM, 1922; was Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of 
Trade, 1902; opponent of Irish Home Rule, the tariff-reform advocate was Chancellor of 
the Exchequer in Lloyd George's Coalition Government c. 1916; oversaw negotiation 
with the United States over Britain's war loans as PM through his 1923 resignation 
owing to cancer. He only served 211 days as PM and has been referred to as ‘The 
Unknown Prime Minister.’ 
 
Margaret Brace Bondfield (1873-1953) 
Parliamentary Committee of the TUC for Women Workers, and TUC representative to 
the American Federation of Labour, 1918 – 1919; MP for Northampton, 1923–1924; 
Wallsend, 1926–1931,  Minister of Labour, 1929–1931. 
 
Charles William ('C W') Bowerman  (1851-1947) 
Trade unionist (printing) and Labour politician, joined the London Society of 




founding member of the 1900 LRC; London county council alderman (from 1901 to 
1907) privy councillor and TUC organiser c. 1916, long-standing MP for Deptford 1906-
1931; Co-operative Printing Society chairman for a number of years. 
 
Cecile Brunschvicg  (1877-1946) 
Co-founder of the French Union for Women's Suffrage (Union française pour le 
suffrage des femmes) secretary-general, the USFS was founded in Paris, 1908 
 
John Burns (1858-1943) 
Prominent SDF propagandist and leader of London’s unemployed; West London ASE 
member from 1879; Socialist candidate for West Nottingham, 1885; a significant figure 
in the 1889 London Dockers’ strike, Burns was elected to London County Council the 
same year, MP for Battersea from 1892 (Battersea Liberal Association) and Lib-Lab 
Cabinet Minister from 1906    
 
Thomas Burt (1837-1922) 
Labour MP for Morpeth 1834-1918; Secretary, Northumberland Miners' Association, 
father of the HoC 1910-18; a Lib-Lab who ran on a radical Labour ticket but never 
joined Labour; among the first workers to enter Parliament under Gladstone 
 
Antonio Sánchez de Bustamante (y Sirven) (1865-1951) 
Cuban Labour Commission member, renowned Cuban lawyer, progressive politician, 
professor of Public and Private International Law, Senator to the Cuban Congress, 
politician,  two-time Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague 
(1922–1944). 
 
Sir Harold Beresford  Butler (1883-1951) 
MoL civil servant who introduced more stringent bureaucratic controls; encouraged the 
spread of Whitley councils and trade boards; assistant secretary to the British labour 
section in Paris, member of the WC Organising Committee; ILO deputy director c. 1920, 
succeeding Thomas as Director in 1932. Butler convinced America to join the ILO in 
1934. He initiated regional labour conferences with a focus on local economic 
conditions; resigned in 1938 to become first warden of Nuffield College, Oxford. Head 
of the British information service in Washington, DC, c. 1942   
 
(Leonard) James 'Jim' Callaghan, Baron Callaghan of Cardiff  (1912-2005) 
Labour Prime Minister ( 1976-9) Chancellor of the exchequer, 1964–7; Home secretary, 
1967–70, Opposition Leader 70-74, Foreign secretary, 1974–76; did not step down from 
the Party leadership after losing the General Election in 1979, hanging on until 1980 
when he was replaced by Michael Foot.  
 
Barbara Ann Castle, Baroness Castle of Blackburn (1910-2002) 
MP for Blackburn 1945, PPS to Sir Stafford Cripps at the Board of Trade, 1945-7; PPS 
to Harold Wilson 1947-51; the dedicated Bevanite held several ministerial posts in the 
Wilson Government, 1964–70 including Transport, first Minister for Overseas 
Development, fourth woman in British history to hold a Cabinet position (Margaret 
Bondfield being the first in 1929) Health & Social Services Secretary, 1974-6.  Her 1969 




said to be partly responsible for Labour's 1970 GE defeat. 
 
Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 1st Viscount Cecil of  
Chelwood, CH, PC, QC (1864-1958), known as Lord Robert Cecil from 1868 to 1923 
British Foreign Office legal adviser c. 1918, served on the Phillimore committee which 
drafted the early draft of the covenant of the League of Nations; integral towards the 
drafting of the Peace Treaty, the Permanent Court of International Justice was a Hurst 
proposal.    
 
(Joseph) Austen Chamberlain (1863-1937) 
Son of Joseph and half-brother of Neville, became Secretary of State for India under 
Asquith but lingered, 1915-7, Minister without Portfolio, 1918; Chancellor of the 
Exchequer c. 1919; Leader of the Conservatives in the Commons in 1921–22, resigned 
when the Carlton Club rebellion ended the Coalition. 
 
Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929) 
French Prime Minister, 1906-9 and 1917-20; former leader of the Radical Party who was 
integral to the French Third Republic, one of the principal architects of the Treaty of 
Versailles, established the highly criticised reparations committee responsible for 
German territorial and financial reparations. 
 
John Robert Clynes (1869-1949) 
ILP and LRC co-founder, the (first English) Labour MP, first for Manchester Northeast, 
1906; then Manchester Platting, 1918; Lancashire Gasworkers' Union and Labour Party 
leader during its parliamentary breakthrough at the 1922 general election; Parliamentary 
Secretary of the Ministry of Food Control, 1917; Minister of Food Control, 1918; Home 
Secretary during MacDonald’s 1929-31 Government. 
 
George Nathaniel Curzon,  Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1859-1925) 
Conservative-Unionist member of the Cabinet, Viceroy of India, 1899-1905, Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, 1919-24; he of the ‘Curzon Line’ which became the Poland- 
Soviet Union border;  stayed in London while Balfour went to Paris with Lloyd George. 
 
Sir Malcolm Delevingne (1868-1950) 
Civil servant, never left the Home Office, British government delegate to Bern (1906 
and 1913)  largely responsible for the bans on white phosphorus in match-making, and 
on night work for women. Participated in   Washington (1919) and Geneva (1923, 1928, 
and 1929) Labour Conferences; did a great deal to improve health and safety in the 
British factory system; remained active after retirement in industrial welfare, serving on 
the royal commission on safety in coal mines, 1936 and  chaired the Safety in Mines 
Research Board, 1939-7, et al.   
 
Constance Drexel (1894-1956) 
Reported from the front as a Red Cross nurse c. 1915, She returned to report on the Paris 
Peace Conference and the International Conference of Women and International Woman 
Suffrage Alliance; one of Capitol Hill’s few women political correspondents; was later 





Edo (Eduard Carl) Fimmen (1881-1942) 
Dutch multi-linguist trade unionist and editor who became involved in the Christian 
Anarchist magazine Vrede (Peace) c. 1901; moved away from anarchism to joined the 
National Union of Commercial and Office Employees, 1903; a founder and treasurer of 
the General Confederation of Netherlands Trade and Office Employees, becoming 
Secretary, 1907-16 from 1907 – 1916; General Secretary of the International Transport 
Workers' Federation, 1919-42. 
 
Arthur Fontaine (1860-1931) 
French engineer, Assistant Secretary to the Labour Commission; entered the French 
Ministry for Labour in 1891, and was Director, 1899-1920; co-founder of the 
International Association for Labor Legislation in 1900; Berne Conference delegate 
1906 and 1913; after the Peace he was appointed the first President of the ILO 
Governing Body, a role he held until death. 
 
Andrew Furuseth (1854-1938) 
Norwegian-born Furusth organised the Sailor's Union of the Pacific, 1880; leader of The 
International Seamen's Union (ISU) 1908-38; noteworthy for bringing about the 
Seamen's Act of 1915, the ‘Magna Carta of the American Seamen’. Led the ISU strike to 
victory in 1919, resulting in record high peace-time wages but after the WW1 shipping 
boom ended, 1921’s failed two-month strike saw seamen’s wages cut by 25%. 
 
Hugh Gaitskell (1906-1963) 
Leader of the Labour Party, 1955-63, economics lecturer and wartime civil servant; 
Minister of Fuel and Power, 1946-7 then Chancellor of the Exchequer. Led the Labour 
Party to defeat in 1959 after trying to revoke Clause IV of the Party Constitution.  The 
polarising, centrist Gaitskell died suddenly in 1963 when it seemed he might have been 
able to lead Labour back into power. (Gaitskell’s grave in Hampstead, north London, is 
very near to this author’s former home)   
 
Henry George (1839-1897) 
American political economist, journalist, author and progressive very popular with 
British and Irish socialists during the 19th century; his theory of ‘Georgism’ espoused 
that the economic value of land belonged to the entire community; his ‘land value tax’ 
proposed to eliminate social problems. 
 
David Lloyd George, 1st Earl Lloyd-George of Dwyfor, OM, PC (1863-1945) 
Liberal PM 1916-22, as Chancellor of the Exchequer 1908-15 his reforms ushered in the 
modern welfare state; major force within the ‘big four’ during the 1919 Peace 
Conference which redrew Europe’s borders; after  series of domestic and foreign 
relations crises, the 1922 Carlton Club rebellion led the Conservatives to leave the 
coalition and force his resignation; returned to lead the Liberal Party later that decade but 
he never returned to the stature he held in 1919 and he became increasingly irrelevant. 
by the mid-1930s. 
 
William Gillies (1884-1958) 
Scottish Fabian / socialist; joined Labour’s research division in 1912 (a role that made 




liaison; was instrumental in re-convening the Second International which collapsed 
during the war; imperial advisory committee member ; head of Labour’s international 
dept. from 1922, serving the Party and the TUC through 1925; was a regular British 
delegate to the  Labour and Socialist International moved to Switzerland in 1925, he was 
a regular (and sometimes sole) British delegate to attend its conferences. 
 
Samuel Gompers (1850-1924) 
American Federation of Labor (AFL) originator; see thesis introduction. 
 
(Viscount) Edward Grey of Fallodon (1862-1933) 
Liberal statesman and adherent of ‘New Liberalism’; foreign secretary, 1906-16; US 
Ambassador, 1919-20; Leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Lords, 1923-4. 
 
Sir Arthur Sackville Trevor (A.S.T.) Griffith-Boscawen (1865-1946) 
Conservative; Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Pensions (with Barnes) 1916; 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of the Board of Agriculture, 1918-21; Privy Council, 
1920; Minister of Agriculture, 1921; when  Lloyd George's government fell in 1922 he 
was one of the few Cabinet members to remain; then became Minister of Health under 
Bonar Law. Ran unsuccessfully in a number of Parliamentary elections during his career.      
 
(Sir) Maurice Pascal Alers Hankey (1877-1963) 
A most effective aide to Lloyd George during the war as first Cabinet Secretary; a post 
he held for nineteen years. Became Clerk of the Privy Council, 1923; was British 
Secretary to numerous international conferences and Secretary-General to many Imperial 
Conferences; instituted instrumental changes to how the civil service operated by 
introducing the cabinet secretariat and re-determining the way cabinet minutes, 
conclusions and memoranda were circulated, credited with making the civil service a 
more efficient organisation. Provided counsel on domestic and foreign affairs, as well as 
administrative support, to five premiers. Retired in 1938. 
 
(James) Keir Hardie (1856-1915) 
Scottish socialist, politician, and trade unionist; cofounder of the ILP and Labour Party, 
first Leader of the Labour Party and the first Labour MP, elected to West Ham, 1892. 
The temperance campaigner and lay preacher supported votes for women, self-rule for 
India and home-rule for Scotland et al., began organising a pacifist strike as the war 
began but soon passed away. 
 
Arthur  Henderson, PC (1863-1935) 
The first Labour cabinet minister, served in Lloyd George’s 1916-7 administration; 
Labour Party leader three times; President of the Iron Founders’ c. 1910; the Wesleyan 
Methodist started out as Lib-Lab and replaced Hardie as PLP chairman, 1908; Party 
treasurer from 1912 who played a role in MacDonald’s succession as its leader; 
chairman of the National Advisory Committee and munitions of war committee, 1915; 
central author of 1918’s Labour and the New Social Order; Foreign Secretary c. 1929; 







G M Hodgson (n/a) 
Unfortunately little information available about Barnes’ trusted Parliamentary Private 
Secretary. 
 
Edward Mandell ‘Colonel’ House  (1858-1938) 
American peace delegation. A powerful American diplomat, politician, and advisor to 
President Woodrow Wilson on European affairs. The President’s most trusted adviser 
was called ‘Colonel’ as a show of respect but had no military experience; in March 1919 
he and Wilson  parted ways after the President felt he had been ‘deceived’ by bad 
information House and others supplied during the Peace Conference. 
 
Sir Cecil James Barrington Hurst (1870-1963) 
British lawyer, advisor to the League of Nations Council during the peace conference; 
June 1902 began in the Foreign Office 1902, and became it Principal Legal Adviser, 
1918. Hurst was a delegate at the 1907 Hague Convention; became a member of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, 1929, remaining a member through its 
dissolution, 1945. 
 
Henry 'Max' Mayers Hyndman (1842-1941) 
Well-educated, financially comfortable British socialist leader and author; his The Text-
Book of Democracy: England for All (1881) summarised Das Kapital but neglected 
mentioning Marx, leading to a permanent rift between the two. 
 
Leon Jouhaux (1879-1954) 
French Trade Unionist and IFTU member; joined the CGT In 1906, become secretary-
general, 1909-47; organised  mass protests against start of  WWII but was eventually 
imprisoned at Buchenwald; left the CGT after the war to form the social-democrat 
Workers' Force (CGT-FO); Nobel Prize recipient, 1951; substitute for Colliard and 
Fontaine on the Commission. 
 
George Lansbury (1859-1940) 
Editor, Daily Herald c. 1919; not an MP since 1912 (ex-Bow and Bromley) held 
virtually every local public office since 1893; went to prison in 1921 over the Poplar 
‘rates revolt’; published Lansbury's Labour Weekly, 1925-7; the staunchly anti-
imperialist, left wing Christian Socialist Lansbury lead the Labour Party, 1931-5; Taylor 
called him ‘the most lovable figure in modern politics’ (A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 
1914–1945, 1965,p.14)  
 
Robert Lansing (1864-1928) 
US Secretary of State, 1915-20; the influential Lansing is credited with vastly 
overhauling US Foreign Policy; established the Diplomatic Security Service to observe 
Central Power activities in America; was a lead negotiator during the Peace Talks; 
resigned in 1920 over disagreements with the ailing Wilson regarding the League of 
Nations   
 
Maxim Litvinov (1876-1951) 
Soviet  plenipotentiary representative in Great Britain;  appointed John Maclean 




public gatherings opposing intervention in the Russian Civil War; became USSR’s 
American Ambassador, 1941. 
 
Margaret Caroline Llewelyn-Davies (1861-1944) 
British social worker, Hon. Secretary of the Women's Co-operative Guild (would not 
accept a salary); c. 1915 supported the International Women's Congress to the Hague; 
General Council of the UDC.   
 
Louis Loucher (1872-1931) 
French industrialist and politician in the Third Republic, went from conservative 
Republican Federation to Democratic Republican Alliance and of the Independent 
Radicals; became Minister of Armaments, 1917-18, replacing Albert Thomas; Minister 
of Industrial Re-construction, 1918-20; Clemenceau’s principal economic advisor at the 
Peace Conference.  
 
Mary Reid Macarthur  (1880-1921) 
British suffragist and strike organiser; first woman on the Scottish district council, 
executive on the Anti-sweating League, founded the National Federation of Women 
Workers (NFWW) editor of Woman Worker, and ILP National Council member et al., 
ran unsuccessfully for Parliament in 1918 and died only aged 40. 
 
(James) Ramsay MacDonald (1866-1937) 
First Labour Prime Minister, served twice 1924 (as PM and Foreign Secretary) and 
1929-35 (from 1931 as head of a coalition Government); ILP chairman, 1906-9; middle-
class Scot credited with developing the Party ideology and published many works on 
socialism and parliamentary democracy; left the Leadership 1914-22 in protest of the 
war and helped form the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), arguing for a negotiated 
peace; played a leading role during the Geneva conferences of the early 1930s; his first 
brief administration was brought down during 1924’s ‘red scare’ and his second (after 
the economic depression prompted a massive Treasury loan) in failing health after being 
coerced to form a coalition government by King George V among others. 
 
John Maclean  (1879-1923) 
Scottish revolutionary socialist and schoolteacher of the Red Clydeside; arrested under 
the Defence of the Realm Act in 1915 for organising anti-war protests; prominent in the 
Clyde rent strike, 1915; arrested in 1916 during an anti-militant sweep along with Jimmy 
Maxton and other Clydesiders; arrested for sedition in 1918; although  appointed 
Bolshevik representative in Scotland, he disagreed with the Communist Party of Great 
Britain despite their absorption of the British Socialist Party; hunger-strikes and forced-
feeding in prison permanently affected his health, he collapsed during a speech and died 
of pneumonia aged only forty-four. 
 
Thomas James Macnamara (1861-1931) 
Educator and Liberal MP for Camberwell North, 1900-18; then Camberwell North West 
until 1924;  served under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, then Parliamentary and 
Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, 1908-20; sworn of the Privy Council in 1911; a 
close Lloyd George associate, he was given a cabinet position and appointed him 






Ernest Aimé Joseph Mahaim (1865-1938)  
Professor at the University of Liège, taught law at the University of Paris from 1912, 
became Belgium’s Minister of Industry, Labor and Food in 1921; ILO President, 1931. 
 
Thomas Mann (1856-1941) 
ASE member c. 1881, left his career as a turner to become full-time SDF propagandist, 
1887, Lancashire/Tyne locals. Also prominent during 1889 strike, became Dockers’ 
Union President as a result.   
 
William ‘Bill’ Ferguson Massey (1856-1925) 
Conservative Prime minister of New Zealand, 1912-35;  the most ‘Imperial’ of the 
Dominion leaders who denounced socialism and nationalisation of land; championed 
NZ’s autonomy and had little faith in the League of Nations; founded the conservative 
Reform Party in 1909;  New Zealand's second-longest serving PM.  
 
James ‘Jimmy’ Maxton  (1885-1946) 
Scottish far-left politician, propagandist, orator, conscientious objector and prominent 
ILP leader from Red Clydeside; influenced into socialism through John MacLean and 
Philip Snowden; involved in strikes in the shipyards as part of the Clyde Workers' 
Committee; charged with sedition in 1916 and imprisoned for a year; elected to the 
National Council of the Labour Party, 1918; he was responsible (with MacDonald) for 
the motion to leave the Coalition to run independently in 1918; President of The Scottish 
Home Rule Association; MP for Glasgow Bridgeton, 1922 but his   parliamentary 
privileges were temporarily revoked for his outbursts; chairman of the ILP, 1926-31; and 
1934-9; published biography of V. I. Lenin in 1932, the same year he successfully 
moved to disaffiliate the ILP from the Labour Party, seen by some as a necessary step 
back from MacDonald’s ‘gradualism’ and a tragic mistake by others. 
 
J S  (‘Jim’) Middleton (1878-1962) 
Assistant then General Secretary of the Labour Party, 1902-31; 1935-44. Journalist and 
political organiser; began political life as a member of the Young People's Society of 
Christian Endeavour and ILP; held prominent roles with the Workington Trades Council 
and the local Labour Representation Committee; first Assistant Secretary of the Labour 
Party, 1902; a close associate of  Ramsay MacDonald; opposed the war and founded the 
Emergency Workers' National Committee. Left the Labour Party in 1931 when 
MacDonald formed the National Labour Organisation and the coalition government; 
succeeded Arthur Henderson as General Secretary of the party from 1935.  
 
William Morris (1834-1896) 
Textile designer, poet, novelist, translator, and visionary socialist/activist; came under 
police surveillance as a prominent public figure during a phase of great political protest 
c.1886-7; travelled extensively, preaching to the working men's clubs; his literary works 
were integral to the early British socialist movement in Britain and the utopian News 
from Nowhere (1893) was cited by many in the early Labour Party as an inspiration.  
 




Robert Cecil’s secretary, served the LON secretariat through 1922, secretary to the 
British delegation to the League of Nations 1923-4; professor of international relations, 
University of London, 1924-9; Labour MP for Coventry, 1929, became Arthur 
Henderson’s PPS when he was foreign secretary in the second Labour government; 
served under Ernest Bevin at the Foreign Office c. 1945.  
 
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (1860-1952) 
Liberal Italian PM, 1903-1919, one of the ‘big four’ at Versailles, resigned in June after 
failing to secure Italian interests at the Peace Conference; his inability to Fiume in the 
peace settlement has been attributed to the ‘mutilated victory’ inspiring in part the rise of 
Benito Mussolini.   
 
William George Arthur Ormsby-Gore, fourth Baron Harlech (1885-1964) 
Unionist MP for Stafford and held the title of Assistant Secretary 1917-1918; member of 
the British delegation to the Paris peace conference in 1919, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State 1922 – 1924, et al., not a supporter of the DLG coalition during the 
1922 election.   
 
Robert Owen (1771-1858) 
Philanthropic social reformer and Welsh textile manufacturer, a founder of utopian 
socialism and the cooperative movement; In the early 1800s, the wealthy Owen 
established a system for philanthropic management to improve living and working 
conditions at his New Lanark mills; In 1824 he invested the bulk of his fortune in 
experimental socialistic communities in America; establishing communal settlements in  
Indiana, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, all ending by 1827. In 1828 he 
became an advocate for the working classes in London; Owen promoted the growth of 
the trade union movement, the passage of child labour laws and the introduction of free, 
co-educational schools 
 
Edward J. Phelan  (1888-1967) 
British civil servant of Irish descent, secretary in Paris to the British delegation’s labour 
section and Assistant Secretary to the whole International Labour Commission; member 
of the Washington Conference Organising Committee, 1919; head of the ILO’s 
Diplomatic Division c. 1920; under-secretary to Harold Butler, ILO Director, from 1932; 
fourth Director of the ILO 1941-1948, in 1944 had responsibility toward the Declaration 
of Philadelphia, splitting and expanding the ILO’s remit into a human rights and social 
policy direction, and  an international economic planning direction. 
 
Carol Reigelman (Lubin) (1909-2005) 
Lubin wrote her Smith College thesis on the ILO; she continued her studies at Columbia 
University, 1930-3, earning an MA in international relations and was employed as 
researcher, editorial assistant, and secretary to James T Shotwell; in preparation for The 
Origins of the International Labour Organization she travelled extensively in Europe, 
collecting letters, reports, and other documents; Lubin wrote Chapter III of Volume I and 
provided Volume II’s notes; was hired by the ILO, 1935,  appointed to assist the ILO’s 
first American assistant, then General, director, John G. Winant; Lubin also completed a 
PhD in public law and administration at Columbia, 1950; worked temporarily at the 




ILO Migration Program, and was an ILO delegate to the UN, 1951-2. 
 
Henry M. Robinson (n/a) 
California Banker, Shipping Board member; replaced  
A N Hurley on the labour commission after the first sitting (little information available) 
 
David James Shackleton  (1863-1938) 
Third Labour Member of Parliament, General Secretary of the Textile Factory Workers 
Association and chairman of the Trades Union Congress, 1906-09; Vice-chairman of the 
Labour Party, 1906-8; MP for Clitheroe, 1902-10; left Parliament to became a senior 
civil servant at Churchill’s invitation; Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Labour, 
1917; viewed as the first working-class man to take such a senior position. Knighted in 
1917, he was chief labour adviser to the reorganized Ministry of Labour, 1920-25, even 
being called upon for advice after his 1925 retirement. 
 
Robert Shirkie (1869- ?) 
TUC PLP, 1919; Secretary of National Federation of Colliery Enginemen and 
Boilermen; received an OBE in 1935. 
 
James T. Shotwell (1874-1965) 
Canadian-born member of the American delegation to the Peace Conference, served on 
‘The Inquiry’, President Wilson’s historical materials study group; historian and director 
of division of Economics and History at Columbia University, NYC; Director of 
research, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace c. 1917; vocal advocate for 
children’s labour protections. Published many works on peace and international 
relations; was influential towards the inclusion of a human rights declaration in the UN 
Charter. 
 
Sir Ganga Singh, Maharaja of Bikaner (1880-1943)  
Member of the Imperial War Conference, 1917, and signatory to the treaty of Versailles; 
often viewed as a modern reformist visionary; the only non-white member of the British 
Imperial War Cabinet; was ruling Maharaja of the princely Indian state of Bikaner (now 
Rajasthan) from 1888 to 1943; appointed honorary major-general in 1917, lieutenant-
general, 1930, and general, 1937; Singh was the first Indian to be given the rank of 
general in the British army; an honorary aide-de-camp to many successive British kings.   
 
Lord Satyendra Prasanno Sinha (1863-1928) 
Prominent lawyer and statesman in British India; Indian National Congress, 1896-19; 
went to England in 1914 as a member of the War Conference, representing India at the 
Allied Peace Conference; knighted in 1915; first Indian to be appointed as Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for India, 1919, and became the first Indian member of the 
House of Lords the same year. He navigated the bill through the House of Lords which 
became the Government of India Act (1919) which transferred legislative power from 
the Viceroy of India to an Indian Legislature; also a member of the Imperial Privy 
Council; retired in 1921 owing to ill health. 
 
Robert Smillie (1857-1940) 




Labour Party, 1888, and of the ILP in 1893. A close associate of Keir Hardie who 
declined to stand for Parliament, opting to remain with his work for the miners;  VP of 
the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB), 1909-12; helped to establish the ‘triple 
alliance’ of miners, railway workers, and transport workers before WWI, become its 
chairman in 1915 after its constitution was approved. The anti-war Smillie was the 
president of the National Council Against Conscription, 1915, and presided over the 
1917 Leeds Convention of June 1917; served on the War Emergency Workers' National 
Committee, acting chair from 1915-8;  Smillie declined the post of food controller in 
1916. Achieved peak notoriety during the post-war miners’ struggle and nationalization 
of the mines; resigned MFGB leadership, 1921; became president of the Scottish Miners' 
Federation, 1922-8, and became Labour MP for Morpeth, 1923-9, despite ill health. Also 
declined a post with the 1924 Labour Government    
 
Jan Christiaan Smuts (1870-1950) 
Prime minister of South Africa, 1919 -24  and 1939-48; he went from being a 
segregationist to an apartheid oppositionist; Imperial War Cabinet, 1917 -19 and 
instrumental in the formation of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Smuts was the only the only 




 Viscount Philip Snowden, PC (1864-1937) 
British socialist politician, journalist and agitator,  joined the Bradford ILP branch upon 
its formation, and held that the ILP's form of socialism was rooted in a British radical 
tradition and in the moral teachings of Christ, yet he maintained many of his Liberal 
values. He was a fiery orator on capitalism’s evils, and helped form the nascent Labour 
Party’s financial policy, writing many pamphlets including on for a ‘socialist budget’ to 
rival that of the Liberal Party in 1909; was pro-women’s suffrage and one of Labour's 
most prominent supporters of the non-militant movement; became MP for Colne Valley, 
1922, and Labour’s first chancellor of the exchequer, 1924, and again 1929-31. Snowden 
was expelled from the Party in 1931, and the unfortunate part he played in the fiscal 
disaster that befell the second Labour Government has cast a long shadow.  
 
Francis Herbert Stead (1857-1928) 
Congregationalist Minister, publisher and social reformer, champion for old-age 
pensions, instrumental towards bringing the plight of the impoverished and aged poor to 
the nation’s attention. 
 
Frances (Lloyd George) Stevenson,Countess Lloyd-George of Dwyfor  (1888-1972) 
David Lloyd George’s second wife, ‘devoted mistress and confidential secretary’; she 
became a Commander of the Order of the British Empire, 1918, accompanying the 
Prime Minister to the Peace Conference as his secretary; arranged and collated his vast 
archive of papers for his War Memoirs; the two did not wed until 1943 after his wife 
Margaret died; Lloyd George died just two years later. 
 
George (G.H.) Harold Stuart-Bunning  (1870-1951) 
British trade unionist, Federation of Postal Workers Secretary; involved in the formation 
of the Union of Post Office Workers and the  Civil Service federation;  Parliamentary 
Secretary of the TUC, 1919, also resigning that year; became British representative of 






Albert Thomas  (1878-1932) 
ILO’s first Director, 1920-32; a prominent, moderate socialist; assistant editor of 
L'Humanite, the French Sociality Party newspaper; elected to the leadership of the 
Chamber of Deputies, 1910; in May 1915 became the first Minister of Armament for the 
Third Republic, a role he used to reorganise munitions production, and distance the 
Ministry from its relationship with the military high command. Became a labour minister 
in 1916; special ambassador to Petrograd in 1917; resigned over the French 
government's refusal to issue passports for attendees to the Stockholm international 
socialist conference; attended the Paris Peace Conference but not the Washington 
Conference where the Governing Body nominated him for the ILO Directorship.    
 
James Henry (J.H., ‘Jimmy’) Thomas (1874-1949) 
National Union of Railwaymen, TUC Chairman 1919-20; IFTU President, 1920-4; a 
target of the Left much as Barnes was, Thomas was highly averse to direct action and his 
withdrawal of the NUR’s support for the Miners’ Federation in 1921 contributed to the 
‘black Friday’ fiasco that brought down the triple alliance. 
 
Benjamin Tillett  (1860-1943) 
British socialist and politician, co-founder of the ILP who later joined the SDF, Fabian 
and ‘new unionism’ trade union leader; alderman on the London County Council, 1892-
8; played a major role in founding the Dockers Union after the 1889 strike and as a strike 
leader in the 1911-12 dock strikes; instrumental in the creation of the National Transport 
Workers' Federation, 1910; he was its International and Political Secretary through 1931; 
held a seat on the TUC General Council through 1932; supported the war effort after 
initially considering a general strike in opposition; MP for Salford North, 1917-24 and 
1929-31 
 
Emile Vandervelde (1866-1938) 
Belgian socialist, politician and freemason. The middle-class Vandervelde was a leading 
figure in the Belgian Labour Party (POB–BWP) and in international socialism; Belgian 
Minister of State, 1914; was concerned the extension of universal suffrage and social 
democracy and wrote extensively; Minister of Justice, 1918-21, he supported prison 
reform, trade union rights and women's rights; Minister of Foreign Affairs 1925-7, 
contributing to the Locarno Pact, et al.  
 
(Martha) Beatrice Webb (nee Potter), Baroness Passfield  (1858-1943) 
English social reformer, diarist, author and labour historian who reportedly coined the 
term "collective bargaining"; was a founder of the London School of Economics and was 
also instrumental in forming the Fabian Society; wrote on co-operatism in the late 1800s; 
as member of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress 1905-09, 
her minority report outlined the welfare state which influenced the 1942 Beveridge 
Report; she and husband Sidney co-founded the New Statesman in 1913, and they 
became Labour Party members in late 1914; the two collaborated on many publications 








 Baron) Wedgwood (1872-1943) 
British Liberal and Labour politician, served under Ramsay MacDonald; a follower of 
Henry George, he became president of the League for the Taxation of Land Values, 
1908; Liberal MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme, 1906; became disillusioned with the 
Liberals c. 1910, and in 1913 attained prominence as a backbencher and vociferous  
opponent of the Government’s unjust policies; travelled extensively during the war; in 
the 1918 General Election his (Liberal) affiliation was unclear but he distanced himself 
from   the Coalition Government; he took the Labour whip in 1919 and joined the ILP, 
becoming joint Vice-Chairman of the PLP in 1921; was well-known for his criticism of 
German reparations and the government's partition of British territories into Palestine 
and Transjordan, and led a TUC-Labour Party commission to Hungary where they 
witnessed the brutal treatment of suspected communists; was also well-known for his 
support for refugees and the Indian independence movement. 
 
Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) 
28 President of the United States, 1913-21; The United States did not declare war on 
Germany until April 1917; he announced the Fourteen Points - American war aims – in 
January 1918; in Paris he sought to build an enduring peace, but the resultant League of 
Nations Covenant and the Versailles Treaty failed in the Senate; already ill, he undertook 
a national tour to rally public support for the treaty, but this exhausted him and a near-
fatal stroke ended his political activity.    
 




Appendix 8: thumbnails of Barnes portraits 
 
 
Sir James Guthrie (1859-1930), Statesmen 
of World War I (1924-30) 
National Portrait Gallery, London 
Barnes is standing in the rear, left, leaning 




John Christen Johansen  
(1876-1964),  
Signing of the Treaty of Versailles (1919)  
National Portrait Gallery, London 
Barnes is believed to be seated at the table, 
far left.  
 
 
William Orpen (1878-1931)  
The Right Honourable G. N. Barnes, PC 
(1919) 





William Orpen (1878-1931)  
The Signing of Peace in the Hall of 
Mirrors, Versailles, 28 June 1919 (1919) 
Imperial War Museum, London 





Appendix 9: the ‘forgotten’ portrait of George N. Barnes,  





The Rt Hon. G. N. Barnes, oil painting by Murray Urquhart (year unknown).   
 
Recognised during a walk-through of the ILO headquarters in Geneva,  
February 2016; the painting’s plaque was missing and staff were unsure  











Papers of George Nicoll Barnes, Special Collections, London School of Economics (LSE), 
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